关于「马格里布商人之争:格雷夫的联盟与爱德华兹—奥格尔维的法庭」,《商帮多边惩罚与买手信任网络》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第二章对读格雷夫与爱德华兹—奥格尔维,计算表明法庭与多边惩罚是补充关系:只有胜诉概率 0.4 的法庭时门槛为 0.8497,与只有黑名单时相差无几。
数据口径:书中代理人、订单与网络参数均为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化的经营分析,不构成经营、法律或理财建议。 第四章求临界群规模:链状熟人网络在示意参数下只有几十到一百多人,均匀混合网络要到 33742 人。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.4, 0.8497
| G/r | 5, fine f = 0.2; d* and r_min (at d = 0.90) |
| court c d* multi d* bilat r_min multi r_min bilat | |
| 0.0 | 0.8333 0.9804 0.556 1.536 |
| 0.2 | 0.7917 0.9314 0.422 1.167 |
| 0.4 | 0.7222 0.8497 0.289 0.799 |
| 0.6 | 0.5833 0.6863 0.156 0.430 |
| drop in d* when a court with c | 0.4 is added: |
| multilateral 0.1111, bilateral 0.1307 | |
| d* with c | 0.4 but no boycott at all (q = 0.15) vs |
| boycott with no court | 0.8497 vs 0.8333 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 2. p21: courts and coalitions, substitutes or complements.
# Model: a court wins back the stolen gain plus a fine f with probability
# c, so the expected gain shrinks to Gc = G (1 - c (1 + f)). Reputation
# then needs d >= Gc / ((1 - q)(Gc + r)). q = 0 is the multilateral
# boycott Greif describes, q = 0.15 a bilateral regime in which other
# merchants often have not heard. G/r = 5, f = 0.2 and d = 0.90 are
# illustrative; c falls with the distance to a usable court.
# 模型:法院以概率 c 追回赃款并罚款,与多边惩罚叠加时的守信门槛。
def gain_after_court(g, c, f):
return max(0.0, g * (1.0 - c * (1.0 + f)))
def d_star(g, r, q):
if g == 0.0:
return 0.0
return g / ((1.0 - q) * (g + r))
def r_min(g, d, q):
a = d * (1.0 - q)
return g * (1.0 - a) / a
if __name__ == "__main__":
g, r, f, d = 5.0, 1.0, 0.2, 0.90
print("G/r = 5, fine f = 0.2; d* and r_min (at d = 0.90)")
print(" court c d* multi d* bilat r_min multi r_min bilat")
rows = {}
for c in (0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6):
gc = gain_after_court(g, c, f)
dm, db = d_star(gc, r, 0.0), d_star(gc, r, 0.15)
rows[c] = (dm, db)
bil = "{:.4f}".format(db) if db < 1.0 else " none"
print(" {:.1f} {:.4f} {} {:6.3f} {:6.3f}"
.format(c, dm, bil, r_min(gc, d, 0.0),
r_min(gc, d, 0.15)))
print("drop in d* when a court with c = 0.4 is added:")
print(" multilateral {:.4f}, bilateral {:.4f}".format(
rows[0.0][0] - rows[0.4][0], rows[0.0][1] - rows[0.4][1]))
print("d* with c = 0.4 but no boycott at all (q = 0.15) vs")
print("boycott with no court: {:.4f} vs {:.4f}".format(
rows[0.4][1], rows[0.0][0]))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《商帮多边惩罚声誉机制、马格里布商人代理博弈与买手社群信任网络母典》第 2 章「马格里布商人之争:格雷夫的联盟与爱德华兹—奥格尔维的法庭」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-222 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026222,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}