关于「声誉的边界:终局、退出与换马甲」,《商帮多边惩罚与买手信任网络》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:声誉的抵押品是未来,所以凡是削弱未来的东西都会削弱声誉。代理人每期离开的概率达到 0.05,示意参数下租金现值就不够抵消一次侵吞;已知终局时,离开前 13 期以内的大额托付都需要托管款补位;换马甲免费时,所有诚实的新人都要为骗子的伪装能力交 8 期考察期的学费。补救的共同原则是:在未来不够值钱的地方,让代理人现在就有东西可以失去。到这里,模型部分已经完整。古人对这些问题是怎么想的?下一章回到两部原典,一部来自明代徽州,一部来自开罗的那间储藏室。

数据口径:书中代理人、订单与网络参数均为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化的经营分析,不构成经营、法律或理财建议。 第四章求临界群规模:链状熟人网络在示意参数下只有几十到一百多人,均匀混合网络要到 33742 人。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.05, 13

A. unknown exit date, exit chance x per period
x a rent at stake escrow needed for G5
0.000.8550 5.897 0.000
0.020.8379 5.169 0.000
0.050.8122 4.326 0.674
0.100.7695 3.338 1.662
0.200.6840 2.165 2.835
B. known exit date, x0, k periods left
k rent at stake escrow needed for G5
00.000 5.000
10.855 4.145
21.586 3.414
32.211 2.789
53.202 1.798
104.666 0.334
205.640 0.000
C. without escrow honesty needs at least k13 periods left
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 6. p61: exits, last voyages and escrowed pay.
# Model: with a = d (1 - x)(1 - q), where x is the chance per period
# that the agent leaves the trade for good, the rent he forfeits by a
# theft is worth r a (1 - a^k) / (1 - a) when k periods of relation are
# left (k infinite gives r a / (1 - a)). Honesty needs G <= that value
# plus any escrow B he would forfeit. d = 0.90, q = 0.05, r = 1 and the
# theft gain G = 5 are illustrative.
# 模型:代理人退出概率与已知终局对守信的侵蚀,以及托管薪酬的补救。

D, Q, R, G = 0.90, 0.05, 1.0, 5.0


def a_of(x):
    return D * (1.0 - x) * (1.0 - Q)


def rent_value(x, k=None):
    a = a_of(x)
    if k is None:
        return R * a / (1.0 - a)
    return R * a * (1.0 - a ** k) / (1.0 - a)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("A. unknown exit date, exit chance x per period")
    print("   x      a       rent at stake   escrow needed for G = 5")
    for x in (0.0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20):
        v = rent_value(x)
        print("  {:.2f}   {:.4f}  {:7.3f}         {:6.3f}".format(
            x, a_of(x), v, max(0.0, G - v)))
    print("B. known exit date, x = 0, k periods left")
    print("   k     rent at stake   escrow needed for G = 5")
    for k in (0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20):
        v = rent_value(0.0, k)
        print("  {:<3d}    {:7.3f}         {:6.3f}".format(
            k, v, max(0.0, G - v)))
    k = 0
    while rent_value(0.0, k) < G:
        k += 1
    print("C. without escrow honesty needs at least k = {} periods left"
          .format(k))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《商帮多边惩罚声誉机制、马格里布商人代理博弈与买手社群信任网络母典》第 6 章「声誉的边界:终局、退出与换马甲」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-222 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026222,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论