关于「一次性侵吞与未来租金:多边惩罚的折现因子门槛」,《商帮多边惩罚与买手信任网络》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第一章推导多边惩罚下的折现因子门槛 G/(G+r),侵吞所得为五期租金时为 0.8333;骗子每期只要有 0.15 的机会被别人再雇用,门槛就升到 0.9804。

数据口径:书中代理人、订单与网络参数均为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化的经营分析,不构成经营、法律或理财建议。 第四章求临界群规模:链状熟人网络在示意参数下只有几十到一百多人,均匀混合网络要到 33742 人。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.15, 0.8333, 0.9804

d*(q) = G / ((1 - q)(G + r)); 'none' means no d < 1 works
G/r q0.00 q=0.05 q=0.10 q=0.15 q=0.25 q=0.50
10.5000 0.5263 0.5556 0.5882 0.6667 none
30.7500 0.7895 0.8333 0.8824 none none
50.8333 0.8772 0.9259 0.9804 none none
90.9000 0.9474 none none none none
largest rehire probability that any d < 1 survives:
G/r1: q < 0.5000
G/r3: q < 0.2500
G/r5: q < 0.1667
G/r9: q < 0.1000

核心公式

\[d \ge d^* = \frac{G}{G + r}.\]
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 1. p12: bilateral versus multilateral punishment.
# Model: after a theft the cheated merchant never hires the agent again,
# but each later period another merchant, who has not heard, rehires
# him with probability q (q = 0 is the full multilateral boycott). With
# the value recursion of the text, honesty needs
#     d >= d*(q) = G / ((1 - q) * (G + r)),
# and no discount factor below one works once q >= r / (G + r).
# G is the one-shot gain, r the per-period rent. Values illustrative.
# 模型:双边惩罚下被骗者之外的商人以概率 q 再雇用骗子。


def d_star(g, r, q):
    return g / ((1.0 - q) * (g + r))


def q_limit(g, r):
    return r / (g + r)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    qs = (0.0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.25, 0.50)
    print("d*(q) = G / ((1 - q)(G + r)); 'none' means no d < 1 works")
    print("  G/r  " + "".join("  q={:.2f}".format(q) for q in qs))
    for ratio in (1.0, 3.0, 5.0, 9.0):
        cells = []
        for q in qs:
            d = d_star(ratio, 1.0, q)
            cells.append("  {:6.4f}".format(d) if d < 1.0 else
                         "    none")
        print("  {:3.0f}  ".format(ratio) + "".join(cells))
    print("largest rehire probability that any d < 1 survives:")
    for ratio in (1.0, 3.0, 5.0, 9.0):
        print("  G/r = {:.0f}: q < {:.4f}".format(ratio,
                                             q_limit(ratio, 1.0)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《商帮多边惩罚声誉机制、马格里布商人代理博弈与买手社群信任网络母典》第 1 章「一次性侵吞与未来租金:多边惩罚的折现因子门槛」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-222 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026222,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论