关于「买手联盟的黑名单:共享覆盖率、误报与保证金」,《商帮多边惩罚与买手信任网络》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第五章计算买手联盟的共享黑名单:覆盖率 0.95 时可托付的订单额上限为 7.163 期租金,上报滞后一个周期就降到 3.673;误报与保证金的作用也逐一量化。

数据口径:书中代理人、订单与网络参数均为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化的经营分析,不构成经营、法律或理财建议。 第四章求临界群规模:链状熟人网络在示意参数下只有几十到一百多人,均匀混合网络要到 33742 人。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.95, 3.673, 7.163

largest order value at stake (in units of one period's rent)
share slag 0lag 1lag 3lag 6
0.000.8180.8180.8180.818
0.502.0771.3850.9330.829
0.804.2632.3681.1320.847
0.957.1633.6731.3960.871
1.009.0004.5001.5640.886
check, s = 0, lag 0: a r / (1 - a) with a = 0.45 is 0.818
full sharing, no lag: d / (1 - d) = 9.000

核心公式

\[E_{\max}(B) = p_f\,B + \frac{a\,(r - i\,B)}{1-a}, \qquad a = d\,(1 - H\,(1-s)).\]
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 5. p51: what a shared blacklist buys a buyer alliance.
# Model: an agent who defaults on one buyer is reported to the shared
# list after a lag of L hiring periods; a share s of the other buyers
# consult the list. Each period the defaulter finds an opening with
# probability H = 0.5 and is taken on unless that buyer has seen the
# report: q_t = H for t <= L and H (1 - s) after. With rent r = 1 a
# period, outside value w0 = 1 and d = 0.90, we find by bisection the
# largest one-shot gain G_max (order value at stake) that still leaves
# honesty optimal. All parameters are illustrative.
# 模型:黑名单共享覆盖率 s 与上报滞后 L 决定可托付的最大订单额。
import math

R, W0, H, D = 1.0, 1.0, 0.5, 0.90


def margin(g, s, lag, horizon=400):
    w = W0 + R
    v = w / (1.0 - D)
    q_tail = H * (1.0 - s)
    u = (q_tail * v + (1.0 - q_tail) * W0) / (1.0 - (1.0 - q_tail) * D)
    for t in range(horizon, 0, -1):
        q = H if t <= lag else q_tail
        u = q * v + (1.0 - q) * (W0 + D * u)
    return v - math.fsum([w, g, D * u])


def g_max(s, lag):
    lo, hi = 0.0, 1000.0
    for _ in range(70):
        mid = 0.5 * (lo + hi)
        if margin(mid, s, lag) >= 0.0:
            lo = mid
        else:
            hi = mid
    return lo


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("largest order value at stake (in units of one period's rent)")
    print("  share s   lag 0    lag 1    lag 3    lag 6")
    for s in (0.0, 0.5, 0.8, 0.95, 1.0):
        cells = ["{:6.3f}".format(g_max(s, lag)) for lag in (0, 1, 3, 6)]
        print("  {:.2f}     ".format(s) + "   ".join(cells))
    a = D * (1.0 - H)
    print("check, s = 0, lag 0: a r / (1 - a) with a = {:.2f} is {:.3f}"
          .format(a, a * R / (1.0 - a)))
    print("full sharing, no lag: d / (1 - d) = {:.3f}".format(D / (1 - D)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《商帮多边惩罚声誉机制、马格里布商人代理博弈与买手社群信任网络母典》第 5 章「买手联盟的黑名单:共享覆盖率、误报与保证金」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-222 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026222,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论