Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities: chapter answers
Cross-border traders widely believe that multilateral punishment inside a small circle, blacklisting together, disciplines overseas agents better than contracts and lawsuits, and that once the group grows too large news stops spreading and the blacklist fails. This book writes that belief as runnable arithmetic and tests when it holds. The core model is the efficiency-wage condition of a repeated game: an agent stays honest when the present value of future rent exceeds a one-shot theft; an SI model of information diffusion then yields the critical group size at which reputation fails. The pro…
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-222 · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · One-Shot Theft against Future Rent: the Discount Threshold of Multilateral Punishment
Chapter 1 derives the discount threshold G/(G+r) under multilateral punishment, 0.8333 when theft is worth five periods of rent; if the cheat has a 0.15 chance per period of being rehired elsewhere it rises to 0.9804. - Chapter 2 · The Maghribi Dispute: Greif's Coalition and Edwards and Ogilvie's Courts
Chapter 2 sets Greif against Edwards and Ogilvie and finds courts and multilateral punishment to be complements: a court that wins with probability 0.4 and no blacklist gives a threshold of 0.8497, close to that of a bl… - Chapter 3 · How Bad News Travels: SI Diffusion, Rings of Correspondents and Rumours that Stop
Chapter 3 compares the speed of news in well-mixed, ring and small-world networks and shows that a rumour which stops leaves 0.2032 of a large population unreached. - Chapter 4 · The Critical Group Size: How Large a Network Can Reputation Police
Chapter 4 finds the critical group size: tens to over a hundred members in chain-like networks of acquaintances under illustrative parameters, but 33742 in a well-mixed network. - Chapter 5 · Blacklists in Buyer Alliances: Coverage, False Reports and Deposits
Chapter 5 prices a buyer alliance's shared blacklist: at a coverage of 0.95 the largest order that can be entrusted is 7.163 periods of rent, falling to 3.673 with a reporting lag of one period; false reports and deposi… - Chapter 6 · Where Reputation Ends: Last Periods, Exits and New Names
Reputation's collateral is the future, so whatever weakens the future weakens reputation. Once an agent's chance of leaving reaches 0.05 per period, the rent at stake under illustrative parameters no longer outweighs a… - Chapter 7 · Sources East and West: the Shishang leiyao and the Cairo Geniza Letters
The Ming merchant manuals represented by the Shishang leiyao and the letters of the Maghribi traders in the Cairo Geniza answer the same question from two directions. The manuals' precepts tell a merchant how to protect… - Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Blacklist-Sharing Protocol, Deposits and the Agent Credit Scorecard
Chapter 8 gives eight clauses for sharing a blacklist, a pre-registered test and the distilled Agent Credit Scorecard; in simulation a verified shared list cuts the share of agents with a motive to default to 0.245, whi…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote