What does Flagship Talent Pricing conclude, in numbers, about “Split Image Licensing: Pricing by Channel, Territory and Term, and When to Bundle”?
Answer: Chapter 6 shows that, net of dilution, a menu of channel prices, bundle prices and a published eligibility floor earns 260 more than pricing for gross revenue.
Scope of the numbers: All parameters are illustrative and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. The book evaluates no living person and is not personalised legal, financial or investment advice; contract terms are described only as structure and game logic, subject to review before publication.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python only
| ignoring dilution, best gross plan 280/450/650: gross 2,420, net 1,340 | ||||
| plan (net-optimal) | gross | net | O/F/bundle | floor b |
| split, no floor | 2,300 | 1,220 | 280/450/- | 0.00 |
| pure bundle | 1,800 | 1,560 | -/-/600 | 0.00 |
| mixed menu | 2,200 | 1,600 | 400/450/600 | 0.00 |
| split + floor | 1,740 | 1,440 | 280/450/- | 0.60 |
| mixed menu + floor | 2,200 | 1,600 | 400/450/600 | 0.20 |
| dilution charge per licence: L1 0, L2 0, P1 120, P2 180, M1 360, M2 420 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p61: split image licences by channel versus a bundle
# (Adams and Yellen 1976), once dilution is counted.
# Six brands value an online licence O and an offline licence F (same
# territory, same term). Each brand has a market position b. Selling any
# licence to a brand below the talent's position s0 = 0.9 costs
# 600 (s0 - b) in future luxury fees (a dilution charge in the spirit
# of p32). Pricing options: separate prices, a pure bundle, mixed
# bundling, and split licences with a published eligibility floor on b.
# Each brand buys the option with the largest non-negative surplus.
# Valuations and positions are illustrative. Exact integer search.
from itertools import product
BRANDS = [("L1", 300, 500, 95), ("L2", 200, 450, 90),
("P1", 350, 250, 70), ("P2", 280, 150, 60),
("M1", 400, 100, 30), ("M2", 320, 60, 20)] # b in percent
S0 = 90
def dil(b):
return 6 * max(0, S0 - b) # 600 (s0 - b) with b in percent
def outcome(po, pf, pb, floor=0):
gross = net = 0
for _, vo, vf, b in BRANDS:
if b < floor:
continue
opts = [(0, 0, 0)]
if po is not None:
opts.append((vo - po, po, 1))
if pf is not None:
opts.append((vf - pf, pf, 1))
if pb is not None:
opts.append((vo + vf - pb, pb, 2))
if po is not None and pf is not None:
opts.append((vo + vf - po - pf, po + pf, 2))
sur, pay, n = max(opts, key=lambda o: (o[0], o[1]))
if sur < 0:
continue
gross += pay
net += pay - n * dil(b)
return gross, net
def best(cands, floor_set=(0,)):
top = None
for c in cands:
for fl in floor_set:
g, n = outcome(*c, floor=fl)
if top is None or n > top[1]:
top = (g, n, c, fl)
return top
def show(c):
return "/".join("-" if x is None else str(x) for x in c)
if __name__ == "__main__":
vo = sorted({x[1] for x in BRANDS})
vf = sorted({x[2] for x in BRANDS})
vb = sorted({x[1] + x[2] for x in BRANDS})
floors = sorted({x[3] for x in BRANDS})
sep = [(a, b, None) for a, b in product(vo, vf)]
bun = [(None, None, c) for c in vb]
mix = [(a, b, c) for a, b, c in product(vo, vf, vb) if c < a + b]
g_top = max(sep + bun + mix, key=lambda c: outcome(*c)[0])
g, n = outcome(*g_top)
print("ignoring dilution, best gross plan {}: gross {:,}, net {:,}"
.format(show(g_top), g, n))
plans = [("split, no floor", best(sep)),
("pure bundle", best(bun)),
("mixed menu", best(mix)),
("split + floor", best(sep, floors)),
("mixed menu + floor", best(mix, floors))]
print(" plan (net-optimal) gross net O/F/bundle floor b")
for name, (g, n, c, fl) in plans:
print(" {:<20} {:>6,} {:>6,} {:<12} {:.2f}".format(
name, g, n, show(c), fl / 100))
print("dilution charge per licence: " + ", ".join(
"{} {}".format(x[0], dil(x[3])) for x in BRANDS))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Split Image Licensing: Pricing by Channel, Territory and Term, and When to Bundle. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-343 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026343,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Convex Superstar Pricing: a Small Edge in Talent, a Large Edge in Fees
- Chapter 2 · The Fee Ladder: a Markov Chain of Tiers and the Eyesight of Event Studies
- Chapter 3 · Down-Market Dilution: a Reputation Stock, a Signing-Day Charge and the Loss Borne by Others
- Chapter 4 · Deciding on a Deal: Thresholds under Uncertainty and the Slot that Exclusivity Locks
- Chapter 5 · The Hold-Up Game in Exclusive Representation: Investment Protection, Buy-Out Prices and Control
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: Buying a Horse's Bones for Five Hundred, and the Conspicuous Consumption of the Leisure Class
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Quarterly Fee and Deal Checkup, the Distilled Tool and a Pre-Registered Test