Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory: chapter answers
Talent agencies widely believe that a performer's fee rises with her exposure and that every commercial offer is worth taking. This book writes that belief as runnable arithmetic and tests it. Under Rosen's economics of superstars, flagship fees are a convex function of rank in talent; because they are convex, the cash from one down-market deal is often smaller than the depreciation it imposes on future luxury fees; and without investment protection, an agency with exclusive rights invests less than is jointly efficient. After checking the originals the book corrects its project blueprint: th…
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- Chapter 1 · Convex Superstar Pricing: a Small Edge in Talent, a Large Edge in Fees
Chapter 1 shows that a ten percent edge in talent is worth a fee 1.464 times higher on a convex schedule with k equal to 4, and uses Krueger's concert-revenue concentration to test the direction of convexity. - Chapter 2 · The Fee Ladder: a Markov Chain of Tiers and the Eyesight of Event Studies
The fee ladder is a Markov chain. Raise the chance of slipping by a few points and lower the chance of climbing by a few points, and the expected time to the top becomes three to five times longer while the present valu… - Chapter 3 · Down-Market Dilution: a Reputation Stock, a Signing-Day Charge and the Loss Borne by Others
Chapter 3 builds a reputation-stock model: under illustrative parameters one down-market deal carries a dilution charge of 977.4, which is 3.672 times the linear estimate of 266.2, against only 167.5 for a mid-market pe… - Chapter 4 · Deciding on a Deal: Thresholds under Uncertainty and the Slot that Exclusivity Locks
Chapter 4 sets the charge at the eightieth percentile under uncertainty, 1,236.4, and adds a slot cost of 553.9 for category exclusivity. - Chapter 5 · The Hold-Up Game in Exclusive Representation: Investment Protection, Buy-Out Prices and Control
Chapter 5 is the hold-up game of exclusive representation: an indexed buy-out lifts total surplus to 0.9924 of the efficient level, a lock leaves only 0.7171, and splitting image control by channel reaches 0.9829. - Chapter 6 · Split Image Licensing: Pricing by Channel, Territory and Term, and When to Bundle
Chapter 6 shows that, net of dilution, a menu of channel prices, bundle prices and a published eligibility floor earns 260 more than pricing for gross revenue. - Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: Buying a Horse's Bones for Five Hundred, and the Conspicuous Consumption of the Leisure Class
With an exclusivity index of 1.0, the effective slope of demand with respect to price is 0.40, the brand's profit-maximising price is 125.0 and its revenue 6,250.0. When the index falls to 0.9, the slope rises to 0.46,… - Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Quarterly Fee and Deal Checkup, the Distilled Tool and a Pre-Registered Test
Chapter 8 gives the quarterly fee and deal checkup, the distilled Talent Deal Downgrade Cost Calculator and a pre-registered test plan that needs 112 performers per group. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runna…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote