What does Flagship Talent Pricing conclude, in numbers, about “Closing the Loop: a Quarterly Fee and Deal Checkup, the Distilled Tool and a Pre-Registered Test”?
Answer: Chapter 8 gives the quarterly fee and deal checkup, the distilled Talent Deal Downgrade Cost Calculator and a pre-registered test plan that needs 112 performers per group. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (19 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Scope of the numbers: All parameters are illustrative and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. The book evaluates no living person and is not personalised legal, financial or investment advice; contract terms are described only as structure and game logic, subject to review before publication.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 112
| H1 dilution: talents per arm | 112, total = 224 |
| simulated power at that n | 0.819 |
| if delta | 0.10: per arm 252 |
| if delta | 0.20: per arm 63 |
| H2 convexity: talent-fee pairs | 69 |
| if true k | 1.25: pairs = 275 |
| model-implied log drop at the p31 trough | -0.371 |
| refute H1 if the 95% CI of the gap lies above -0.05 | |
| H2 unsupported if the one-sided 95% lower bound of k < | 1 |
| refute H2 if the one-sided 95% upper bound of k < 1 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 8. p82: sample sizes for the pre-registered tests.
# H1 dilution: talents who take a down-market deal see their next
# luxury fee fall, in logs, by delta relative to matched controls.
# Planning values: delta 0.15, sd of the log fee change 0.40 (both
# assumed). Two-sided 5%, power 80%; a seeded simulation checks power.
# H2 convexity: the slope k of log fee on a log talent proxy exceeds 1.
# Planning values: true k 1.5, residual sd 0.5, sd of the log proxy 0.3;
# one-sided 5%, power 80%. All planning values are illustrative and
# must be fixed in the registration before any data are seen.
import math
import random
Z2 = 1.959964
Z1 = 1.644854
ZP = 0.841621
SEED = 20261120
def n_two_arm(delta, sd):
return math.ceil(2 * ((Z2 + ZP) * sd / delta) ** 2)
def n_slope(diff, resid, sdx):
return math.ceil(((Z1 + ZP) * resid / (sdx * diff)) ** 2)
def sim_two_arm(delta, sd, n, reps, rng):
hits = 0
for _ in range(reps):
a = [rng.gauss(-delta, sd) for _ in range(n)]
c = [rng.gauss(0.0, sd) for _ in range(n)]
ma, mc = math.fsum(a) / n, math.fsum(c) / n
va = math.fsum((x - ma) ** 2 for x in a) / (n - 1)
vc = math.fsum((x - mc) ** 2 for x in c) / (n - 1)
if abs(ma - mc) / math.sqrt((va + vc) / n) > Z2:
hits += 1
return hits / reps
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(20261120)
n1 = n_two_arm(0.15, 0.40)
print("H1 dilution: talents per arm = {}, total = {}".format(
n1, 2 * n1))
print(" simulated power at that n = {:.3f}".format(
sim_two_arm(0.15, 0.40, n1, 2000, rng)))
for d in (0.10, 0.20):
print(" if delta = {:.2f}: per arm {}".format(
d, n_two_arm(d, 0.40)))
n2 = n_slope(0.5, 0.5, 0.3)
print("H2 convexity: talent-fee pairs = {}".format(n2))
print(" if true k = 1.25: pairs = {}".format(
n_slope(0.25, 0.5, 0.3)))
print("model-implied log drop at the p31 trough = {:.3f}".format(
math.log(452.6 / 656.1)))
print("refute H1 if the 95% CI of the gap lies above -0.05")
print("H2 unsupported if the one-sided 95% lower bound of k <= 1")
print("refute H2 if the one-sided 95% upper bound of k < 1")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 8: Closing the Loop: a Quarterly Fee and Deal Checkup, the Distilled Tool and a Pre-Registered Test. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-343 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026343,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Convex Superstar Pricing: a Small Edge in Talent, a Large Edge in Fees
- Chapter 2 · The Fee Ladder: a Markov Chain of Tiers and the Eyesight of Event Studies
- Chapter 3 · Down-Market Dilution: a Reputation Stock, a Signing-Day Charge and the Loss Borne by Others
- Chapter 4 · Deciding on a Deal: Thresholds under Uncertainty and the Slot that Exclusivity Locks
- Chapter 5 · The Hold-Up Game in Exclusive Representation: Investment Protection, Buy-Out Prices and Control
- Chapter 6 · Split Image Licensing: Pricing by Channel, Territory and Term, and When to Bundle
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: Buying a Horse's Bones for Five Hundred, and the Conspicuous Consumption of the Leisure Class