What does Flagship Talent Pricing conclude, in numbers, about “Down-Market Dilution: a Reputation Stock, a Signing-Day Charge and the Loss Borne by Others”?
Answer: Chapter 3 builds a reputation-stock model: under illustrative parameters one down-market deal carries a dilution charge of 977.4, which is 3.672 times the linear estimate of 266.2, against only 167.5 for a mid-market performer, and luxury partners can bear an external share of 0.722.
Scope of the numbers: All parameters are illustrative and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. The book evaluates no living person and is not personalised legal, financial or investment advice; contract terms are described only as structure and game logic, subject to review before publication.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 266.2, 3.672, 977.4
| positioning path (quarters 1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 20): | |
| 0.8685 | 0.8464 0.8202 0.8808 0.8954 0.8997 |
| current luxury fee at s0 | 656.1 |
| fee at the trough | 452.6 |
| PV of lost luxury fees, linear schedule | 266.2 |
| PV of lost luxury fees, convex k | 4 = 977.4 |
| convex / linear | 3.672 |
| deal cash 300: linear says accept, convex says decline | |
| loss by k (same s0 fee scale FMAX): | |
| k | 1: 365.1 |
| k | 2: 638.5 |
| k | 4: 977.4 |
| k | 6: 1,124.5 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p31: a down-market deal as a hit to a reputation stock.
# Positioning s in [0, 1] (1 = top luxury) is a stock: each quarter
# s <- (1 - d) s + d m, where m is the exposure-weighted mean position of
# the brands the talent appears with that quarter. A deal with a brand
# at position b, taking exposure share w for T quarters, pulls m down to
# (1 - w) s0 + w b. Future luxury fees are fee(s) = FMAX * s ** k, so a
# convex schedule (k > 1) turns a small dent in s into a large fee loss.
# The linear schedule is calibrated to the same current fee. All
# parameters (s0 0.90, b 0.20, w 0.15, T 4, d 0.30, k 4, FMAX 1,000,
# one luxury deal a quarter, 3% discount, 20 quarters) are illustrative.
import math
S0, B, W, T = 0.90, 0.20, 0.15, 4
D, K, FMAX = 0.30, 4, 1000.0
N_LUX, R, H = 1.0, 0.03, 20
CASH = 300.0
def path(s0, b, w, t_on, d, h):
s, out = s0, []
for t in range(1, h + 1):
m = (1 - w) * s0 + w * b if t <= t_on else s0
s = (1 - d) * s + d * m
out.append(s)
return out
def fee(s, k, fmax, s0=None):
if s0 is None:
return fmax * s ** k
return fmax * s0 ** k * (s / s0) # linear, same fee at s0
def pv_loss(s0, b, w, t_on, d, k, fmax, n_lux, r, h, linear=False):
ref = s0 if linear else None
base = fee(s0, k, fmax, ref)
terms = [n_lux * (base - fee(s, k, fmax, ref)) / (1 + r) ** t
for t, s in enumerate(path(s0, b, w, t_on, d, h), 1)]
return math.fsum(terms)
if __name__ == "__main__":
p = path(S0, B, W, T, D, H)
print("positioning path (quarters 1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 20):")
print(" " + " ".join("{:.4f}".format(p[i - 1])
for i in (1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 20)))
print("current luxury fee at s0 = {:.1f}".format(fee(S0, K, FMAX)))
print("fee at the trough = {:.1f}".format(fee(min(p), K, FMAX)))
lin = pv_loss(S0, B, W, T, D, K, FMAX, N_LUX, R, H, linear=True)
cvx = pv_loss(S0, B, W, T, D, K, FMAX, N_LUX, R, H)
print("PV of lost luxury fees, linear schedule = {:,.1f}".format(lin))
print("PV of lost luxury fees, convex k = {} = {:,.1f}".format(
K, cvx))
print("convex / linear = {:.3f}".format(cvx / lin))
print("deal cash {:.0f}: linear says {}, convex says {}".format(
CASH, "accept" if CASH > lin else "decline",
"accept" if CASH > cvx else "decline"))
print("loss by k (same s0 fee scale FMAX):")
for k in (1, 2, 4, 6):
print(" k = {}: {:,.1f}".format(
k, pv_loss(S0, B, W, T, D, k, FMAX, N_LUX, R, H)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: Down-Market Dilution: a Reputation Stock, a Signing-Day Charge and the Loss Borne by Others. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-343 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026343,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Convex Superstar Pricing: a Small Edge in Talent, a Large Edge in Fees
- Chapter 2 · The Fee Ladder: a Markov Chain of Tiers and the Eyesight of Event Studies
- Chapter 4 · Deciding on a Deal: Thresholds under Uncertainty and the Slot that Exclusivity Locks
- Chapter 5 · The Hold-Up Game in Exclusive Representation: Investment Protection, Buy-Out Prices and Control
- Chapter 6 · Split Image Licensing: Pricing by Channel, Territory and Term, and When to Bundle
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: Buying a Horse's Bones for Five Hundred, and the Conspicuous Consumption of the Leisure Class
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Quarterly Fee and Deal Checkup, the Distilled Tool and a Pre-Registered Test