What does Flagship Talent Pricing conclude, in numbers, about “Classical Sources: Buying a Horse's Bones for Five Hundred, and the Conspicuous Consumption of the Leisure Class”?
Answer: With an exclusivity index of 1.0, the effective slope of demand with respect to price is 0.40, the brand's profit-maximising price is 125.0 and its revenue 6,250.0. When the index falls to 0.9, the slope rises to 0.46, the profit-maximising price falls to 108.7 and revenue to 5,434.8, only 0.870 of its former level. At an index of 0.8 revenue is 0.769 of the original; at 0.5 it is only 0.571.
Scope of the numbers: All parameters are illustrative and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. The book evaluates no living person and is not personalised legal, financial or investment advice; contract terms are described only as structure and game logic, subject to review before publication.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.40, 0.46, 0.5, 0.571, 0.769, 0.8
| x | slope | best price | revenue | / revenue at x = 1 |
| 1.0 | 0.40 | 125.0 | 6,250.0 | 1.000 |
| 0.9 | 0.46 | 108.7 | 5,434.8 | 0.870 |
| 0.8 | 0.52 | 96.2 | 4,807.7 | 0.769 |
| 0.7 | 0.58 | 86.2 | 4,310.3 | 0.690 |
| 0.6 | 0.64 | 78.1 | 3,906.2 | 0.625 |
| 0.5 | 0.70 | 71.4 | 3,571.4 | 0.571 |
| revenue drop from x 1.0 to 0.9 = 0.130 | ||||
| revenue drop from x 0.6 to 0.5 = 0.086 (of the x 0.6 level) | ||||
| Veblen region (demand rising in price) needs gamma x > beta: | ||||
| here the largest gamma x = 0.6 < beta = 1.0 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. p72: a Veblen effect (Leibenstein 1950) priced through a
# talent's exclusivity.
# Demand for a conspicuous good: Q = A - beta P + gamma Pc, where Pc is
# the conspicuous price, the price others believe was paid. In
# equilibrium Pc equals the real price times x, an exclusivity index of
# the talent fronting the brand (1 = seen only with top houses; lower
# when the same face also fronts mass-market goods). So
# Q = A - (beta - gamma x) P; the brand's best price and revenue are
# P* = A / (2 (beta - gamma x)) and R* = A^2 / (4 (beta - gamma x)).
# A = 100, beta = 1.0, gamma = 0.6 are illustrative.
A, BETA, GAMMA = 100.0, 1.0, 0.6
def best(x):
slope = BETA - GAMMA * x
return A / (2 * slope), A * A / (4 * slope)
if __name__ == "__main__":
p1, r1 = best(1.0)
print(" x slope best price revenue / revenue at x = 1")
for x in (1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5):
p, r = best(x)
print(" {:.1f} {:.2f} {:>9.1f} {:>8,.1f} {:.3f}".format(
x, BETA - GAMMA * x, p, r, r / r1))
print("revenue drop from x 1.0 to 0.9 = {:.3f}".format(
1 - best(0.9)[1] / r1))
print("revenue drop from x 0.6 to 0.5 = {:.3f} (of the x 0.6 level)"
.format(1 - best(0.5)[1] / best(0.6)[1]))
print("Veblen region (demand rising in price) needs gamma x > beta:")
print(" here the largest gamma x = {:.1f} < beta = {:.1f}".format(
GAMMA, BETA))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Classical Sources: Buying a Horse's Bones for Five Hundred, and the Conspicuous Consumption of the Leisure Class. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-343 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026343,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Convex Superstar Pricing: a Small Edge in Talent, a Large Edge in Fees
- Chapter 2 · The Fee Ladder: a Markov Chain of Tiers and the Eyesight of Event Studies
- Chapter 3 · Down-Market Dilution: a Reputation Stock, a Signing-Day Charge and the Loss Borne by Others
- Chapter 4 · Deciding on a Deal: Thresholds under Uncertainty and the Slot that Exclusivity Locks
- Chapter 5 · The Hold-Up Game in Exclusive Representation: Investment Protection, Buy-Out Prices and Control
- Chapter 6 · Split Image Licensing: Pricing by Channel, Territory and Term, and When to Bundle
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Quarterly Fee and Deal Checkup, the Distilled Tool and a Pre-Registered Test