What does Flagship Talent Pricing conclude, in numbers, about “The Hold-Up Game in Exclusive Representation: Investment Protection, Buy-Out Prices and Control”?
Answer: Chapter 5 is the hold-up game of exclusive representation: an indexed buy-out lifts total surplus to 0.9924 of the efficient level, a lock leaves only 0.7171, and splitting image control by channel reaches 0.9829.
Scope of the numbers: All parameters are illustrative and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. The book evaluates no living person and is not personalised legal, financial or investment advice; contract terms are described only as structure and game logic, subject to review before publication.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.7171, 0.9924
| first best: e = 0.500, joint surplus = 1.7500 | ||||
| rule | e | P(leave) | joint | / first best |
| none P = 0 | 0.163 | 0.729 | 1.6919 | 0.9668 |
| fixed P = 0.2 | 0.132 | 0.669 | 1.7016 | 0.9723 |
| indexed P = theta Y | 0.300 | 0.567 | 1.7367 | 0.9924 |
| lock-in P = 9 | 0.300 | 0.000 | 1.2550 | 0.7171 |
| efficient exit needs cutoff = Y; only the indexed rule does it | ||||
| theta caps e: indexed e equals theta = 0.3 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p52: a buy-out price as an investment-protection clause.
# Stage 1: the agency invests e (cost e^2 / 2); value if the talent
# stays is Y = 1 + e, of which the agency's commission share is theta.
# Stage 2: an outside offer X ~ Uniform(0, 3) arrives; the talent leaves
# if X - P > (1 - theta) Y, where P is the contractual buy-out price.
# Backward induction: the cutoff is c = (1 - theta) Y + P; the agency
# picks e to maximise theta Y Pr(stay) + P Pr(leave) - e^2 / 2.
# Buy-out rules: none (P = 0), a fixed P, an indexed P = theta Y (the
# agency's forgone commission value), and a prohibitive lock-in.
# theta = 0.3 and the offer range are illustrative; this is game logic
# for contract structure, not legal advice on any clause.
THETA, XMAX = 0.3, 3.0
def outcome(e, rule):
y = 1.0 + e
p = rule(y)
c = min(max((1 - THETA) * y + p, 0.0), XMAX)
stay = c / XMAX
agency = THETA * y * stay + p * (1 - stay) - e * e / 2
joint = y * stay + (XMAX * XMAX - c * c) / (2 * XMAX) - e * e / 2
return agency, joint, 1 - stay
def best_e(rule):
grid = [i / 1000 for i in range(0, 2001)]
return max(grid, key=lambda e: outcome(e, rule)[0])
def first_best():
grid = [i / 1000 for i in range(0, 2001)]
def joint(e):
y = 1.0 + e
c = min(y, XMAX)
return y * c / XMAX + (XMAX * XMAX - c * c) / (2 * XMAX) - e * e / 2
e = max(grid, key=joint)
return e, joint(e)
RULES = [("none P = 0", lambda y: 0.0),
("fixed P = 0.2", lambda y: 0.2),
("indexed P = theta Y", lambda y: THETA * y),
("lock-in P = 9", lambda y: 9.0)]
if __name__ == "__main__":
e_fb, s_fb = first_best()
print("first best: e = {:.3f}, joint surplus = {:.4f}".format(
e_fb, s_fb))
print(" rule e P(leave) joint / first best")
for name, rule in RULES:
e = best_e(rule)
a, j, lv = outcome(e, rule)
print(" {:<20} {:.3f} {:.3f} {:.4f} {:.4f}".format(
name, e, lv, j, j / s_fb))
print("efficient exit needs cutoff = Y; only the indexed rule does it")
print("theta caps e: indexed e equals theta = {:.1f}".format(THETA))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: The Hold-Up Game in Exclusive Representation: Investment Protection, Buy-Out Prices and Control. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-343 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026343,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Convex Superstar Pricing: a Small Edge in Talent, a Large Edge in Fees
- Chapter 2 · The Fee Ladder: a Markov Chain of Tiers and the Eyesight of Event Studies
- Chapter 3 · Down-Market Dilution: a Reputation Stock, a Signing-Day Charge and the Loss Borne by Others
- Chapter 4 · Deciding on a Deal: Thresholds under Uncertainty and the Slot that Exclusivity Locks
- Chapter 6 · Split Image Licensing: Pricing by Channel, Territory and Term, and When to Bundle
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: Buying a Horse's Bones for Five Hundred, and the Conspicuous Consumption of the Leisure Class
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Quarterly Fee and Deal Checkup, the Distilled Tool and a Pre-Registered Test