What does Flagship Talent Pricing conclude, in numbers, about “The Hold-Up Game in Exclusive Representation: Investment Protection, Buy-Out Prices and Control”?

Answer: Chapter 5 is the hold-up game of exclusive representation: an indexed buy-out lifts total surplus to 0.9924 of the efficient level, a lock leaves only 0.7171, and splitting image control by channel reaches 0.9829.

Scope of the numbers: All parameters are illustrative and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. The book evaluates no living person and is not personalised legal, financial or investment advice; contract terms are described only as structure and game logic, subject to review before publication.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.7171, 0.9924

first best: e = 0.500, joint surplus = 1.7500
ruleeP(leave)joint/ first best
none P = 00.1630.7291.69190.9668
fixed P = 0.20.1320.6691.70160.9723
indexed P = theta Y0.3000.5671.73670.9924
lock-in P = 90.3000.0001.25500.7171
efficient exit needs cutoff = Y; only the indexed rule does it
theta caps e: indexed e equals theta = 0.3
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p52: a buy-out price as an investment-protection clause.
# Stage 1: the agency invests e (cost e^2 / 2); value if the talent
# stays is Y = 1 + e, of which the agency's commission share is theta.
# Stage 2: an outside offer X ~ Uniform(0, 3) arrives; the talent leaves
# if X - P > (1 - theta) Y, where P is the contractual buy-out price.
# Backward induction: the cutoff is c = (1 - theta) Y + P; the agency
# picks e to maximise theta Y Pr(stay) + P Pr(leave) - e^2 / 2.
# Buy-out rules: none (P = 0), a fixed P, an indexed P = theta Y (the
# agency's forgone commission value), and a prohibitive lock-in.
# theta = 0.3 and the offer range are illustrative; this is game logic
# for contract structure, not legal advice on any clause.
THETA, XMAX = 0.3, 3.0


def outcome(e, rule):
    y = 1.0 + e
    p = rule(y)
    c = min(max((1 - THETA) * y + p, 0.0), XMAX)
    stay = c / XMAX
    agency = THETA * y * stay + p * (1 - stay) - e * e / 2
    joint = y * stay + (XMAX * XMAX - c * c) / (2 * XMAX) - e * e / 2
    return agency, joint, 1 - stay


def best_e(rule):
    grid = [i / 1000 for i in range(0, 2001)]
    return max(grid, key=lambda e: outcome(e, rule)[0])


def first_best():
    grid = [i / 1000 for i in range(0, 2001)]
    def joint(e):
        y = 1.0 + e
        c = min(y, XMAX)
        return y * c / XMAX + (XMAX * XMAX - c * c) / (2 * XMAX) - e * e / 2
    e = max(grid, key=joint)
    return e, joint(e)


RULES = [("none P = 0", lambda y: 0.0),
         ("fixed P = 0.2", lambda y: 0.2),
         ("indexed P = theta Y", lambda y: THETA * y),
         ("lock-in P = 9", lambda y: 9.0)]

if __name__ == "__main__":
    e_fb, s_fb = first_best()
    print("first best: e = {:.3f}, joint surplus = {:.4f}".format(
        e_fb, s_fb))
    print("  rule                  e      P(leave)  joint    / first best")
    for name, rule in RULES:
        e = best_e(rule)
        a, j, lv = outcome(e, rule)
        print("  {:<20} {:.3f}   {:.3f}    {:.4f}   {:.4f}".format(
            name, e, lv, j, j / s_fb))
    print("efficient exit needs cutoff = Y; only the indexed rule does it")
    print("theta caps e: indexed e equals theta = {:.1f}".format(THETA))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: The Hold-Up Game in Exclusive Representation: Investment Protection, Buy-Out Prices and Control. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-343 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026343,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

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