What does Flagship Talent Pricing conclude, in numbers, about “Convex Superstar Pricing: a Small Edge in Talent, a Large Edge in Fees”?
Answer: Chapter 1 shows that a ten percent edge in talent is worth a fee 1.464 times higher on a convex schedule with k equal to 4, and uses Krueger's concert-revenue concentration to test the direction of convexity.
Scope of the numbers: All parameters are illustrative and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. The book evaluates no living person and is not personalised legal, financial or investment advice; contract terms are described only as structure and game logic, subject to review before publication.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 1.464
| performers 1,000; talent top/median | 1.278 |
| talent top-1% share | 0.0125, gini = 0.0557 |
| k top/median fee top-1% share gini | |
| 1 | 1.28 0.0125 0.0557 |
| 2 | 1.63 0.0154 0.1100 |
| 4 | 2.67 0.0230 0.2135 |
| 8 | 7.12 0.0462 0.3974 |
| 16 | 50.76 0.1340 0.6680 |
| a 10% talent edge is worth, in fee: | |
| k | 1: x 1.100 |
| k | 4: x 1.464 |
| k | 8: x 2.144 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: convex fees magnify small talent gaps (Rosen 1981).
# Model: fee(q) = q ** k. Talent q is drawn for 1,000 performers from a
# normal law with mean 1 and a small spread (sd 0.10), seed fixed.
# k = 1 is a linear schedule; k > 1 is the convex schedule that Rosen's
# joint-consumption technology produces. The spread and the k values are
# illustrative, not estimates for any market.
import math
import random
N = 1000
SEED = 20261120
def talents():
rng = random.Random(20261120)
return sorted(max(0.5, rng.gauss(1.0, 0.10)) for _ in range(N))
def top_share(fees, frac):
m = int(round(frac * len(fees)))
top = sorted(fees, reverse=True)[:m]
return math.fsum(top) / math.fsum(fees)
def gini(xs):
xs = sorted(xs)
n = len(xs)
terms = [(2 * (i + 1) - n - 1) * x for i, x in enumerate(xs)]
return math.fsum(terms) / (n * math.fsum(xs))
if __name__ == "__main__":
q = talents()
med = q[N // 2]
best = q[-1]
print("performers {:,}; talent top/median = {:.3f}".format(
N, best / med))
print("talent top-1% share = {:.4f}, gini = {:.4f}".format(
top_share(q, 0.01), gini(q)))
print(" k top/median fee top-1% share gini")
for k in (1, 2, 4, 8, 16):
f = [x ** k for x in q]
print(" {:<3} {:>14.2f} {:>12.4f} {:.4f}".format(
k, (best / med) ** k, top_share(f, 0.01), gini(f)))
print("a 10% talent edge is worth, in fee:")
for k in (1, 4, 8):
print(" k = {}: x {:.3f}".format(k, 1.1 ** k))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Convex Superstar Pricing: a Small Edge in Talent, a Large Edge in Fees. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-343 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026343,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · The Fee Ladder: a Markov Chain of Tiers and the Eyesight of Event Studies
- Chapter 3 · Down-Market Dilution: a Reputation Stock, a Signing-Day Charge and the Loss Borne by Others
- Chapter 4 · Deciding on a Deal: Thresholds under Uncertainty and the Slot that Exclusivity Locks
- Chapter 5 · The Hold-Up Game in Exclusive Representation: Investment Protection, Buy-Out Prices and Control
- Chapter 6 · Split Image Licensing: Pricing by Channel, Territory and Term, and When to Bundle
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: Buying a Horse's Bones for Five Hundred, and the Conspicuous Consumption of the Leisure Class
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Quarterly Fee and Deal Checkup, the Distilled Tool and a Pre-Registered Test