关于「肖像拆分授权:按渠道、地区、期限定价,以及何时打包」,《头部艺人稀缺溢价与降格成本》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第六章说明扣除稀释代价后,分渠道价、套装价与公开资格线并存的菜单比按毛收入选价多赚 260。

数据口径:核对原文后,本书对立项蓝图作了修正:凸性是对能力而非对曝光,且有 Adler 与 Hamlen 的反方证据;已发表的代言事件研究测的是企业股价,不是艺人报价,降格污染因此写成模型与预注册假说;套牢的经典表述来自 Klein、Crawford 与 Alchian,Grossman 与 Hart 讨论的是剩余控制权;「肖像暗投」一律改写为如实披露的肖像拆分授权。 书中参数均为示意,全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不点名评价任何在世人士,不是个人化的法律、财务或投资建议,合同条款只写结构与博弈逻辑,以上架前人工复核为准。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库

ignoring dilution, best gross plan 280/450/650: gross 2,420, net 1,340
plan (net-optimal)grossnetO/F/bundlefloor b
split, no floor2,3001,220280/450/-0.00
pure bundle1,8001,560-/-/6000.00
mixed menu2,2001,600400/450/6000.00
split + floor1,7401,440280/450/-0.60
mixed menu + floor2,2001,600400/450/6000.20
dilution charge per licence: L1 0, L2 0, P1 120, P2 180, M1 360, M2 420
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 6. p61: split image licences by channel versus a bundle
# (Adams and Yellen 1976), once dilution is counted.
# Six brands value an online licence O and an offline licence F (same
# territory, same term). Each brand has a market position b. Selling any
# licence to a brand below the talent's position s0 = 0.9 costs
# 600 (s0 - b) in future luxury fees (a dilution charge in the spirit
# of p32). Pricing options: separate prices, a pure bundle, mixed
# bundling, and split licences with a published eligibility floor on b.
# Each brand buys the option with the largest non-negative surplus.
# Valuations and positions are illustrative. Exact integer search.
from itertools import product

BRANDS = [("L1", 300, 500, 95), ("L2", 200, 450, 90),
          ("P1", 350, 250, 70), ("P2", 280, 150, 60),
          ("M1", 400, 100, 30), ("M2", 320, 60, 20)]   # b in percent
S0 = 90


def dil(b):
    return 6 * max(0, S0 - b)          # 600 (s0 - b) with b in percent


def outcome(po, pf, pb, floor=0):
    gross = net = 0
    for _, vo, vf, b in BRANDS:
        if b < floor:
            continue
        opts = [(0, 0, 0)]
        if po is not None:
            opts.append((vo - po, po, 1))
        if pf is not None:
            opts.append((vf - pf, pf, 1))
        if pb is not None:
            opts.append((vo + vf - pb, pb, 2))
        if po is not None and pf is not None:
            opts.append((vo + vf - po - pf, po + pf, 2))
        sur, pay, n = max(opts, key=lambda o: (o[0], o[1]))
        if sur < 0:
            continue
        gross += pay
        net += pay - n * dil(b)
    return gross, net


def best(cands, floor_set=(0,)):
    top = None
    for c in cands:
        for fl in floor_set:
            g, n = outcome(*c, floor=fl)
            if top is None or n > top[1]:
                top = (g, n, c, fl)
    return top


def show(c):
    return "/".join("-" if x is None else str(x) for x in c)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    vo = sorted({x[1] for x in BRANDS})
    vf = sorted({x[2] for x in BRANDS})
    vb = sorted({x[1] + x[2] for x in BRANDS})
    floors = sorted({x[3] for x in BRANDS})
    sep = [(a, b, None) for a, b in product(vo, vf)]
    bun = [(None, None, c) for c in vb]
    mix = [(a, b, c) for a, b, c in product(vo, vf, vb) if c < a + b]
    g_top = max(sep + bun + mix, key=lambda c: outcome(*c)[0])
    g, n = outcome(*g_top)
    print("ignoring dilution, best gross plan {}: gross {:,}, net {:,}"
          .format(show(g_top), g, n))
    plans = [("split, no floor", best(sep)),
             ("pure bundle", best(bun)),
             ("mixed menu", best(mix)),
             ("split + floor", best(sep, floors)),
             ("mixed menu + floor", best(mix, floors))]
    print("  plan (net-optimal)    gross    net   O/F/bundle    floor b")
    for name, (g, n, c, fl) in plans:
        print("  {:<20} {:>6,} {:>6,}   {:<12}  {:.2f}".format(
            name, g, n, show(c), fl / 100))
    print("dilution charge per licence: " + ", ".join(
        "{} {}".format(x[0], dil(x[3])) for x in BRANDS))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《超模与头部艺人稀缺溢价保护、代言降格污染惩罚与独家经纪博弈母典》第 6 章「肖像拆分授权:按渠道、地区、期限定价,以及何时打包」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-343 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026343,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Flagship Talent Scarcity Pricing, Brand-Dilution Spillover Penalties and Exclusive Representation Game Theory},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论