What does Evolutionary Games and Reciprocity conclude, in numbers, about “Network Reciprocity: Spatial Structure and Human Network Experiments”?

Answer: When individuals interact only with neighbours, cooperators can survive by forming clusters: in the Nowak–May model cooperators settle at about 31 % for \(1.8 < T < 2\), whereas they all die out under random mixing. The rule of Ohtsuki and colleagues, \(b/c > k\), gives the condition under which a network favours cooperation with death–birth updating and weak selection; the exact threshold for finite networks, \((N - 2)/(N/k - 2)\), is higher, and under birth–death updating a network never favours cooperation. In human experiments a large static network did not raise cooperation, while cooperation remained stable under the condition \(b/c > k\); whether networks help cooperation depends on payoff structure and on how people actually respond. The next chapter discusses a mechanism that changes payoffs directly: punishment.

Scope of the numbers: The book discusses mathematical models of evolutionary games; it is not moral instruction and not business advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python only

Tcooperator share (generations 150-200, 3 runs)
1.100.9810.9820.986mean 0.983
1.300.8660.8750.854mean 0.865
1.550.7940.8240.829mean 0.816
1.700.7040.7070.717mean 0.709
1.800.4100.3990.411mean 0.407
1.900.3180.3100.309mean 0.312
1.990.3130.3110.322mean 0.315
2.050.0430.0180.047mean 0.036

Key formula

\[b/c > k,\]
Show the full program
# Spatial games after Nowak & May (1992). Players sit on a 60 x 60 torus; each plays the
# one-shot game with its 8 neighbours and itself, with C vs C = 1, D vs C = T, and 0
# otherwise (a "weak" prisoner's dilemma, 1 < T < 2). Then every site, simultaneously,
# copies the strategy of the highest scorer among itself and its 8 neighbours.
# Start: 10 % defectors at random. Reported: cooperator share averaged over generations
# 150-200, in each of 3 runs. In a well-mixed population defectors take over for every
# T > 1.
import random
rng = random.Random(10)
L = 60
NB = [(dx, dy) for dx in (-1, 0, 1) for dy in (-1, 0, 1)]    # includes the site itself

def step(g, T):
    score = [[0.0] * L for _ in range(L)]
    for i in range(L):
        for j in range(L):
            nc = sum(g[(i + dx) % L][(j + dy) % L] for dx, dy in NB)
            score[i][j] = nc * (1.0 if g[i][j] else T)
    new = [[0] * L for _ in range(L)]
    for i in range(L):
        for j in range(L):
            best, s = g[i][j], score[i][j]
            for dx, dy in NB:
                a, b = (i + dx) % L, (j + dy) % L
                if score[a][b] > s: s, best = score[a][b], g[a][b]
            new[i][j] = best
    return new

def run(T, gens=200, p_def=0.1):
    g = [[0 if rng.random() < p_def else 1 for _ in range(L)] for _ in range(L)]
    hist = []
    for t in range(gens):
        g = step(g, T)
        if t >= 150: hist.append(sum(map(sum, g)) / L ** 2)
    return sum(hist) / len(hist), g

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("  T      cooperator share (generations 150-200, 3 runs)")
    for T in (1.10, 1.30, 1.55, 1.70, 1.80, 1.90, 1.99, 2.05):
        vals = [run(T)[0] for _ in range(3)]
        print(f"  {T:.2f}   " + "  ".join(f"{v:.3f}" for v in vals)
              + f"   mean {sum(vals) / 3:.3f}")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Network Reciprocity: Spatial Structure and Human Network Experiments. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}

Other chapter answers in this book