Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation: chapter answers
Natural selection favours individuals that leave more offspring; how, then, can behaviour that costs the actor and benefits others persist? This book uses evolutionary game theory to examine when cooperation emerges, is maintained and breaks down. It covers the replicator equation dx_i/dt = x_i[f_i(x) − f̄(x)] and evolutionarily stable strategies, with cooperators inevitably disappearing in the one-shot anonymous prisoner's dilemma while the two strategies coexist in the hawk–dove game and the outcome of the stag hunt depends on the starting point, together with fixation probabilities in fini…
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · Read the monograph · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · Replicator Dynamics: Why Cooperation Loses in One-Shot Anonymous Games
The last part of the program checks this law. With a stag payoff of 4, $x^ = 0.75$ and $\rho N = 0.65$; with a stag payoff of 12, $x = 0.25$ and $\rho N = 1.15$. The dividing line lies close to $x^ = 1/3$: at $x = 0.333… - Chapter 2 · Hamilton's Rule, the Price Equation and the Five Mechanisms
The network threshold $k$ is the limit for large populations. For a finite network in which everyone has $k$ neighbours the exact threshold is $(N - 2)/(N/k - 2)$ (Taylor 2007; Chen 2013): with $k = 4$ it is 6.00 for $N… - Chapter 3 · Direct Reciprocity: Tournaments, Noise and Forgiveness
Tit for tat won Axelrod's two tournaments, but it never beats an opponent in a single match, and its ranking depends on the field. With execution errors two tit-for-tat players fall into a retaliation cycle and their lo… - Chapter 4 · Indirect Reciprocity: Image Scores and Second-Order Reputation Norms
The first set of results shows the flaw in image scoring: with 90 % discriminators and 10 % defectors, under image scoring only 8 % of discriminators are rated good, discriminators help each other only 8 % of the time,… - Chapter 5 · Network Reciprocity: Spatial Structure and Human Network Experiments
When individuals interact only with neighbours, cooperators can survive by forming clusters: in the Nowak–May model cooperators settle at about 31 % for $1.8 < T < 2$, whereas they all die out under random mixing. The r… - Chapter 6 · Punishment: Altruistic Punishment, Antisocial Punishment and Governing the Commons
The last part of the program lists each person's payoff in a group of 5 to show the efficiency cost of punishment. When all cooperate each gets 2.0, the same as when all are punishers, because nobody needs to be punishe… - Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-Registered Trial
With an SD of community means of 0.15 (slightly more conservative than the illustrative model above), a smallest difference of interest of 0.10 (control 0.40, arm A 0.50), two-sided $\alpha = 0.05$ and 90 % power, 48 an…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote