What does Evolutionary Games and Reciprocity conclude, in numbers, about “Indirect Reciprocity: Image Scores and Second-Order Reputation Norms”?
Answer: The first set of results shows the flaw in image scoring: with 90 % discriminators and 10 % defectors, under image scoring only 8 % of discriminators are rated good, discriminators help each other only 8 % of the time, and their average payoff per round is 0.14, almost as low as the defectors'. Refusing defectors makes discriminators bad, refusing bad discriminators makes more discriminators bad, and cooperation among discriminators collapses. Shunning gives almost the same result. Under simple standing and stern judging 97 % of discriminators are good, they help each other 95 % of the time, and they earn 1.71 and 1.70, far above the defectors' 0.28 and 0.30. With 30 % defectors the difference is starker.
Scope of the numbers: The book discusses mathematical models of evolutionary games; it is not moral instruction and not business advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.14, 0.28, 0.30, 1.70, 1.71, 10
| columns: share Good by strategy | DISC->DISC help rate | payoff per round | |
| population DISC 90, ALLD 10 | |
| image scoring | 0.08 0.01 | 0.08 | +0.14 +0.03 |
| shunning | 0.09 0.01 | 0.09 | +0.16 +0.03 |
| simple standing | 0.97 0.11 | 0.95 | +1.71 +0.28 |
| stern judging | 0.97 0.12 | 0.95 | +1.70 +0.30 |
| population DISC 70, ALLD 30 | |
| image scoring | 0.03 0.01 | 0.04 | +0.05 +0.02 |
| shunning | 0.04 0.01 | 0.04 | +0.05 +0.02 |
| simple standing | 0.98 0.24 | 0.96 | +1.26 +0.51 |
| stern judging | 0.98 0.24 | 0.96 | +1.26 +0.50 |
| population DISC 80, ALLC 20 | |
| image scoring | 0.86 0.97 | 0.84 | +1.73 +1.91 |
| shunning | 0.24 0.25 | 0.25 | +0.94 +0.18 |
| simple standing | 0.97 0.97 | 0.95 | +1.92 +1.90 |
| stern judging | 0.97 0.93 | 0.95 | +1.93 +1.80 |
| population DISC 70, ALLD 15, ALLC 15 | |
| image scoring | 0.45 0.01 0.97 | 0.44 | +0.92 +0.47 +1.44 |
| shunning | 0.06 0.01 0.06 | 0.06 | +0.52 +0.46 -0.43 |
| simple standing | 0.97 0.15 0.97 | 0.95 | +1.61 +0.76 +1.44 |
| stern judging | 0.98 0.17 0.81 | 0.96 | +1.64 +0.80 +1.11 |
Show the full program
# Indirect reciprocity with public reputations (everyone shares one view, as in Ohtsuki
# & Iwasa 2004). N = 100 players; each step a random donor meets a random recipient and
# may give b = 3 at cost c = 1. DISC (discriminators) help Good recipients and refuse
# Bad ones; ALLC always help; ALLD never. An observer then labels the DONOR Good or Bad
# by a norm that looks at the action and the recipient's label (second-order norms;
# image scoring looks at the action only). Errors: an intended help fails with prob. e =
# 0.02; the observer assigns the wrong label with prob. mu = 0.01.
# help Good refuse Good help Bad refuse Bad
# image scoring G B G B
# shunning G B B B
# simple standing G B G G
# stern judging G B B G
import random
rng = random.Random(8)
KEYS = (("C", "G"), ("D", "G"), ("C", "B"), ("D", "B"))
NORMS = {name: dict(zip(KEYS, labels)) for name, labels in
(("image scoring", "GBGB"), ("shunning", "GBBB"), ("simple standing", "GBGG"),
("stern judging", "GBBG"))}
B, C, E, MU = 3.0, 1.0, 0.02, 0.01
def run(norm, mix, steps=200000, N=100):
types = [t for t, k in mix.items() for _ in range(k)]
rep = ["G"] * N; pay = [0.0] * N
good = {t: 0 for t in mix}; seen = {t: 0 for t in mix}
zz_help = zz = 0
for step in range(steps):
d, r = rng.sample(range(N), 2)
t = types[d]
want = t == "ALLC" or (t == "DISC" and rep[r] == "G")
act = "C" if want and rng.random() > E else "D"
if act == "C": pay[d] -= C; pay[r] += B
if t == "DISC" and types[r] == "DISC": zz += 1; zz_help += act == "C"
lab = NORMS[norm][(act, rep[r])]
if rng.random() < MU: lab = "B" if lab == "G" else "G"
rep[d] = lab
if step > steps // 4 and step % 50 == 0:
for i in range(N): good[types[i]] += rep[i] == "G"; seen[types[i]] += 1
av = {t: sum(p for p, ty in zip(pay, types) if ty == t) / mix[t] / steps * N
for t in mix}
return {t: good[t] / seen[t] for t in mix}, zz_help / zz, av
print("columns: share Good by strategy | DISC->DISC help rate | payoff per round")
for mix in ({"DISC": 90, "ALLD": 10}, {"DISC": 70, "ALLD": 30}, {"DISC": 80, "ALLC": 20},
{"DISC": 70, "ALLD": 15, "ALLC": 15}):
ks = list(mix)
print("population " + ", ".join(f"{k} {v}" for k, v in mix.items()))
for norm in NORMS:
g, h, av = run(norm, mix)
print(f" {norm:16s} " + " ".join(f"{g[k]:5.2f}" for k in ks)
+ f" | {h:.2f} | " + " ".join(f"{av[k]:+.2f}" for k in ks))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Indirect Reciprocity: Image Scores and Second-Order Reputation Norms. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Replicator Dynamics: Why Cooperation Loses in One-Shot Anonymous Games
- Chapter 2 · Hamilton's Rule, the Price Equation and the Five Mechanisms
- Chapter 3 · Direct Reciprocity: Tournaments, Noise and Forgiveness
- Chapter 5 · Network Reciprocity: Spatial Structure and Human Network Experiments
- Chapter 6 · Punishment: Altruistic Punishment, Antisocial Punishment and Governing the Commons
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-Registered Trial