What does Evolutionary Games and Reciprocity conclude, in numbers, about “Hamilton's Rule, the Price Equation and the Five Mechanisms”?

Answer: The network threshold \(k\) is the limit for large populations. For a finite network in which everyone has \(k\) neighbours the exact threshold is \((N - 2)/(N/k - 2)\) (Taylor 2007; Chen 2013): with \(k = 4\) it is 6.00 for \(N = 20\), 4.26 for \(N = 100\) and 4.02 for \(N = 1000\). In small networks the threshold lies well above \(k\). The group-selection threshold \(1 + n/m\) approaches 1 when groups are many and small: 1.2 with 50 groups of 10, and 3 with 5 groups of 10.

Scope of the numbers: The book discusses mathematical models of evolutionary games; it is not moral instruction and not business advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 10, 100, 1000, 20, 4.02, 4.26

direct reciprocity ESS risk-dominant one-third law
w0.5: numeric 2.000 3.000 4.000
formula2.000 (1/w) 3.000 ((2-w)/w) 4.000 ((3-2w)/w)
w0.8: numeric 1.250 1.500 1.750
formula1.250 (1/w) 1.500 ((2-w)/w) 1.750 ((3-2w)/w)
w0.9: numeric 1.111 1.222 1.333
formula1.111 (1/w) 1.222 ((2-w)/w) 1.333 ((3-2w)/w)
indirect reciprocity
q0.5: numeric 2.000 3.000 4.000
q0.8: numeric 1.250 1.500 1.750
q0.9: numeric 1.111 1.222 1.333
network reciprocity, critical b/c: k (large N) vs (N - 2)/(N/k - 2)
k2: N=20: 2.25 N=50: 2.09 N=100: 2.04 N=1000: 2.00 limit 2
k4: N=20: 6.00 N=50: 4.57 N=100: 4.26 N=1000: 4.02 limit 4
k8: N=20: 36.00 N=50: 11.29 N=100: 9.33 N=1000: 8.11 limit 8
kin selection 1/r: full sibs r1/2 -> 2, half sibs 1/4 -> 4, cousins 1/8 -> 8
group selection 1 + n/m (Traulsen & Nowak 2006: weak selection, rare splitting):
max group size n10, m = 5 groups: 3.00
max group size n10, m = 50 groups: 1.20
max group size n30, m = 10 groups: 4.00

Key formula

\[r\,b > c\]
Show the full program
# Nowak's (2006) five thresholds, each recomputed from its own model. Every rule has the
# form b/c > critical value, but the models and assumptions differ (see the text).
# Direct reciprocity: TFT vs ALLD, w = probability of another round. Row payoffs:
#     TFT vs TFT (b - c)/(1 - w), TFT vs ALLD -c, ALLD vs TFT b, ALLD vs ALLD 0.
# Indirect reciprocity: discriminators know a reputation with probability q:
#     DISC vs DISC b - c, DISC vs ALLD -c (1 - q), ALLD vs DISC b (1 - q), ALLD vs ALLD 0.
# For a 2 x 2 game [[a, b'], [c', d]] (cooperative strategy first): cooperation is an
# ESS if a > c', risk-dominant if a + b' > c' + d, and favoured by weak selection in a
# large population (one-third law) if a + 2b' > c' + 2d.
def conditions(M):
    (a, b, c, d) = M
    return a > c, a + b > c + d, a + 2 * b > c + 2 * d

def crit(make, lo=1.0001, hi=60.0):
    """Smallest b/c (c = 1) at which each of the three conditions holds, by bisection."""
    out = []
    for k in range(3):
        l, h = lo, hi
        if not conditions(make(h))[k]: out.append(float("inf")); continue
        for _ in range(60):
            m = (l + h) / 2
            if conditions(make(m))[k]: h = m
            else: l = m
        out.append(h)
    return out

print("direct reciprocity          ESS          risk-dominant        one-third law")
for w in (0.5, 0.8, 0.9):
    e, r, t = crit(lambda bc: ((bc - 1) / (1 - w), -1, bc, 0))
    print(f"  w = {w}: numeric   {e:6.3f}            {r:6.3f}             {t:6.3f}")
    print(f"           formula   {1 / w:6.3f} (1/w)      {(2 - w) / w:6.3f} ((2-w)/w)"
          f"     {(3 - 2 * w) / w:6.3f} ((3-2w)/w)")
print("indirect reciprocity")
for q in (0.5, 0.8, 0.9):
    e, r, t = crit(lambda bc: (bc - 1, -(1 - q), bc * (1 - q), 0))
    print(f"  q = {q}: numeric   {e:6.3f}            {r:6.3f}             {t:6.3f}")
# Network reciprocity (Ohtsuki et al. 2006: death-birth updating, weak selection, k << N);
# exact value for vertex-transitive graphs of size N (Taylor, Day & Wild 2007).
print("network reciprocity, critical b/c: k (large N) vs (N - 2)/(N/k - 2)")
for k in (2, 4, 8):
    print(f"  k = {k}: " + "  ".join(f"N={N}: {(N - 2) / (N / k - 2):6.2f}"
                                     for N in (20, 50, 100, 1000)) + f"   limit {k}")
print("kin selection 1/r: full sibs r = 1/2 -> 2, half sibs 1/4 -> 4, cousins 1/8 -> 8")
print("group selection 1 + n/m (Traulsen & Nowak 2006: weak selection, rare splitting):")
for n, m in ((10, 5), (10, 50), (30, 10)):
    print(f"  max group size n = {n}, m = {m} groups: {1 + n / m:.2f}")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Hamilton's Rule, the Price Equation and the Five Mechanisms. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}

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