What does Evolutionary Games and Reciprocity conclude, in numbers, about “Hamilton's Rule, the Price Equation and the Five Mechanisms”?
Answer: The network threshold \(k\) is the limit for large populations. For a finite network in which everyone has \(k\) neighbours the exact threshold is \((N - 2)/(N/k - 2)\) (Taylor 2007; Chen 2013): with \(k = 4\) it is 6.00 for \(N = 20\), 4.26 for \(N = 100\) and 4.02 for \(N = 1000\). In small networks the threshold lies well above \(k\). The group-selection threshold \(1 + n/m\) approaches 1 when groups are many and small: 1.2 with 50 groups of 10, and 3 with 5 groups of 10.
Scope of the numbers: The book discusses mathematical models of evolutionary games; it is not moral instruction and not business advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 10, 100, 1000, 20, 4.02, 4.26
| direct reciprocity ESS risk-dominant one-third law | |
| w | 0.5: numeric 2.000 3.000 4.000 |
| formula | 2.000 (1/w) 3.000 ((2-w)/w) 4.000 ((3-2w)/w) |
| w | 0.8: numeric 1.250 1.500 1.750 |
| formula | 1.250 (1/w) 1.500 ((2-w)/w) 1.750 ((3-2w)/w) |
| w | 0.9: numeric 1.111 1.222 1.333 |
| formula | 1.111 (1/w) 1.222 ((2-w)/w) 1.333 ((3-2w)/w) |
| indirect reciprocity | |
| q | 0.5: numeric 2.000 3.000 4.000 |
| q | 0.8: numeric 1.250 1.500 1.750 |
| q | 0.9: numeric 1.111 1.222 1.333 |
| network reciprocity, critical b/c: k (large N) vs (N - 2)/(N/k - 2) | |
| k | 2: N=20: 2.25 N=50: 2.09 N=100: 2.04 N=1000: 2.00 limit 2 |
| k | 4: N=20: 6.00 N=50: 4.57 N=100: 4.26 N=1000: 4.02 limit 4 |
| k | 8: N=20: 36.00 N=50: 11.29 N=100: 9.33 N=1000: 8.11 limit 8 |
| kin selection 1/r: full sibs r | 1/2 -> 2, half sibs 1/4 -> 4, cousins 1/8 -> 8 |
| group selection 1 + n/m (Traulsen & Nowak 2006: weak selection, rare splitting): | |
| max group size n | 10, m = 5 groups: 3.00 |
| max group size n | 10, m = 50 groups: 1.20 |
| max group size n | 30, m = 10 groups: 4.00 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Nowak's (2006) five thresholds, each recomputed from its own model. Every rule has the
# form b/c > critical value, but the models and assumptions differ (see the text).
# Direct reciprocity: TFT vs ALLD, w = probability of another round. Row payoffs:
# TFT vs TFT (b - c)/(1 - w), TFT vs ALLD -c, ALLD vs TFT b, ALLD vs ALLD 0.
# Indirect reciprocity: discriminators know a reputation with probability q:
# DISC vs DISC b - c, DISC vs ALLD -c (1 - q), ALLD vs DISC b (1 - q), ALLD vs ALLD 0.
# For a 2 x 2 game [[a, b'], [c', d]] (cooperative strategy first): cooperation is an
# ESS if a > c', risk-dominant if a + b' > c' + d, and favoured by weak selection in a
# large population (one-third law) if a + 2b' > c' + 2d.
def conditions(M):
(a, b, c, d) = M
return a > c, a + b > c + d, a + 2 * b > c + 2 * d
def crit(make, lo=1.0001, hi=60.0):
"""Smallest b/c (c = 1) at which each of the three conditions holds, by bisection."""
out = []
for k in range(3):
l, h = lo, hi
if not conditions(make(h))[k]: out.append(float("inf")); continue
for _ in range(60):
m = (l + h) / 2
if conditions(make(m))[k]: h = m
else: l = m
out.append(h)
return out
print("direct reciprocity ESS risk-dominant one-third law")
for w in (0.5, 0.8, 0.9):
e, r, t = crit(lambda bc: ((bc - 1) / (1 - w), -1, bc, 0))
print(f" w = {w}: numeric {e:6.3f} {r:6.3f} {t:6.3f}")
print(f" formula {1 / w:6.3f} (1/w) {(2 - w) / w:6.3f} ((2-w)/w)"
f" {(3 - 2 * w) / w:6.3f} ((3-2w)/w)")
print("indirect reciprocity")
for q in (0.5, 0.8, 0.9):
e, r, t = crit(lambda bc: (bc - 1, -(1 - q), bc * (1 - q), 0))
print(f" q = {q}: numeric {e:6.3f} {r:6.3f} {t:6.3f}")
# Network reciprocity (Ohtsuki et al. 2006: death-birth updating, weak selection, k << N);
# exact value for vertex-transitive graphs of size N (Taylor, Day & Wild 2007).
print("network reciprocity, critical b/c: k (large N) vs (N - 2)/(N/k - 2)")
for k in (2, 4, 8):
print(f" k = {k}: " + " ".join(f"N={N}: {(N - 2) / (N / k - 2):6.2f}"
for N in (20, 50, 100, 1000)) + f" limit {k}")
print("kin selection 1/r: full sibs r = 1/2 -> 2, half sibs 1/4 -> 4, cousins 1/8 -> 8")
print("group selection 1 + n/m (Traulsen & Nowak 2006: weak selection, rare splitting):")
for n, m in ((10, 5), (10, 50), (30, 10)):
print(f" max group size n = {n}, m = {m} groups: {1 + n / m:.2f}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Hamilton's Rule, the Price Equation and the Five Mechanisms. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Replicator Dynamics: Why Cooperation Loses in One-Shot Anonymous Games
- Chapter 3 · Direct Reciprocity: Tournaments, Noise and Forgiveness
- Chapter 4 · Indirect Reciprocity: Image Scores and Second-Order Reputation Norms
- Chapter 5 · Network Reciprocity: Spatial Structure and Human Network Experiments
- Chapter 6 · Punishment: Altruistic Punishment, Antisocial Punishment and Governing the Commons
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-Registered Trial