What does Evolutionary Games and Reciprocity conclude, in numbers, about “Replicator Dynamics: Why Cooperation Loses in One-Shot Anonymous Games”?
Answer: The last part of the program checks this law. With a stag payoff of 4, \(x* = 0.75\) and \(\rho N = 0.65\); with a stag payoff of 12, \(x* = 0.25\) and \(\rho N = 1.15\). The dividing line lies close to \(x* = 1/3\): at \(x* = 0.333\), \(\rho N = 0.96\), and at \(x^* = 0.30\) it is 1.02. That \(\rho N\) falls slightly below 1 exactly at 1/3 when \(N = 100\) is a finite-population correction, which shrinks as the population grows. Chapter 2 shows that the one-third law is one of the three criteria Nowak used to compare the five mechanisms.
Scope of the numbers: The book discusses mathematical models of evolutionary games; it is not moral instruction and not business advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.01, 0.1, 0.253, 0.257, 0.333, 10
| one-shot donation game, b | 3, c = 1; rho x N (1 = neutral) |
| N s cooperator mutant defector mutant | |
| 10 | 0.01 0.9408 1.0608 |
| 10 | 0.10 0.4941 1.6585 |
| 50 | 0.01 0.7611 1.2802 |
| 50 | 0.10 0.0246 4.6693 |
| 200 | 0.01 0.3070 2.3145 |
| 200 | 0.10 0.0000 17.1476 |
| simulation check, N | 20, s = 0.1, 40,000 runs: |
| cooperator rho x N | 0.257 (formula 0.253) |
| stag hunt, weak selection s | 0.005, N = 100: rho x N for a single stag hunter |
| stag payoff | 4: x* = 0.750, rho x N = 0.653 |
| stag payoff | 6: x* = 0.500, rho x N = 0.773 |
| stag payoff | 9: x* = 0.333, rho x N = 0.959 |
| stag payoff 10: x* | 0.300, rho x N = 1.022 |
| stag payoff 12: x* | 0.250, rho x N = 1.147 |
| stag payoff 20: x* | 0.150, rho x N = 1.620 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Finite populations: the Moran process. N individuals; each step one is chosen to
# reproduce with probability proportional to fitness 1 - s + s * (average payoff from
# games with all others), and its offspring replaces a randomly chosen individual. rho =
# probability that a single mutant takes over (neutral benchmark 1/N). Closed form (e.g.
# Nowak et al. 2004):
# rho = 1 / (1 + sum_{k=1}^{N-1} prod_{j=1}^{k} g_j / f_j),
# f_j, g_j = fitness of mutant and resident when there are j mutants.
import random
rng = random.Random(2)
def fit(j, N, g, s):
a, b, c, d = g # mutant row first: a, b; resident row: c, d
pm = (a * (j - 1) + b * (N - j)) / (N - 1)
pr = (c * j + d * (N - j - 1)) / (N - 1)
return 1 - s + s * pm, 1 - s + s * pr
def rho(N, g, s):
tot, prod = 1.0, 1.0
for k in range(1, N):
fm, fr = fit(k, N, g, s); prod *= fr / fm; tot += prod
return 1 / tot
def simulate(N, g, s, runs):
won = 0
for _ in range(runs):
j = 1
while 0 < j < N:
fm, fr = fit(j, N, g, s)
birth_m = rng.random() < j * fm / (j * fm + (N - j) * fr)
death_m = rng.random() < j / N
j += birth_m - death_m
won += j == N
return won / runs
PD = (2, -1, 3, 0) # one-shot anonymous donation game, b = 3, c = 1 (C row first)
DC = (0, 3, -1, 2) # the same game with D as the mutant
print("one-shot donation game, b = 3, c = 1; rho x N (1 = neutral)")
print(" N s cooperator mutant defector mutant")
for N in (10, 50, 200):
for s in (0.01, 0.1):
rc, rd = rho(N, PD, s) * N, rho(N, DC, s) * N
print(f"{N:4d} {s:4.2f} {rc:8.4f} {rd:9.4f}")
print(f"simulation check, N = 20, s = 0.1, 40,000 runs:\n cooperator rho x N ="
f" {simulate(20, PD, 0.1, 40000) * 20:.3f} (formula {rho(20, PD, 0.1) * 20:.3f})")
# Stag hunt, payoffs a, b, c, d = 4, 0, 3, 3 (stag row first): the unstable point is x*
# = (d - b)/(a - b - c + d) = 0.75. The one-third law (Nowak et al. 2004): under weak
# selection in a large population, a single stag hunter is favoured (rho > 1/N) iff x* <
# 1/3.
print("stag hunt, weak selection s = 0.005, N = 100: rho x N for a single stag hunter")
for a in (4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 20):
g = (a, 0, 3, 3); xs = 3 / a
rn = 100 * rho(100, g, 0.005)
print(f" stag payoff {a:>2}: x* = {xs:.3f}, rho x N = {rn:.3f}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Replicator Dynamics: Why Cooperation Loses in One-Shot Anonymous Games. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Hamilton's Rule, the Price Equation and the Five Mechanisms
- Chapter 3 · Direct Reciprocity: Tournaments, Noise and Forgiveness
- Chapter 4 · Indirect Reciprocity: Image Scores and Second-Order Reputation Norms
- Chapter 5 · Network Reciprocity: Spatial Structure and Human Network Experiments
- Chapter 6 · Punishment: Altruistic Punishment, Antisocial Punishment and Governing the Commons
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-Registered Trial