关于「复制子动力学:单次匿名博弈中合作为什么输」,《演化博弈与互惠合作》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:程序用莫兰过程(每一步按适合度挑一个个体繁殖,后代随机替换一个个体)计算固定概率,并以 \(\rho N\) 表示相对于中性的倍数。在单次匿名的捐献博弈中,合作者的 \(\rho N\) 总是小于 1,背叛者的总是大于 1。种群越大、选择越强,差距越大:\(N = 10\)、选择强度 \(s = 0.01\) 时,合作者的固定概率只比中性低 6%(0.94);\(N = 200\)、\(s = 0.1\) 时,它实际上为零,而背叛者是中性的 17 倍。对 \(N = 20\)、\(s = 0.1\) 的模拟(40,000 次)得到 0.257,与公式的 0.253 相符。小种群中合作者偶尔能靠运气固定下来,但选择的方向始终不利于它。
数据口径:本书讨论演化博弈的数学模型,不作道德说教,也不是经营建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(15 段程序,全部核对)、原典与作者的假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.01, 0.1, 0.253, 0.257, 0.333, 10
| one-shot donation game, b | 3, c = 1; rho x N (1 = neutral) |
| N s cooperator mutant defector mutant | |
| 10 | 0.01 0.9408 1.0608 |
| 10 | 0.10 0.4941 1.6585 |
| 50 | 0.01 0.7611 1.2802 |
| 50 | 0.10 0.0246 4.6693 |
| 200 | 0.01 0.3070 2.3145 |
| 200 | 0.10 0.0000 17.1476 |
| simulation check, N | 20, s = 0.1, 40,000 runs: |
| cooperator rho x N | 0.257 (formula 0.253) |
| stag hunt, weak selection s | 0.005, N = 100: rho x N for a single stag hunter |
| stag payoff | 4: x* = 0.750, rho x N = 0.653 |
| stag payoff | 6: x* = 0.500, rho x N = 0.773 |
| stag payoff | 9: x* = 0.333, rho x N = 0.959 |
| stag payoff 10: x* | 0.300, rho x N = 1.022 |
| stag payoff 12: x* | 0.250, rho x N = 1.147 |
| stag payoff 20: x* | 0.150, rho x N = 1.620 |
核心公式
\[\dot x_i = x_i\,[f_i(x) - \bar f(x)]\]
查看完整验算程序
# Finite populations: the Moran process. N individuals; each step one is chosen to
# reproduce with probability proportional to fitness 1 - s + s * (average payoff from
# games with all others), and its offspring replaces a randomly chosen individual. rho =
# probability that a single mutant takes over (neutral benchmark 1/N). Closed form (e.g.
# Nowak et al. 2004):
# rho = 1 / (1 + sum_{k=1}^{N-1} prod_{j=1}^{k} g_j / f_j),
# f_j, g_j = fitness of mutant and resident when there are j mutants.
import random
rng = random.Random(2)
def fit(j, N, g, s):
a, b, c, d = g # mutant row first: a, b; resident row: c, d
pm = (a * (j - 1) + b * (N - j)) / (N - 1)
pr = (c * j + d * (N - j - 1)) / (N - 1)
return 1 - s + s * pm, 1 - s + s * pr
def rho(N, g, s):
tot, prod = 1.0, 1.0
for k in range(1, N):
fm, fr = fit(k, N, g, s); prod *= fr / fm; tot += prod
return 1 / tot
def simulate(N, g, s, runs):
won = 0
for _ in range(runs):
j = 1
while 0 < j < N:
fm, fr = fit(j, N, g, s)
birth_m = rng.random() < j * fm / (j * fm + (N - j) * fr)
death_m = rng.random() < j / N
j += birth_m - death_m
won += j == N
return won / runs
PD = (2, -1, 3, 0) # one-shot anonymous donation game, b = 3, c = 1 (C row first)
DC = (0, 3, -1, 2) # the same game with D as the mutant
print("one-shot donation game, b = 3, c = 1; rho x N (1 = neutral)")
print(" N s cooperator mutant defector mutant")
for N in (10, 50, 200):
for s in (0.01, 0.1):
rc, rd = rho(N, PD, s) * N, rho(N, DC, s) * N
print(f"{N:4d} {s:4.2f} {rc:8.4f} {rd:9.4f}")
print(f"simulation check, N = 20, s = 0.1, 40,000 runs:\n cooperator rho x N ="
f" {simulate(20, PD, 0.1, 40000) * 20:.3f} (formula {rho(20, PD, 0.1) * 20:.3f})")
# Stag hunt, payoffs a, b, c, d = 4, 0, 3, 3 (stag row first): the unstable point is x*
# = (d - b)/(a - b - c + d) = 0.75. The one-third law (Nowak et al. 2004): under weak
# selection in a large population, a single stag hunter is favoured (rho > 1/N) iff x* <
# 1/3.
print("stag hunt, weak selection s = 0.005, N = 100: rho x N for a single stag hunter")
for a in (4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 20):
g = (a, 0, 3, 3); xs = 3 / a
rn = 100 * rho(100, g, 0.005)
print(f" stag payoff {a:>2}: x* = {xs:.3f}, rho x N = {rn:.3f}")唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《演化博弈、直接与间接互惠及合作涌现的数学模型》第 1 章「复制子动力学:单次匿名博弈中合作为什么输」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}