关于「直接互惠:锦标赛、噪声与宽容」,《演化博弈与互惠合作》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:一报还一报在阿克塞尔罗德的两次锦标赛中胜出,但它从不在单局中击败对手,名次依赖参赛构成。有执行错误时,两个一报还一报陷入报复循环,长期收益降到四种结果的平均值。慷慨一报还一报的原谅概率有上限 \(\min\{1 - (T - R)/(R - S), (R - P)/(T - P)\}\),捐献博弈中为 \(1 - c/b\);赢定输移在 \(b/c > 2\) 时稳健,在演化中占优。零行列式的勒索策略在每局中都不吃亏,但在大种群的演化中被淘汰。直接互惠需要同一对个体反复相遇;下一章讨论另一种情形:帮助一个以后不会再见的人。
数据口径:本书讨论演化博弈的数学模型,不作道德说教,也不是经营建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(15 段程序,全部核对)、原典与作者的假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库
noise 0.00: GTFT 2.64 TF2T 2.54 TFT 2.50 WSLS 2.43 ALLC 2.43
TESTER 2.31 GRIM 2.29 RANDOM 2.21 STFT 2.04 ALLD 1.86 JOSS 1.86
noise 0.01: GTFT 2.43 TF2T 2.37 TESTER 2.31 WSLS 2.30 TFT 2.25
RANDOM 2.20 ALLC 2.16 STFT 2.13 GRIM 2.07 JOSS 1.98 ALLD 1.89
noise 0.05: TESTER 2.31 GTFT 2.30 TF2T 2.25 WSLS 2.25 RANDOM 2.23
TFT 2.21 STFT 2.18 JOSS 2.15 GRIM 2.04 ALLC 2.04 ALLD 2.03
a rule against its own twin, points per round (mean of 200 matches)
noise 0 1 %, 200 rounds 1 %, 5000 rounds 5 %, 5000 rounds
TFT 3.00 2.43 2.26 2.25
GTFT 3.00 2.97 2.97 2.86
WSLS 3.00 2.95 2.95 2.78
GRIM 3.00 1.51 1.05 1.15核心公式
\[q^* = \min\left\{1 - \frac{T - R}{R - S},\ \frac{R - P}{T - P}\right\}\]
查看完整验算程序
# A small round-robin tournament in the spirit of Axelrod (1980): eleven simple rules;
# every pair (and each rule against its own twin) plays 200 rounds of the prisoner's
# dilemma with Axelrod's payoffs R = 3, S = 0, T = 5, P = 1. With execution noise eps,
# each intended move is flipped with probability eps. Scores are average points per
# round. This is NOT a replay of Axelrod's tournaments, whose 14 and 62 entries were
# more varied; rankings depend on the field of entries.
import random
rng = random.Random(5)
PAY = {("C", "C"): 3, ("C", "D"): 0, ("D", "C"): 5, ("D", "D"): 1}
def allc(m, o): return "C"
def alld(m, o): return "D"
def tft(m, o): return o[-1] if o else "C"
def stft(m, o): return o[-1] if o else "D" # suspicious TFT
def tf2t(m, o): return "D" if o[-2:] == ["D", "D"] else "C"
def grim(m, o): return "D" if "D" in o else "C"
def wsls(m, o): # win-stay, lose-shift (Pavlov)
if not m: return "C"
return m[-1] if PAY[(m[-1], o[-1])] >= 3 else ("D" if m[-1] == "C" else "C")
def gtft(m, o): # forgives a D with prob. 1/3
if not o or o[-1] == "C": return "C"
return "C" if rng.random() < 1 / 3 else "D"
def joss(m, o): # TFT, but sneaks in 10 % D
if o and o[-1] == "D": return "D"
return "D" if rng.random() < 0.1 else "C"
def tester(m, o): # probes with D in round 1; if the other side does not hit
if not m: return "D" # back in round 2, it defects every other round; else TFT
if len(m) == 1: return "C"
if o[1] == "D": return o[-1]
return "D" if len(m) % 2 == 0 else "C"
def rand(m, o): return "C" if rng.random() < 0.5 else "D"
RULES = {"TFT": tft, "TF2T": tf2t, "GTFT": gtft, "WSLS": wsls, "GRIM": grim, "ALLC": allc,
"STFT": stft, "JOSS": joss, "RANDOM": rand, "ALLD": alld,
"TESTER": tester}
def match(f, g, eps, n=200):
a, b, sa, sb = [], [], 0, 0
for _ in range(n):
x, y = f(a, b), g(b, a)
if rng.random() < eps: x = "D" if x == "C" else "C"
if rng.random() < eps: y = "D" if y == "C" else "C"
a.append(x); b.append(y); sa += PAY[(x, y)]; sb += PAY[(y, x)]
return sa / n, sb / n
def tournament(eps, reps):
tot = {k: 0.0 for k in RULES}
names = list(RULES)
for _ in range(reps):
for i, p in enumerate(names):
for q in names[i:]:
s1, s2 = match(RULES[p], RULES[q], eps)
if p == q: tot[p] += s1
else: tot[p] += s1; tot[q] += s2
return {k: v / (reps * len(names)) for k, v in tot.items()}
for eps, reps in ((0.0, 20), (0.01, 20), (0.05, 20)):
res = sorted(tournament(eps, reps).items(), key=lambda kv: -kv[1])
print(f"noise {eps:4.2f}: " + " ".join(f"{k} {v:.2f}" for k, v in res[:5]))
print(" " + " ".join(f"{k} {v:.2f}" for k, v in res[5:]))
print("a rule against its own twin, points per round (mean of 200 matches)")
print(" noise 0 1 %, 200 rounds 1 %, 5000 rounds 5 %, 5000 rounds")
for name in ("TFT", "GTFT", "WSLS", "GRIM"):
row = []
for eps, n in ((0.0, 200), (0.01, 200), (0.01, 5000), (0.05, 5000)):
f = RULES[name]
row.append(sum(match(f, f, eps, n)[0] for _ in range(200)) / 200)
print(f" {name:5s} {row[0]:.2f} {row[1]:.2f} {row[2]:.2f}"
f" {row[3]:.2f}")唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《演化博弈、直接与间接互惠及合作涌现的数学模型》第 3 章「直接互惠:锦标赛、噪声与宽容」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}