What does Evolutionary Games and Reciprocity conclude, in numbers, about “Direct Reciprocity: Tournaments, Noise and Forgiveness”?
Answer: Tit for tat won Axelrod's two tournaments, but it never beats an opponent in a single match, and its ranking depends on the field. With execution errors two tit-for-tat players fall into a retaliation cycle and their long-run payoff drops to the average of the four outcomes. Generous tit for tat's forgiveness has an upper limit \(\min\{1 - (T - R)/(R - S), (R - P)/(T - P)\}\), which is \(1 - c/b\) in the donation game; win-stay, lose-shift is robust when \(b/c > 2\) and prevails in evolution. Zero-determinant extortioners never lose a match but are eliminated in evolution in large populations. Direct reciprocity needs the same pair to meet again and again; the next chapter turns to the case of helping someone one will never meet again.
Scope of the numbers: The book discusses mathematical models of evolutionary games; it is not moral instruction and not business advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python only
noise 0.00: GTFT 2.64 TF2T 2.54 TFT 2.50 WSLS 2.43 ALLC 2.43
TESTER 2.31 GRIM 2.29 RANDOM 2.21 STFT 2.04 ALLD 1.86 JOSS 1.86
noise 0.01: GTFT 2.43 TF2T 2.37 TESTER 2.31 WSLS 2.30 TFT 2.25
RANDOM 2.20 ALLC 2.16 STFT 2.13 GRIM 2.07 JOSS 1.98 ALLD 1.89
noise 0.05: TESTER 2.31 GTFT 2.30 TF2T 2.25 WSLS 2.25 RANDOM 2.23
TFT 2.21 STFT 2.18 JOSS 2.15 GRIM 2.04 ALLC 2.04 ALLD 2.03
a rule against its own twin, points per round (mean of 200 matches)
noise 0 1 %, 200 rounds 1 %, 5000 rounds 5 %, 5000 rounds
TFT 3.00 2.43 2.26 2.25
GTFT 3.00 2.97 2.97 2.86
WSLS 3.00 2.95 2.95 2.78
GRIM 3.00 1.51 1.05 1.15Key formula
Show the full program
# A small round-robin tournament in the spirit of Axelrod (1980): eleven simple rules;
# every pair (and each rule against its own twin) plays 200 rounds of the prisoner's
# dilemma with Axelrod's payoffs R = 3, S = 0, T = 5, P = 1. With execution noise eps,
# each intended move is flipped with probability eps. Scores are average points per
# round. This is NOT a replay of Axelrod's tournaments, whose 14 and 62 entries were
# more varied; rankings depend on the field of entries.
import random
rng = random.Random(5)
PAY = {("C", "C"): 3, ("C", "D"): 0, ("D", "C"): 5, ("D", "D"): 1}
def allc(m, o): return "C"
def alld(m, o): return "D"
def tft(m, o): return o[-1] if o else "C"
def stft(m, o): return o[-1] if o else "D" # suspicious TFT
def tf2t(m, o): return "D" if o[-2:] == ["D", "D"] else "C"
def grim(m, o): return "D" if "D" in o else "C"
def wsls(m, o): # win-stay, lose-shift (Pavlov)
if not m: return "C"
return m[-1] if PAY[(m[-1], o[-1])] >= 3 else ("D" if m[-1] == "C" else "C")
def gtft(m, o): # forgives a D with prob. 1/3
if not o or o[-1] == "C": return "C"
return "C" if rng.random() < 1 / 3 else "D"
def joss(m, o): # TFT, but sneaks in 10 % D
if o and o[-1] == "D": return "D"
return "D" if rng.random() < 0.1 else "C"
def tester(m, o): # probes with D in round 1; if the other side does not hit
if not m: return "D" # back in round 2, it defects every other round; else TFT
if len(m) == 1: return "C"
if o[1] == "D": return o[-1]
return "D" if len(m) % 2 == 0 else "C"
def rand(m, o): return "C" if rng.random() < 0.5 else "D"
RULES = {"TFT": tft, "TF2T": tf2t, "GTFT": gtft, "WSLS": wsls, "GRIM": grim, "ALLC": allc,
"STFT": stft, "JOSS": joss, "RANDOM": rand, "ALLD": alld,
"TESTER": tester}
def match(f, g, eps, n=200):
a, b, sa, sb = [], [], 0, 0
for _ in range(n):
x, y = f(a, b), g(b, a)
if rng.random() < eps: x = "D" if x == "C" else "C"
if rng.random() < eps: y = "D" if y == "C" else "C"
a.append(x); b.append(y); sa += PAY[(x, y)]; sb += PAY[(y, x)]
return sa / n, sb / n
def tournament(eps, reps):
tot = {k: 0.0 for k in RULES}
names = list(RULES)
for _ in range(reps):
for i, p in enumerate(names):
for q in names[i:]:
s1, s2 = match(RULES[p], RULES[q], eps)
if p == q: tot[p] += s1
else: tot[p] += s1; tot[q] += s2
return {k: v / (reps * len(names)) for k, v in tot.items()}
for eps, reps in ((0.0, 20), (0.01, 20), (0.05, 20)):
res = sorted(tournament(eps, reps).items(), key=lambda kv: -kv[1])
print(f"noise {eps:4.2f}: " + " ".join(f"{k} {v:.2f}" for k, v in res[:5]))
print(" " + " ".join(f"{k} {v:.2f}" for k, v in res[5:]))
print("a rule against its own twin, points per round (mean of 200 matches)")
print(" noise 0 1 %, 200 rounds 1 %, 5000 rounds 5 %, 5000 rounds")
for name in ("TFT", "GTFT", "WSLS", "GRIM"):
row = []
for eps, n in ((0.0, 200), (0.01, 200), (0.01, 5000), (0.05, 5000)):
f = RULES[name]
row.append(sum(match(f, f, eps, n)[0] for _ in range(200)) / 200)
print(f" {name:5s} {row[0]:.2f} {row[1]:.2f} {row[2]:.2f}"
f" {row[3]:.2f}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: Direct Reciprocity: Tournaments, Noise and Forgiveness. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Replicator Dynamics: Why Cooperation Loses in One-Shot Anonymous Games
- Chapter 2 · Hamilton's Rule, the Price Equation and the Five Mechanisms
- Chapter 4 · Indirect Reciprocity: Image Scores and Second-Order Reputation Norms
- Chapter 5 · Network Reciprocity: Spatial Structure and Human Network Experiments
- Chapter 6 · Punishment: Altruistic Punishment, Antisocial Punishment and Governing the Commons
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-Registered Trial