What does Evolutionary Games and Reciprocity conclude, in numbers, about “Punishment: Altruistic Punishment, Antisocial Punishment and Governing the Commons”?

Answer: The last part of the program lists each person's payoff in a group of 5 to show the efficiency cost of punishment. When all cooperate each gets 2.0, the same as when all are punishers, because nobody needs to be punished. With 4 punishers and 1 defector the group's total payoff is −8.0, lower not only than the 10.0 of full cooperation but also than the 0 of full defection: each punisher gets only 0.4 and the defector is driven down to −9.6. When 3 punishers and 2 antisocial punishers punish each other, the group total is −42.0. Punishment when used always destroys income; its value lies before use: if its threat is enough to make people cooperate, it rarely needs to be used. This is the logic of the 50-period experiment of Gächter and colleagues.

Scope of the numbers: The book discusses mathematical models of evolutionary games; it is not moral instruction and not business advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.4, 10.0, 2.0

selection strength beta0.05: long-run share of time; share contributing
C+D C 0.109, D 0.891;0.109
C+D+P C 0.126, D 0.631, P 0.243;0.369
C+D+P+A C 0.063, D 0.385, P 0.134, A 0.418;0.197
C+D+L+P C 0.249, D 0.114, L 0.104, P 0.533;0.782
C+D+L+P+A C 0.222, D 0.092, L 0.115, P 0.533, A 0.038;0.755
selection strength beta1.0: long-run share of time; share contributing
C+D C 0.000, D 1.000;0.000
C+D+P C 0.000, D 1.000, P 0.000;0.000
C+D+P+A C 0.000, D 0.500, P 0.000, A 0.500;0.000
C+D+L+P C 0.047, D 0.026, L 0.061, P 0.866;0.913
C+D+L+P+A C 0.047, D 0.025, L 0.061, P 0.866, A 0.000;0.913
group of 5, payoff per player (contributing 1 is the cost of cooperating):
CCCCC: +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 group total +10.0
DDDDD: +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 group total +0.0
PPPPP: +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 +2.0 group total +10.0
PPPPD: +0.4 +0.4 +0.4 +0.4 -9.6 group total -8.0
PPPAA-7.2 -7.2 -7.2 -10.2 -10.2 group total -42.0
CCCCA-1.6 -1.6 -1.6 -1.6 -1.6 group total -8.0
Show the full program
# Public goods with prosocial and antisocial punishment. Population N = 100; groups of
# n = 5 are drawn at random. Contributors pay 1; the pot is multiplied by r = 3 and shared
# equally among the participants. Then punishers act: each punishing act costs the
# punisher 1 and the target 3 (the 1:3 technology of Fehr & Gachter 2002 and Herrmann et
# al. 2008).
#   C  contributes, never punishes      D  defects, never punishes
#   P  contributes, punishes every D
#   A  defects, punishes every contributor (antisocial punishment)
#   L  loner: stays out and gets 1 (optional participation; groups with fewer than two
#      participants also give 1). Punishment acts only among participants.
# Expected payoffs in a population with i mutants follow from hypergeometric group draws.
# Imitation by pairwise comparison with rare mutations, as in p07: long-run share of time
# in each strategy, for weak (beta = 0.05) and strong (beta = 1) selection. All parameters
# are illustrative.
import math

R_MULT, NG, FINE, COST, SIGMA = 3.0, 5, 3.0, 1.0, 1.0
CONTRIB = {"C": 1, "D": 0, "P": 1, "A": 0, "L": None}

def payoff(me, others):
    """Payoff of 'me' in a group whose other members are 'others'."""
    part = [s for s in [me] + others if s != "L"]
    if me == "L" or len(part) < 2: return SIGMA
    pay = R_MULT * sum(CONTRIB[s] for s in part) / len(part) - CONTRIB[me]
    po = [s for s in others if s != "L"]
    if me == "P": pay -= COST * sum(CONTRIB[s] == 0 for s in po)
    if me == "A": pay -= COST * sum(CONTRIB[s] == 1 for s in po)
    if CONTRIB[me] == 0: pay -= FINE * sum(s == "P" for s in po)
    else: pay -= FINE * sum(s == "A" for s in po)
    return pay

def hyper(k, K, N, n):       # P(k of the n others are mutants), K mutants in N others
    return math.comb(K, k) * math.comb(N - K, n - k) / math.comb(N, n)

def expected(me, mut, res, i, N):
    """Expected payoff of a 'me'-player when the population has i mutants (mut) and N - i
    residents (res); the other NG - 1 group members are drawn from the remaining N - 1."""
    K = i - (me == mut)
    return sum(hyper(k, K, N - 1, NG - 1) * payoff(me, [mut] * k + [res] * (NG - 1 - k))
               for k in range(NG))

def fixation(mut, res, N, beta):
    tot, prod = 1.0, 1.0
    for i in range(1, N):
        d = expected(mut, mut, res, i, N) - expected(res, mut, res, i, N)
        prod *= math.exp(-beta * d); tot += prod
        if prod > 1e300: return 0.0
    return 1 / tot

def abundance(names, N=100, beta=1.0):
    n = len(names)
    T = [[0.0] * n for _ in range(n)]
    for j, res in enumerate(names):
        for i, mut in enumerate(names):
            if i != j: T[j][i] = fixation(mut, res, N, beta) / (n - 1)
        T[j][j] = 1 - sum(T[j])
    v = [1 / n] * n
    for _ in range(100000):
        w = [sum(v[j] * T[j][i] for j in range(n)) for i in range(n)]
        if max(abs(x - y) for x, y in zip(v, w)) < 1e-14: break
        v = w
    return v

for beta in (0.05, 1.0):
    print(f"selection strength beta = {beta}: long-run share of time; share contributing")
    for names in (["C", "D"], ["C", "D", "P"], ["C", "D", "P", "A"], ["C", "D", "L", "P"],
                  ["C", "D", "L", "P", "A"]):
        v = abundance(names, beta=beta)
        coop = sum(x for s, x in zip(names, v) if CONTRIB[s] == 1)
        sh = ", ".join(f"{s} {x:.3f}" for s, x in zip(names, v))
        print(f"  {'+'.join(names):10s} {sh};  {coop:.3f}")
print("group of 5, payoff per player (contributing 1 is the cost of cooperating):")
for grp in (["C"] * 5, ["D"] * 5, ["P"] * 5, ["P"] * 4 + ["D"], ["P"] * 3 + ["A"] * 2,
            ["C"] * 4 + ["A"]):
    pays = [payoff(grp[k], grp[:k] + grp[k + 1:]) for k in range(5)]
    print(f"  {''.join(grp)}: " + " ".join(f"{p:+.1f}" for p in pays)
          + f"   group total {sum(pays):+.1f}")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Punishment: Altruistic Punishment, Antisocial Punishment and Governing the Commons. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}

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