关于「网络互惠:空间结构与人类网络实验」,《演化博弈与互惠合作》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:当个体只与邻居互动时,合作者可以结成团块而存活:诺瓦克—梅模型中,合作者在 \(1.8 < T < 2\) 时稳定在约 31%,而随机相遇时全部灭绝。大槻等人的规则 \(b/c > k\) 给出了「死亡—出生」更新、弱选择下网络偏爱合作的条件;有限网络的精确门槛 \((N - 2)/(N/k - 2)\) 更高,「出生—死亡」更新下网络从不偏爱合作。人类实验中,大型静态网络没有提高合作,而在 \(b/c > k\) 的条件下合作保持稳定;网络能否帮助合作,取决于收益结构与人们实际的反应方式。下一章讨论一种直接改变收益的机制:惩罚。

数据口径:本书讨论演化博弈的数学模型,不作道德说教,也不是经营建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(15 段程序,全部核对)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库

Tcooperator share (generations 150-200, 3 runs)
1.100.9810.9820.986mean 0.983
1.300.8660.8750.854mean 0.865
1.550.7940.8240.829mean 0.816
1.700.7040.7070.717mean 0.709
1.800.4100.3990.411mean 0.407
1.900.3180.3100.309mean 0.312
1.990.3130.3110.322mean 0.315
2.050.0430.0180.047mean 0.036

核心公式

\[b/c > k,\]
查看完整验算程序
# Spatial games after Nowak & May (1992). Players sit on a 60 x 60 torus; each plays the
# one-shot game with its 8 neighbours and itself, with C vs C = 1, D vs C = T, and 0
# otherwise (a "weak" prisoner's dilemma, 1 < T < 2). Then every site, simultaneously,
# copies the strategy of the highest scorer among itself and its 8 neighbours.
# Start: 10 % defectors at random. Reported: cooperator share averaged over generations
# 150-200, in each of 3 runs. In a well-mixed population defectors take over for every
# T > 1.
import random
rng = random.Random(10)
L = 60
NB = [(dx, dy) for dx in (-1, 0, 1) for dy in (-1, 0, 1)]    # includes the site itself

def step(g, T):
    score = [[0.0] * L for _ in range(L)]
    for i in range(L):
        for j in range(L):
            nc = sum(g[(i + dx) % L][(j + dy) % L] for dx, dy in NB)
            score[i][j] = nc * (1.0 if g[i][j] else T)
    new = [[0] * L for _ in range(L)]
    for i in range(L):
        for j in range(L):
            best, s = g[i][j], score[i][j]
            for dx, dy in NB:
                a, b = (i + dx) % L, (j + dy) % L
                if score[a][b] > s: s, best = score[a][b], g[a][b]
            new[i][j] = best
    return new

def run(T, gens=200, p_def=0.1):
    g = [[0 if rng.random() < p_def else 1 for _ in range(L)] for _ in range(L)]
    hist = []
    for t in range(gens):
        g = step(g, T)
        if t >= 150: hist.append(sum(map(sum, g)) / L ** 2)
    return sum(hist) / len(hist), g

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("  T      cooperator share (generations 150-200, 3 runs)")
    for T in (1.10, 1.30, 1.55, 1.70, 1.80, 1.90, 1.99, 2.05):
        vals = [run(T)[0] for _ in range(3)]
        print(f"  {T:.2f}   " + "  ".join(f"{v:.3f}" for v in vals)
              + f"   mean {sum(vals) / 3:.3f}")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《演化博弈、直接与间接互惠及合作涌现的数学模型》第 5 章「网络互惠:空间结构与人类网络实验」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}

本书其他章节结论