关于「汉密尔顿法则、普莱斯方程与五种机制」,《演化博弈与互惠合作》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:网络互惠的门槛 \(k\) 是大种群中的极限。对每人都有 \(k\) 个邻居的有限网络,精确门槛是 \((N - 2)/(N/k - 2)\) (Taylor 2007; Chen 2013):\(k = 4\) 时,\(N = 20\) 需要 6.00,\(N = 100\) 需要 4.26,\(N = 1000\) 需要 4.02。小网络中门槛远高于 \(k\)。群体选择的门槛 \(1 + n/m\) 在群体多、规模小时接近 1:10 人的群体有 50 个时为 1.2,有 5 个时为 3。
数据口径:本书讨论演化博弈的数学模型,不作道德说教,也不是经营建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(15 段程序,全部核对)、原典与作者的假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 10, 100, 1000, 20, 4.02, 4.26
| direct reciprocity ESS risk-dominant one-third law | |
| w | 0.5: numeric 2.000 3.000 4.000 |
| formula | 2.000 (1/w) 3.000 ((2-w)/w) 4.000 ((3-2w)/w) |
| w | 0.8: numeric 1.250 1.500 1.750 |
| formula | 1.250 (1/w) 1.500 ((2-w)/w) 1.750 ((3-2w)/w) |
| w | 0.9: numeric 1.111 1.222 1.333 |
| formula | 1.111 (1/w) 1.222 ((2-w)/w) 1.333 ((3-2w)/w) |
| indirect reciprocity | |
| q | 0.5: numeric 2.000 3.000 4.000 |
| q | 0.8: numeric 1.250 1.500 1.750 |
| q | 0.9: numeric 1.111 1.222 1.333 |
| network reciprocity, critical b/c: k (large N) vs (N - 2)/(N/k - 2) | |
| k | 2: N=20: 2.25 N=50: 2.09 N=100: 2.04 N=1000: 2.00 limit 2 |
| k | 4: N=20: 6.00 N=50: 4.57 N=100: 4.26 N=1000: 4.02 limit 4 |
| k | 8: N=20: 36.00 N=50: 11.29 N=100: 9.33 N=1000: 8.11 limit 8 |
| kin selection 1/r: full sibs r | 1/2 -> 2, half sibs 1/4 -> 4, cousins 1/8 -> 8 |
| group selection 1 + n/m (Traulsen & Nowak 2006: weak selection, rare splitting): | |
| max group size n | 10, m = 5 groups: 3.00 |
| max group size n | 10, m = 50 groups: 1.20 |
| max group size n | 30, m = 10 groups: 4.00 |
核心公式
\[r\,b > c\]
查看完整验算程序
# Nowak's (2006) five thresholds, each recomputed from its own model. Every rule has the
# form b/c > critical value, but the models and assumptions differ (see the text).
# Direct reciprocity: TFT vs ALLD, w = probability of another round. Row payoffs:
# TFT vs TFT (b - c)/(1 - w), TFT vs ALLD -c, ALLD vs TFT b, ALLD vs ALLD 0.
# Indirect reciprocity: discriminators know a reputation with probability q:
# DISC vs DISC b - c, DISC vs ALLD -c (1 - q), ALLD vs DISC b (1 - q), ALLD vs ALLD 0.
# For a 2 x 2 game [[a, b'], [c', d]] (cooperative strategy first): cooperation is an
# ESS if a > c', risk-dominant if a + b' > c' + d, and favoured by weak selection in a
# large population (one-third law) if a + 2b' > c' + 2d.
def conditions(M):
(a, b, c, d) = M
return a > c, a + b > c + d, a + 2 * b > c + 2 * d
def crit(make, lo=1.0001, hi=60.0):
"""Smallest b/c (c = 1) at which each of the three conditions holds, by bisection."""
out = []
for k in range(3):
l, h = lo, hi
if not conditions(make(h))[k]: out.append(float("inf")); continue
for _ in range(60):
m = (l + h) / 2
if conditions(make(m))[k]: h = m
else: l = m
out.append(h)
return out
print("direct reciprocity ESS risk-dominant one-third law")
for w in (0.5, 0.8, 0.9):
e, r, t = crit(lambda bc: ((bc - 1) / (1 - w), -1, bc, 0))
print(f" w = {w}: numeric {e:6.3f} {r:6.3f} {t:6.3f}")
print(f" formula {1 / w:6.3f} (1/w) {(2 - w) / w:6.3f} ((2-w)/w)"
f" {(3 - 2 * w) / w:6.3f} ((3-2w)/w)")
print("indirect reciprocity")
for q in (0.5, 0.8, 0.9):
e, r, t = crit(lambda bc: (bc - 1, -(1 - q), bc * (1 - q), 0))
print(f" q = {q}: numeric {e:6.3f} {r:6.3f} {t:6.3f}")
# Network reciprocity (Ohtsuki et al. 2006: death-birth updating, weak selection, k << N);
# exact value for vertex-transitive graphs of size N (Taylor, Day & Wild 2007).
print("network reciprocity, critical b/c: k (large N) vs (N - 2)/(N/k - 2)")
for k in (2, 4, 8):
print(f" k = {k}: " + " ".join(f"N={N}: {(N - 2) / (N / k - 2):6.2f}"
for N in (20, 50, 100, 1000)) + f" limit {k}")
print("kin selection 1/r: full sibs r = 1/2 -> 2, half sibs 1/4 -> 4, cousins 1/8 -> 8")
print("group selection 1 + n/m (Traulsen & Nowak 2006: weak selection, rare splitting):")
for n, m in ((10, 5), (10, 50), (30, 10)):
print(f" max group size n = {n}, m = {m} groups: {1 + n / m:.2f}")唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《演化博弈、直接与间接互惠及合作涌现的数学模型》第 2 章「汉密尔顿法则、普莱斯方程与五种机制」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}