关于「汉密尔顿法则、普莱斯方程与五种机制」,《演化博弈与互惠合作》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:网络互惠的门槛 \(k\) 是大种群中的极限。对每人都有 \(k\) 个邻居的有限网络,精确门槛是 \((N - 2)/(N/k - 2)\) (Taylor 2007; Chen 2013):\(k = 4\) 时,\(N = 20\) 需要 6.00,\(N = 100\) 需要 4.26,\(N = 1000\) 需要 4.02。小网络中门槛远高于 \(k\)。群体选择的门槛 \(1 + n/m\) 在群体多、规模小时接近 1:10 人的群体有 50 个时为 1.2,有 5 个时为 3。

数据口径:本书讨论演化博弈的数学模型,不作道德说教,也不是经营建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(15 段程序,全部核对)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 10, 100, 1000, 20, 4.02, 4.26

direct reciprocity ESS risk-dominant one-third law
w0.5: numeric 2.000 3.000 4.000
formula2.000 (1/w) 3.000 ((2-w)/w) 4.000 ((3-2w)/w)
w0.8: numeric 1.250 1.500 1.750
formula1.250 (1/w) 1.500 ((2-w)/w) 1.750 ((3-2w)/w)
w0.9: numeric 1.111 1.222 1.333
formula1.111 (1/w) 1.222 ((2-w)/w) 1.333 ((3-2w)/w)
indirect reciprocity
q0.5: numeric 2.000 3.000 4.000
q0.8: numeric 1.250 1.500 1.750
q0.9: numeric 1.111 1.222 1.333
network reciprocity, critical b/c: k (large N) vs (N - 2)/(N/k - 2)
k2: N=20: 2.25 N=50: 2.09 N=100: 2.04 N=1000: 2.00 limit 2
k4: N=20: 6.00 N=50: 4.57 N=100: 4.26 N=1000: 4.02 limit 4
k8: N=20: 36.00 N=50: 11.29 N=100: 9.33 N=1000: 8.11 limit 8
kin selection 1/r: full sibs r1/2 -> 2, half sibs 1/4 -> 4, cousins 1/8 -> 8
group selection 1 + n/m (Traulsen & Nowak 2006: weak selection, rare splitting):
max group size n10, m = 5 groups: 3.00
max group size n10, m = 50 groups: 1.20
max group size n30, m = 10 groups: 4.00

核心公式

\[r\,b > c\]
查看完整验算程序
# Nowak's (2006) five thresholds, each recomputed from its own model. Every rule has the
# form b/c > critical value, but the models and assumptions differ (see the text).
# Direct reciprocity: TFT vs ALLD, w = probability of another round. Row payoffs:
#     TFT vs TFT (b - c)/(1 - w), TFT vs ALLD -c, ALLD vs TFT b, ALLD vs ALLD 0.
# Indirect reciprocity: discriminators know a reputation with probability q:
#     DISC vs DISC b - c, DISC vs ALLD -c (1 - q), ALLD vs DISC b (1 - q), ALLD vs ALLD 0.
# For a 2 x 2 game [[a, b'], [c', d]] (cooperative strategy first): cooperation is an
# ESS if a > c', risk-dominant if a + b' > c' + d, and favoured by weak selection in a
# large population (one-third law) if a + 2b' > c' + 2d.
def conditions(M):
    (a, b, c, d) = M
    return a > c, a + b > c + d, a + 2 * b > c + 2 * d

def crit(make, lo=1.0001, hi=60.0):
    """Smallest b/c (c = 1) at which each of the three conditions holds, by bisection."""
    out = []
    for k in range(3):
        l, h = lo, hi
        if not conditions(make(h))[k]: out.append(float("inf")); continue
        for _ in range(60):
            m = (l + h) / 2
            if conditions(make(m))[k]: h = m
            else: l = m
        out.append(h)
    return out

print("direct reciprocity          ESS          risk-dominant        one-third law")
for w in (0.5, 0.8, 0.9):
    e, r, t = crit(lambda bc: ((bc - 1) / (1 - w), -1, bc, 0))
    print(f"  w = {w}: numeric   {e:6.3f}            {r:6.3f}             {t:6.3f}")
    print(f"           formula   {1 / w:6.3f} (1/w)      {(2 - w) / w:6.3f} ((2-w)/w)"
          f"     {(3 - 2 * w) / w:6.3f} ((3-2w)/w)")
print("indirect reciprocity")
for q in (0.5, 0.8, 0.9):
    e, r, t = crit(lambda bc: (bc - 1, -(1 - q), bc * (1 - q), 0))
    print(f"  q = {q}: numeric   {e:6.3f}            {r:6.3f}             {t:6.3f}")
# Network reciprocity (Ohtsuki et al. 2006: death-birth updating, weak selection, k << N);
# exact value for vertex-transitive graphs of size N (Taylor, Day & Wild 2007).
print("network reciprocity, critical b/c: k (large N) vs (N - 2)/(N/k - 2)")
for k in (2, 4, 8):
    print(f"  k = {k}: " + "  ".join(f"N={N}: {(N - 2) / (N / k - 2):6.2f}"
                                     for N in (20, 50, 100, 1000)) + f"   limit {k}")
print("kin selection 1/r: full sibs r = 1/2 -> 2, half sibs 1/4 -> 4, cousins 1/8 -> 8")
print("group selection 1 + n/m (Traulsen & Nowak 2006: weak selection, rare splitting):")
for n, m in ((10, 5), (10, 50), (30, 10)):
    print(f"  max group size n = {n}, m = {m} groups: {1 + n / m:.2f}")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《演化博弈、直接与间接互惠及合作涌现的数学模型》第 2 章「汉密尔顿法则、普莱斯方程与五种机制」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}

本书其他章节结论