关于「间接互惠:形象分与二阶声誉规范」,《演化博弈与互惠合作》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第一组结果显示了形象分的漏洞:种群中有 90% 的鉴别者与 10% 的背叛者时,在形象分规则下鉴别者中只有 8% 被评为好,鉴别者之间的帮助率只有 8%,每轮平均收益 0.14,几乎与背叛者一样低。拒绝背叛者使鉴别者变坏,而拒绝变坏的鉴别者又使更多鉴别者变坏,合作在鉴别者之间瓦解了。排斥规则的结果几乎一样。在简单持守与严格评判下,鉴别者 97% 为好,彼此之间的帮助率为 95%,收益 1.71 与 1.70,远高于背叛者的 0.28 与 0.30。背叛者 30% 时,差别更明显。
数据口径:本书讨论演化博弈的数学模型,不作道德说教,也不是经营建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(15 段程序,全部核对)、原典与作者的假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.14, 0.28, 0.30, 1.70, 1.71, 10
| columns: share Good by strategy | DISC->DISC help rate | payoff per round | |
| population DISC 90, ALLD 10 | |
| image scoring | 0.08 0.01 | 0.08 | +0.14 +0.03 |
| shunning | 0.09 0.01 | 0.09 | +0.16 +0.03 |
| simple standing | 0.97 0.11 | 0.95 | +1.71 +0.28 |
| stern judging | 0.97 0.12 | 0.95 | +1.70 +0.30 |
| population DISC 70, ALLD 30 | |
| image scoring | 0.03 0.01 | 0.04 | +0.05 +0.02 |
| shunning | 0.04 0.01 | 0.04 | +0.05 +0.02 |
| simple standing | 0.98 0.24 | 0.96 | +1.26 +0.51 |
| stern judging | 0.98 0.24 | 0.96 | +1.26 +0.50 |
| population DISC 80, ALLC 20 | |
| image scoring | 0.86 0.97 | 0.84 | +1.73 +1.91 |
| shunning | 0.24 0.25 | 0.25 | +0.94 +0.18 |
| simple standing | 0.97 0.97 | 0.95 | +1.92 +1.90 |
| stern judging | 0.97 0.93 | 0.95 | +1.93 +1.80 |
| population DISC 70, ALLD 15, ALLC 15 | |
| image scoring | 0.45 0.01 0.97 | 0.44 | +0.92 +0.47 +1.44 |
| shunning | 0.06 0.01 0.06 | 0.06 | +0.52 +0.46 -0.43 |
| simple standing | 0.97 0.15 0.97 | 0.95 | +1.61 +0.76 +1.44 |
| stern judging | 0.98 0.17 0.81 | 0.96 | +1.64 +0.80 +1.11 |
查看完整验算程序
# Indirect reciprocity with public reputations (everyone shares one view, as in Ohtsuki
# & Iwasa 2004). N = 100 players; each step a random donor meets a random recipient and
# may give b = 3 at cost c = 1. DISC (discriminators) help Good recipients and refuse
# Bad ones; ALLC always help; ALLD never. An observer then labels the DONOR Good or Bad
# by a norm that looks at the action and the recipient's label (second-order norms;
# image scoring looks at the action only). Errors: an intended help fails with prob. e =
# 0.02; the observer assigns the wrong label with prob. mu = 0.01.
# help Good refuse Good help Bad refuse Bad
# image scoring G B G B
# shunning G B B B
# simple standing G B G G
# stern judging G B B G
import random
rng = random.Random(8)
KEYS = (("C", "G"), ("D", "G"), ("C", "B"), ("D", "B"))
NORMS = {name: dict(zip(KEYS, labels)) for name, labels in
(("image scoring", "GBGB"), ("shunning", "GBBB"), ("simple standing", "GBGG"),
("stern judging", "GBBG"))}
B, C, E, MU = 3.0, 1.0, 0.02, 0.01
def run(norm, mix, steps=200000, N=100):
types = [t for t, k in mix.items() for _ in range(k)]
rep = ["G"] * N; pay = [0.0] * N
good = {t: 0 for t in mix}; seen = {t: 0 for t in mix}
zz_help = zz = 0
for step in range(steps):
d, r = rng.sample(range(N), 2)
t = types[d]
want = t == "ALLC" or (t == "DISC" and rep[r] == "G")
act = "C" if want and rng.random() > E else "D"
if act == "C": pay[d] -= C; pay[r] += B
if t == "DISC" and types[r] == "DISC": zz += 1; zz_help += act == "C"
lab = NORMS[norm][(act, rep[r])]
if rng.random() < MU: lab = "B" if lab == "G" else "G"
rep[d] = lab
if step > steps // 4 and step % 50 == 0:
for i in range(N): good[types[i]] += rep[i] == "G"; seen[types[i]] += 1
av = {t: sum(p for p, ty in zip(pay, types) if ty == t) / mix[t] / steps * N
for t in mix}
return {t: good[t] / seen[t] for t in mix}, zz_help / zz, av
print("columns: share Good by strategy | DISC->DISC help rate | payoff per round")
for mix in ({"DISC": 90, "ALLD": 10}, {"DISC": 70, "ALLD": 30}, {"DISC": 80, "ALLC": 20},
{"DISC": 70, "ALLD": 15, "ALLC": 15}):
ks = list(mix)
print("population " + ", ".join(f"{k} {v}" for k, v in mix.items()))
for norm in NORMS:
g, h, av = run(norm, mix)
print(f" {norm:16s} " + " ".join(f"{g[k]:5.2f}" for k in ks)
+ f" | {h:.2f} | " + " ".join(f"{av[k]:+.2f}" for k in ks))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《演化博弈、直接与间接互惠及合作涌现的数学模型》第 4 章「间接互惠:形象分与二阶声誉规范」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-035 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026035,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551}
}