What does Envy-Free Inheritance and the Samaritan Trap conclude, in numbers, about “Commitment, Not Conditions: Fixed Distributions, Milestone Trusts, Matching Trusts and the Softening of Trustees”?

Answer: Chapter 5 compares fixed distributions, milestone trusts and matching trusts, showing that the value of commitment comes mainly from payments that do not float with outcomes; as the probability that the enforcer makes exceptions rises to 1, effort falls back to 0.325.

Scope of the numbers: Chapter 2 computes Knaster's sealed-bid procedure exactly (the illustrative surplus is 393.33), shows that it can leave envy of 30.00, and maps all envy-free cash schemes as a region with 5 vertices. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (20 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.325

regimeeffort P(paid)E[paid]heir Upar. U
ex-post top-up0.3251.000038.504.06428.1811
fixed 34 regardless0.5951.000034.004.03278.2223
30 if y >= 200.7051.000030.003.96718.2156
30 if y >= 45 (strict)1.1000.878026.343.75418.0461
match 0.60 per unit0.9001.000027.603.87848.1584
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p51: four ways to give - ex-post top-up, an unconditional
# fixed distribution, a milestone trust and a matching trust.
# Model: as p41 (W = 100, y0 = 10, b = 40, k = 1, altruism a = 1) plus
# noise: heir income y = y0 + b*e + z with z normal, sd 8, replaced by
# 41 equal-probability quantile points (exact, no sampling). Milestone
# trust: pays M if y >= theta, else 0; theta and M are chosen on a grid
# to maximise the parent's expected welfare; a strict milestone (30 if
# y >= 45) is shown for contrast. Matching trust: pays r*y, capped at 60.
# Parameters illustrative.
import math
from statistics import NormalDist

W, Y0, B, K, A, SD = 100.0, 10.0, 40.0, 1.0, 1.0, 8.0
Z = [NormalDist(0, SD).inv_cdf((j + 0.5) / 41) for j in range(41)]


def evaluate(e, rule):
    hu, pu, paid, prob = [], [], [], []
    for z in Z:
        y = max(1.0, Y0 + B * e + z)
        t = rule(y)
        hu.append(math.log(y + t))
        pu.append(math.log(W - t))
        paid.append(t)
        prob.append(1.0 if t > 0 else 0.0)
    h = math.fsum(hu) / 41 - K * e * e / 2
    p = math.fsum(pu) / 41 + A * h
    return h, p, math.fsum(paid) / 41, math.fsum(prob) / 41


def heir_best(rule):
    grid = [j / 200 for j in range(0, 401)]
    return max(grid, key=lambda e: (evaluate(e, rule)[0], -e))


def report(name, rule):
    e = heir_best(rule)
    h, p, paid, prob = evaluate(e, rule)
    print("{:22s} {:6.3f} {:7.4f} {:8.2f} {:7.4f} {:7.4f}".format(
        name, e, prob, paid, h, p))
    return p


print("regime                 effort P(paid)  E[paid]  heir U  par. U")
report("ex-post top-up", lambda y: max(0.0, (A * W - y) / (1 + A)))
best = None
for m in range(0, 61, 2):
    e = heir_best(lambda y: float(m))
    p = evaluate(e, lambda y: float(m))[1]
    if best is None or p > best[0]:
        best = (p, m)
report("fixed {:d} regardless".format(best[1]),
       lambda y: float(best[1]))
best = None
for theta in range(20, 81, 5):
    for m in range(5, 61, 5):
        def rule(y, th=theta, mm=m):
            return float(mm) if y >= th else 0.0
        e = heir_best(rule)
        p = evaluate(e, rule)[1]
        if best is None or p > best[0]:
            best = (p, theta, m)
report("{:d} if y >= {:d}".format(best[2], best[1]),
       lambda y: float(best[2]) if y >= best[1] else 0.0)
report("30 if y >= 45 (strict)",
       lambda y: 30.0 if y >= 45 else 0.0)
best = None
for mt in range(1, 21):
    r = mt / 20

    def rule(y, r=r):
        return min(60.0, r * y)
    e = heir_best(rule)
    p = evaluate(e, rule)[1]
    if best is None or p > best[0]:
        best = (p, r)
report("match {:.2f} per unit".format(best[1]),
       lambda y: min(60.0, best[1] * y))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Commitment, Not Conditions: Fixed Distributions, Milestone Trusts, Matching Trusts and the Softening of Trustees. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book