What does Envy-Free Inheritance and the Samaritan Trap conclude, in numbers, about “Commitment, Not Conditions: Fixed Distributions, Milestone Trusts, Matching Trusts and the Softening of Trustees”?
Answer: Chapter 5 compares fixed distributions, milestone trusts and matching trusts, showing that the value of commitment comes mainly from payments that do not float with outcomes; as the probability that the enforcer makes exceptions rises to 1, effort falls back to 0.325.
Scope of the numbers: Chapter 2 computes Knaster's sealed-bid procedure exactly (the illustrative surplus is 393.33), shows that it can leave envy of 30.00, and maps all envy-free cash schemes as a region with 5 vertices. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (20 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.325
| regime | effort P(paid) | E[paid] | heir U | par. U | |
| ex-post top-up | 0.325 | 1.0000 | 38.50 | 4.0642 | 8.1811 |
| fixed 34 regardless | 0.595 | 1.0000 | 34.00 | 4.0327 | 8.2223 |
| 30 if y >= 20 | 0.705 | 1.0000 | 30.00 | 3.9671 | 8.2156 |
| 30 if y >= 45 (strict) | 1.100 | 0.8780 | 26.34 | 3.7541 | 8.0461 |
| match 0.60 per unit | 0.900 | 1.0000 | 27.60 | 3.8784 | 8.1584 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p51: four ways to give - ex-post top-up, an unconditional
# fixed distribution, a milestone trust and a matching trust.
# Model: as p41 (W = 100, y0 = 10, b = 40, k = 1, altruism a = 1) plus
# noise: heir income y = y0 + b*e + z with z normal, sd 8, replaced by
# 41 equal-probability quantile points (exact, no sampling). Milestone
# trust: pays M if y >= theta, else 0; theta and M are chosen on a grid
# to maximise the parent's expected welfare; a strict milestone (30 if
# y >= 45) is shown for contrast. Matching trust: pays r*y, capped at 60.
# Parameters illustrative.
import math
from statistics import NormalDist
W, Y0, B, K, A, SD = 100.0, 10.0, 40.0, 1.0, 1.0, 8.0
Z = [NormalDist(0, SD).inv_cdf((j + 0.5) / 41) for j in range(41)]
def evaluate(e, rule):
hu, pu, paid, prob = [], [], [], []
for z in Z:
y = max(1.0, Y0 + B * e + z)
t = rule(y)
hu.append(math.log(y + t))
pu.append(math.log(W - t))
paid.append(t)
prob.append(1.0 if t > 0 else 0.0)
h = math.fsum(hu) / 41 - K * e * e / 2
p = math.fsum(pu) / 41 + A * h
return h, p, math.fsum(paid) / 41, math.fsum(prob) / 41
def heir_best(rule):
grid = [j / 200 for j in range(0, 401)]
return max(grid, key=lambda e: (evaluate(e, rule)[0], -e))
def report(name, rule):
e = heir_best(rule)
h, p, paid, prob = evaluate(e, rule)
print("{:22s} {:6.3f} {:7.4f} {:8.2f} {:7.4f} {:7.4f}".format(
name, e, prob, paid, h, p))
return p
print("regime effort P(paid) E[paid] heir U par. U")
report("ex-post top-up", lambda y: max(0.0, (A * W - y) / (1 + A)))
best = None
for m in range(0, 61, 2):
e = heir_best(lambda y: float(m))
p = evaluate(e, lambda y: float(m))[1]
if best is None or p > best[0]:
best = (p, m)
report("fixed {:d} regardless".format(best[1]),
lambda y: float(best[1]))
best = None
for theta in range(20, 81, 5):
for m in range(5, 61, 5):
def rule(y, th=theta, mm=m):
return float(mm) if y >= th else 0.0
e = heir_best(rule)
p = evaluate(e, rule)[1]
if best is None or p > best[0]:
best = (p, theta, m)
report("{:d} if y >= {:d}".format(best[2], best[1]),
lambda y: float(best[2]) if y >= best[1] else 0.0)
report("30 if y >= 45 (strict)",
lambda y: 30.0 if y >= 45 else 0.0)
best = None
for mt in range(1, 21):
r = mt / 20
def rule(y, r=r):
return min(60.0, r * y)
e = heir_best(rule)
p = evaluate(e, rule)[1]
if best is None or p > best[0]:
best = (p, r)
report("match {:.2f} per unit".format(best[1]),
lambda y: min(60.0, best[1] * y))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Commitment, Not Conditions: Fixed Distributions, Milestone Trusts, Matching Trusts and the Softening of Trustees. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Three Yardsticks: How Proportionality, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency Nest over Indivisible Assets
- Chapter 2 · Sealed Bids and Cash Balancing: Knaster's Procedure, the Envy-Free Cash Polytope and Internal Auctions
- Chapter 3 · The Incentive to Misreport: Best Deviations under Complete Information and Shrinking toward the Middle under Uncertainty
- Chapter 4 · The Samaritan's Dilemma: the Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium of an Ex-Post Safety Net and Where the Rotten Kid Theorem Fails
- Chapter 6 · Equity Is Not Power: Shapley Values, Banzhaf Indices and the Externality of Decoupled Voting Rights
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources Examined: Yan Zhitui's Family Instructions and Carnegie's "Wealth"
- Chapter 8 · Practice and Falsification: a Communication Skill Pack for Family Offices and a Pre-Registered Test