关于「承诺而非条件:固定分配、里程碑信托、配比信托与执行者的软化」,《无嫉妒分家与慈父懒惰陷阱》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第五章比较固定分配、里程碑信托与配比信托,说明承诺的价值主要来自给付不随结果浮动,执行者破例的概率升到 1 时努力回落到 0.325。

数据口径:书中的估价、财富、利他系数与表决权重均为示意参数;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是针对任何个人或家庭的法律、税务或理财建议,各法域的继承法、信托法与公司法不同,具体安排须咨询当地持牌专业人士。 第二章精确计算 Knaster 密封出价程序(示意例的盈余为 393.33),说明它可能留下 30.00 的嫉妒,而全部无嫉妒现金方案构成一个有 5 个顶点的区域。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.325

regimeeffort P(paid)E[paid]heir Upar. U
ex-post top-up0.3251.000038.504.06428.1811
fixed 34 regardless0.5951.000034.004.03278.2223
30 if y >= 200.7051.000030.003.96718.2156
30 if y >= 45 (strict)1.1000.878026.343.75418.0461
match 0.60 per unit0.9001.000027.603.87848.1584
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 5. p51: four ways to give - ex-post top-up, an unconditional
# fixed distribution, a milestone trust and a matching trust.
# Model: as p41 (W = 100, y0 = 10, b = 40, k = 1, altruism a = 1) plus
# noise: heir income y = y0 + b*e + z with z normal, sd 8, replaced by
# 41 equal-probability quantile points (exact, no sampling). Milestone
# trust: pays M if y >= theta, else 0; theta and M are chosen on a grid
# to maximise the parent's expected welfare; a strict milestone (30 if
# y >= 45) is shown for contrast. Matching trust: pays r*y, capped at 60.
# Parameters illustrative.
import math
from statistics import NormalDist

W, Y0, B, K, A, SD = 100.0, 10.0, 40.0, 1.0, 1.0, 8.0
Z = [NormalDist(0, SD).inv_cdf((j + 0.5) / 41) for j in range(41)]


def evaluate(e, rule):
    hu, pu, paid, prob = [], [], [], []
    for z in Z:
        y = max(1.0, Y0 + B * e + z)
        t = rule(y)
        hu.append(math.log(y + t))
        pu.append(math.log(W - t))
        paid.append(t)
        prob.append(1.0 if t > 0 else 0.0)
    h = math.fsum(hu) / 41 - K * e * e / 2
    p = math.fsum(pu) / 41 + A * h
    return h, p, math.fsum(paid) / 41, math.fsum(prob) / 41


def heir_best(rule):
    grid = [j / 200 for j in range(0, 401)]
    return max(grid, key=lambda e: (evaluate(e, rule)[0], -e))


def report(name, rule):
    e = heir_best(rule)
    h, p, paid, prob = evaluate(e, rule)
    print("{:22s} {:6.3f} {:7.4f} {:8.2f} {:7.4f} {:7.4f}".format(
        name, e, prob, paid, h, p))
    return p


print("regime                 effort P(paid)  E[paid]  heir U  par. U")
report("ex-post top-up", lambda y: max(0.0, (A * W - y) / (1 + A)))
best = None
for m in range(0, 61, 2):
    e = heir_best(lambda y: float(m))
    p = evaluate(e, lambda y: float(m))[1]
    if best is None or p > best[0]:
        best = (p, m)
report("fixed {:d} regardless".format(best[1]),
       lambda y: float(best[1]))
best = None
for theta in range(20, 81, 5):
    for m in range(5, 61, 5):
        def rule(y, th=theta, mm=m):
            return float(mm) if y >= th else 0.0
        e = heir_best(rule)
        p = evaluate(e, rule)[1]
        if best is None or p > best[0]:
            best = (p, theta, m)
report("{:d} if y >= {:d}".format(best[2], best[1]),
       lambda y: float(best[2]) if y >= best[1] else 0.0)
report("30 if y >= 45 (strict)",
       lambda y: 30.0 if y >= 45 else 0.0)
best = None
for mt in range(1, 21):
    r = mt / 20

    def rule(y, r=r):
        return min(60.0, r * y)
    e = heir_best(rule)
    p = evaluate(e, rule)[1]
    if best is None or p > best[0]:
        best = (p, r)
report("match {:.2f} per unit".format(best[1]),
       lambda y: min(60.0, best[1] * y))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《多继承人不可分资产无嫉妒拍卖、慈父利他主义懒惰陷阱与家族宪章投票权解耦》第 5 章「承诺而非条件:固定分配、里程碑信托、配比信托与执行者的软化」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论