关于「密封出价与现金找补:Knaster 程序、无嫉妒现金多面体与内部拍卖」,《无嫉妒分家与慈父懒惰陷阱》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第二章精确计算 Knaster 密封出价程序(示意例的盈余为 393.33),说明它可能留下 30.00 的嫉妒,而全部无嫉妒现金方案构成一个有 5 个顶点的区域。

数据口径:书中的估价、财富、利他系数与表决权重均为示意参数;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是针对任何个人或家庭的法律、税务或理财建议,各法域的继承法、信托法与公司法不同,具体安排须咨询当地持牌专业人士。 第二章精确计算 Knaster 密封出价程序(示意例的盈余为 393.33),说明它可能留下 30.00 的嫉妒,而全部无嫉妒现金方案构成一个有 5 个顶点的区域。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 393.33

asset winner winning bid
house B420
factory A900
collection C330
surplus in pot 393.33; each heir's equal cut 131.11
heir fair share cash (+in/-out) value of own bundle
A440.00 -328.89 571.11
B406.67 117.78 537.78
C410.00 211.11 541.11
cash balances to 0
envy matrix: row heir's value of column heir's bundle
A571.11 417.78 331.11
B271.11 537.78 411.11
C211.11 477.78 541.11
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 2. p21: Knaster's sealed-bid procedure for three heirs and
# three indivisible assets, in exact fractions, with an envy check.
# Model: Knaster (1946) as described by Steinhaus (1948) and Brams and
# Taylor (1996). Each asset goes to its highest bidder; each heir's fair
# share is 1/n of the sum of her own bids; the winner pays (value won -
# fair share) into a pot, losers draw their shortfall, and the surplus
# left in the pot is split equally. Bids (10k-yuan units) are
# illustrative and assumed truthful here; Chapter 3 drops that.
from fractions import Fraction as F

HEIRS = ["A", "B", "C"]
ITEMS = ["house", "factory", "collection"]
BID = {"A": [300, 900, 120], "B": [420, 600, 200], "C": [360, 540, 330]}


def knaster(bid):
    n = len(HEIRS)
    win = {}
    for i in range(len(ITEMS)):
        win[i] = max(HEIRS, key=lambda h: (bid[h][i], h))
    fair, won, cash = {}, {}, {}
    for h in HEIRS:
        tot = F(0)
        for v in bid[h]:
            tot += v
        fair[h] = tot / n
        won[h] = F(0)
        for i in range(len(ITEMS)):
            if win[i] == h:
                won[h] += bid[h][i]
    pot = F(0)
    for h in HEIRS:
        pot += won[h] - fair[h]
    for h in HEIRS:
        cash[h] = fair[h] - won[h] + pot / n
    return win, fair, cash, pot


win, fair, cash, pot = knaster(BID)
print("asset       winner  winning bid")
for i, name in enumerate(ITEMS):
    print("{:10s}  {:6s}  {:11d}".format(name, win[i], BID[win[i]][i]))
print("surplus in pot {:.2f}; each heir's equal cut {:.2f}".format(
    float(pot), float(pot / 3)))
print("heir  fair share  cash (+in/-out)  value of own bundle")
for h in HEIRS:
    own = F(0)
    for i in range(3):
        if win[i] == h:
            own += BID[h][i]
    print("{:4s}  {:10.2f}  {:15.2f}  {:18.2f}".format(
        h, float(fair[h]), float(cash[h]), float(own + cash[h])))
check = F(0)
for h in HEIRS:
    check += cash[h]
print("cash balances to {}".format(check))
print("envy matrix: row heir's value of column heir's bundle")
for h in HEIRS:
    row = []
    for g in HEIRS:
        v = F(0)
        for i in range(3):
            if win[i] == g:
                v += BID[h][i]
        row.append(float(v + cash[g]))
    print("  {}  ".format(h) + "  ".join("{:8.2f}".format(x) for x in row))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《多继承人不可分资产无嫉妒拍卖、慈父利他主义懒惰陷阱与家族宪章投票权解耦》第 2 章「密封出价与现金找补:Knaster 程序、无嫉妒现金多面体与内部拍卖」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论