关于「密封出价与现金找补:Knaster 程序、无嫉妒现金多面体与内部拍卖」,《无嫉妒分家与慈父懒惰陷阱》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第二章精确计算 Knaster 密封出价程序(示意例的盈余为 393.33),说明它可能留下 30.00 的嫉妒,而全部无嫉妒现金方案构成一个有 5 个顶点的区域。
数据口径:书中的估价、财富、利他系数与表决权重均为示意参数;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是针对任何个人或家庭的法律、税务或理财建议,各法域的继承法、信托法与公司法不同,具体安排须咨询当地持牌专业人士。 第二章精确计算 Knaster 密封出价程序(示意例的盈余为 393.33),说明它可能留下 30.00 的嫉妒,而全部无嫉妒现金方案构成一个有 5 个顶点的区域。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 393.33
| asset winner winning bid | |
| house B | 420 |
| factory A | 900 |
| collection C | 330 |
| surplus in pot 393.33; each heir's equal cut 131.11 | |
| heir fair share cash (+in/-out) value of own bundle | |
| A | 440.00 -328.89 571.11 |
| B | 406.67 117.78 537.78 |
| C | 410.00 211.11 541.11 |
| cash balances to 0 | |
| envy matrix: row heir's value of column heir's bundle | |
| A | 571.11 417.78 331.11 |
| B | 271.11 537.78 411.11 |
| C | 211.11 477.78 541.11 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 2. p21: Knaster's sealed-bid procedure for three heirs and
# three indivisible assets, in exact fractions, with an envy check.
# Model: Knaster (1946) as described by Steinhaus (1948) and Brams and
# Taylor (1996). Each asset goes to its highest bidder; each heir's fair
# share is 1/n of the sum of her own bids; the winner pays (value won -
# fair share) into a pot, losers draw their shortfall, and the surplus
# left in the pot is split equally. Bids (10k-yuan units) are
# illustrative and assumed truthful here; Chapter 3 drops that.
from fractions import Fraction as F
HEIRS = ["A", "B", "C"]
ITEMS = ["house", "factory", "collection"]
BID = {"A": [300, 900, 120], "B": [420, 600, 200], "C": [360, 540, 330]}
def knaster(bid):
n = len(HEIRS)
win = {}
for i in range(len(ITEMS)):
win[i] = max(HEIRS, key=lambda h: (bid[h][i], h))
fair, won, cash = {}, {}, {}
for h in HEIRS:
tot = F(0)
for v in bid[h]:
tot += v
fair[h] = tot / n
won[h] = F(0)
for i in range(len(ITEMS)):
if win[i] == h:
won[h] += bid[h][i]
pot = F(0)
for h in HEIRS:
pot += won[h] - fair[h]
for h in HEIRS:
cash[h] = fair[h] - won[h] + pot / n
return win, fair, cash, pot
win, fair, cash, pot = knaster(BID)
print("asset winner winning bid")
for i, name in enumerate(ITEMS):
print("{:10s} {:6s} {:11d}".format(name, win[i], BID[win[i]][i]))
print("surplus in pot {:.2f}; each heir's equal cut {:.2f}".format(
float(pot), float(pot / 3)))
print("heir fair share cash (+in/-out) value of own bundle")
for h in HEIRS:
own = F(0)
for i in range(3):
if win[i] == h:
own += BID[h][i]
print("{:4s} {:10.2f} {:15.2f} {:18.2f}".format(
h, float(fair[h]), float(cash[h]), float(own + cash[h])))
check = F(0)
for h in HEIRS:
check += cash[h]
print("cash balances to {}".format(check))
print("envy matrix: row heir's value of column heir's bundle")
for h in HEIRS:
row = []
for g in HEIRS:
v = F(0)
for i in range(3):
if win[i] == g:
v += BID[h][i]
row.append(float(v + cash[g]))
print(" {} ".format(h) + " ".join("{:8.2f}".format(x) for x in row))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《多继承人不可分资产无嫉妒拍卖、慈父利他主义懒惰陷阱与家族宪章投票权解耦》第 2 章「密封出价与现金找补:Knaster 程序、无嫉妒现金多面体与内部拍卖」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}