关于「三把尺子:比例公平、无嫉妒与帕累托效率在不可分资产上的包含关系」,《无嫉妒分家与慈父懒惰陷阱》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第一章穷举三位继承人分三件不可分资产的 27 种分法,没有一种比例公平;随机估值下三件资产时只有 0.2150 的估值组合存在无嫉妒分法。
数据口径:书中的估价、财富、利他系数与表决权重均为示意参数;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是针对任何个人或家庭的法律、税务或理财建议,各法域的继承法、信托法与公司法不同,具体安排须咨询当地持牌专业人士。 第二章精确计算 Knaster 密封出价程序(示意例的盈余为 393.33),说明它可能留下 30.00 的嫉妒,而全部无嫉妒现金方案构成一个有 5 个顶点的区域。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 27
| assignments enumerated | 27 |
| proportional | 0 |
| envy-free | 0 |
| Pareto-efficient | 25 |
| proportional and Pareto | 0 |
| heir A total 1320 fair share | 440.00 |
| heir B total 1220 fair share | 406.67 |
| heir C total 1230 fair share | 410.00 |
| dominated assignments (owner of house, factory, collection): | |
| ABA utilities A 420 B 600 C 0 | |
| ACA utilities A 420 B 0 C 540 | |
| max total value 1650 by BAC (A 900 B 420 C 330) |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 1. p11: three heirs, three indivisible assets, no cash: count
# the proportional, envy-free and Pareto-efficient assignments.
# Model: additive valuations; every one of the 3**3 = 27 assignments of
# house, factory and collection to heirs A, B, C is enumerated exactly.
# Proportional: each heir values her bundle at >= 1/3 of her own total.
# Envy-free: no heir values another bundle above her own.
# Pareto: no other assignment is weakly better for all, strictly for one.
# Valuations (in 10k-yuan units) are illustrative, not measured.
import itertools
import math
from fractions import Fraction
HEIRS = ["A", "B", "C"]
ITEMS = ["house", "factory", "collection"]
VAL = {"A": [300, 900, 120], "B": [420, 600, 200], "C": [360, 540, 330]}
def bundles(assign):
out = {h: [] for h in HEIRS}
for item, h in enumerate(assign):
out[h].append(item)
return out
def value(h, items):
return int(math.fsum(VAL[h][i] for i in items))
def utilities(assign):
b = bundles(assign)
return {h: value(h, b[h]) for h in HEIRS}
ALL = list(itertools.product(HEIRS, repeat=len(ITEMS)))
total = {h: int(math.fsum(VAL[h])) for h in HEIRS}
prop, ef, par = [], [], []
for a in ALL:
u = utilities(a)
b = bundles(a)
if all(Fraction(u[h]) >= Fraction(total[h], 3) for h in HEIRS):
prop.append(a)
if all(u[h] >= value(h, b[g]) for h in HEIRS for g in HEIRS):
ef.append(a)
dominated = False
for o in ALL:
v = utilities(o)
if all(v[h] >= u[h] for h in HEIRS) and any(
v[h] > u[h] for h in HEIRS):
dominated = True
break
if not dominated:
par.append(a)
print("assignments enumerated :", len(ALL))
print("proportional :", len(prop))
print("envy-free :", len(ef))
print("Pareto-efficient :", len(par))
print("proportional and Pareto :", len([a for a in prop if a in par]))
for h in HEIRS:
print("heir {} total {:4d} fair share {:7.2f}".format(
h, total[h], total[h] / 3))
print("dominated assignments (owner of house, factory, collection):")
for a in ALL:
if a not in par:
u = utilities(a)
print(" {} utilities A {} B {} C {}".format(
"".join(a), u["A"], u["B"], u["C"]))
best = max(ALL, key=lambda a: (int(math.fsum(utilities(a).values())), a))
u = utilities(best)
print("max total value {} by {} (A {} B {} C {})".format(
int(math.fsum(u.values())), "".join(best), u["A"], u["B"], u["C"]))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《多继承人不可分资产无嫉妒拍卖、慈父利他主义懒惰陷阱与家族宪章投票权解耦》第 1 章「三把尺子:比例公平、无嫉妒与帕累托效率在不可分资产上的包含关系」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}