关于「股权不等于权力:夏普利值、Banzhaf 指数与表决权解耦的外部性」,《无嫉妒分家与慈父懒惰陷阱》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第六章用夏普利值与 Banzhaf 指数的精确枚举说明股权不等于权力:持股四成的成员在表决权信托下权力为 0.000;控制者现金流权为 0.10 时,其他成员每承担 1.053 单位损失才换来控制者 1 单位私人收益。

数据口径:书中的估价、财富、利他系数与表决权重均为示意参数;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是针对任何个人或家庭的法律、税务或理财建议,各法域的继承法、信托法与公司法不同,具体安排须咨询当地持牌专业人士。 第二章精确计算 Knaster 密封出价程序(示意例的盈余为 393.33),说明它可能留下 30.00 的嫉妒,而全部无嫉妒现金方案构成一个有 5 个顶点的区域。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.000, 0.10, 1.053

sP(approve bad)E[dV] approvedothers' lossper 1 of P
1.000.09003.8180.0000.000
0.500.16953.4170.2840.157
0.300.24882.8020.8280.405
0.200.31042.2071.4220.649
0.100.39511.2582.4541.053
0.050.44500.6513.1671.334
first best (approve only if dV > 0): E[dV] 3.984
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 6. p63: what decoupling votes from cash flow costs the other
# heirs. A controller with cash-flow share s decides alone.
# Model (after Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis 2000): a proposal changes
# firm value by dV ~ Normal(0, 10) and gives the controller a private
# benefit P = |Normal(0, 3)| (related-party deals, perks, pet projects).
# The controller approves when s*dV + P > 0. Integration is exact over
# 201 x 101 equal-probability quantile points. Parameters illustrative.
import math
from statistics import NormalDist

DV = [NormalDist(0, 10).inv_cdf((j + 0.5) / 201) for j in range(201)]
PB = [abs(NormalDist(0, 3).inv_cdf(0.5 + (j + 0.5) / 202))
      for j in range(101)]
N = len(DV) * len(PB)

print("  s     P(approve bad)  E[dV] approved  others' loss  per 1 of P")
for s in (1.0, 0.5, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05):
    bad, dv_acc, loss, pb = [], [], [], []
    for dv in DV:
        for p in PB:
            if s * dv + p > 0:
                dv_acc.append(dv)
                pb.append(p)
                if dv < 0:
                    bad.append(1.0)
                    loss.append(-(1 - s) * dv)
    e_dv = math.fsum(dv_acc) / N
    e_loss = math.fsum(loss) / N
    e_pb = math.fsum(pb) / N
    print("{:5.2f}  {:14.4f}  {:14.3f}  {:12.3f}  {:10.3f}".format(
        s, math.fsum(bad) / N, e_dv, e_loss, e_loss / e_pb))
first_best = math.fsum(dv for dv in DV if dv > 0) / len(DV)
print("first best (approve only if dV > 0): E[dV] {:.3f}".format(
    first_best))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《多继承人不可分资产无嫉妒拍卖、慈父利他主义懒惰陷阱与家族宪章投票权解耦》第 6 章「股权不等于权力:夏普利值、Banzhaf 指数与表决权解耦的外部性」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论