关于「撒玛利亚人困境:事后兜底的子博弈精炼均衡与坏孩子定理的失效边界」,《无嫉妒分家与慈父懒惰陷阱》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第四章把布坎南的撒玛利亚人困境写成两阶段博弈:事后兜底使子女努力从 0.8828 降到 0.3252,事先承诺使其回到 0.5975,且父母自身的福利也更高;坏孩子定理在子女能把自己推到不需要转移的角点时失效。
数据口径:书中的估价、财富、利他系数与表决权重均为示意参数;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是针对任何个人或家庭的法律、税务或理财建议,各法域的继承法、信托法与公司法不同,具体安排须咨询当地持牌专业人士。 第二章精确计算 Knaster 密封出价程序(示意例的盈余为 393.33),说明它可能留下 30.00 的嫉妒,而全部无嫉妒现金方案构成一个有 5 个顶点的区域。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.3252, 0.5975, 0.8828
| no parent at all: effort 0.8828, income 45.31 | |
| a | effort T heir U par. U | effort T heir U par. U | |
| | no commitment (SPE) | committed fixed transfer | |
| 0.25 | 0.8828 | 0.00 3.4239 5.4611 | 0.8828 0.00 3.4239 5.4611 |
| 0.50 | 0.3252 18.00 | 3.6608 6.2372 | 0.8365 4.36 3.5176 6.3194 |
| 0.75 | 0.3252 29.71 | 3.9121 7.1867 | 0.6802 21.59 3.8429 7.2440 |
| 1.00 | 0.3252 38.50 | 4.0662 8.1853 | 0.5975 33.05 4.0255 8.2294 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 4. p41: the Samaritan's dilemma as a two-stage game. The heir
# chooses effort, then an altruistic parent tops up her income.
# Model (after Buchanan 1975; Bruce and Waldman 1990): heir income
# y = y0 + b*e, effort cost k*e*e/2, heir welfare U = ln(y + T) - k*e*e/2;
# parent welfare ln(W - T) + a*U with altruism weight a. No commitment:
# the parent picks T >= 0 after seeing y (subgame-perfect: T = max(0,
# (a*W - y)/(1 + a))). Commitment: the parent fixes T in advance, chosen
# to maximise his own welfare given the heir's best response.
# Parameters W = 100, y0 = 10, b = 40, k = 1 are illustrative.
import math
W, Y0, B, K = 100.0, 10.0, 40.0, 1.0
def argmax(f, lo, hi, grid=2000, it=100):
# coarse grid first (the objective can have a kink), then refine
step = (hi - lo) / grid
k = max(range(grid + 1), key=lambda j: f(lo + j * step))
lo, hi = max(lo, lo + (k - 1) * step), min(hi, lo + (k + 1) * step)
for _ in range(it):
m1 = lo + (hi - lo) / 3
m2 = hi - (hi - lo) / 3
if f(m1) < f(m2):
lo = m1
else:
hi = m2
return (lo + hi) / 2
def heir_u(e, t):
return math.log(Y0 + B * e + t) - K * e * e / 2
def spe(a):
def transfer(y):
return max(0.0, (a * W - y) / (1 + a))
def u(e):
y = Y0 + B * e
return heir_u(e, transfer(y))
e = argmax(u, 0.0, 5.0)
return e, transfer(Y0 + B * e)
def commit(a):
def best_e(t):
return argmax(lambda e: heir_u(e, t), 0.0, 5.0)
def parent(t):
e = best_e(t)
return math.log(W - t) + a * heir_u(e, t)
t = argmax(parent, 0.0, W - 1.0)
return best_e(t), t
e0 = argmax(lambda e: heir_u(e, 0.0), 0.0, 5.0)
print("no parent at all: effort {:.4f}, income {:.2f}".format(
e0, Y0 + B * e0))
print(" a | effort T heir U par. U | effort T heir U par. U")
print(" | no commitment (SPE) | committed fixed transfer")
for a in (0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0):
row = []
for e, t in (spe(a), commit(a)):
hu = heir_u(e, t)
pu = math.log(W - t) + a * hu
row.append("{:6.4f} {:5.2f} {:7.4f} {:7.4f}".format(e, t, hu, pu))
print("{:5.2f} | {} | {}".format(a, row[0], row[1]))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《多继承人不可分资产无嫉妒拍卖、慈父利他主义懒惰陷阱与家族宪章投票权解耦》第 4 章「撒玛利亚人困境:事后兜底的子博弈精炼均衡与坏孩子定理的失效边界」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}