What does Envy-Free Inheritance and the Samaritan Trap conclude, in numbers, about “The Samaritan's Dilemma: the Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium of an Ex-Post Safety Net and Where the Rotten Kid Theorem Fails”?

Answer: Chapter 4 writes Buchanan's Samaritan's dilemma as a two-stage game: an ex-post safety net lowers the child's effort from 0.8828 to 0.3252, prior commitment restores it to 0.5975 and leaves the parent better off too, and the rotten kid theorem fails when the child can push herself into a corner where no transfer is needed.

Scope of the numbers: Chapter 2 computes Knaster's sealed-bid procedure exactly (the illustrative surplus is 393.33), shows that it can leave envy of 30.00, and maps all envy-free cash schemes as a region with 5 vertices. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (20 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.3252, 0.5975, 0.8828

no parent at all: effort 0.8828, income 45.31
a | effort T heir U par. U | effort T heir U par. U
| no commitment (SPE) | committed fixed transfer
0.25 | 0.88280.00 3.4239 5.4611 | 0.8828 0.00 3.4239 5.4611
0.50 | 0.3252 18.003.6608 6.2372 | 0.8365 4.36 3.5176 6.3194
0.75 | 0.3252 29.713.9121 7.1867 | 0.6802 21.59 3.8429 7.2440
1.00 | 0.3252 38.504.0662 8.1853 | 0.5975 33.05 4.0255 8.2294
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: the Samaritan's dilemma as a two-stage game. The heir
# chooses effort, then an altruistic parent tops up her income.
# Model (after Buchanan 1975; Bruce and Waldman 1990): heir income
# y = y0 + b*e, effort cost k*e*e/2, heir welfare U = ln(y + T) - k*e*e/2;
# parent welfare ln(W - T) + a*U with altruism weight a. No commitment:
# the parent picks T >= 0 after seeing y (subgame-perfect: T = max(0,
# (a*W - y)/(1 + a))). Commitment: the parent fixes T in advance, chosen
# to maximise his own welfare given the heir's best response.
# Parameters W = 100, y0 = 10, b = 40, k = 1 are illustrative.
import math

W, Y0, B, K = 100.0, 10.0, 40.0, 1.0


def argmax(f, lo, hi, grid=2000, it=100):
    # coarse grid first (the objective can have a kink), then refine
    step = (hi - lo) / grid
    k = max(range(grid + 1), key=lambda j: f(lo + j * step))
    lo, hi = max(lo, lo + (k - 1) * step), min(hi, lo + (k + 1) * step)
    for _ in range(it):
        m1 = lo + (hi - lo) / 3
        m2 = hi - (hi - lo) / 3
        if f(m1) < f(m2):
            lo = m1
        else:
            hi = m2
    return (lo + hi) / 2


def heir_u(e, t):
    return math.log(Y0 + B * e + t) - K * e * e / 2


def spe(a):
    def transfer(y):
        return max(0.0, (a * W - y) / (1 + a))

    def u(e):
        y = Y0 + B * e
        return heir_u(e, transfer(y))
    e = argmax(u, 0.0, 5.0)
    return e, transfer(Y0 + B * e)


def commit(a):
    def best_e(t):
        return argmax(lambda e: heir_u(e, t), 0.0, 5.0)

    def parent(t):
        e = best_e(t)
        return math.log(W - t) + a * heir_u(e, t)
    t = argmax(parent, 0.0, W - 1.0)
    return best_e(t), t


e0 = argmax(lambda e: heir_u(e, 0.0), 0.0, 5.0)
print("no parent at all: effort {:.4f}, income {:.2f}".format(
    e0, Y0 + B * e0))
print("   a  | effort  T     heir U  par. U | effort  T     heir U  par. U")
print("      |  no commitment (SPE)         |  committed fixed transfer")
for a in (0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0):
    row = []
    for e, t in (spe(a), commit(a)):
        hu = heir_u(e, t)
        pu = math.log(W - t) + a * hu
        row.append("{:6.4f} {:5.2f} {:7.4f} {:7.4f}".format(e, t, hu, pu))
    print("{:5.2f} | {} | {}".format(a, row[0], row[1]))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Samaritan's Dilemma: the Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium of an Ex-Post Safety Net and Where the Rotten Kid Theorem Fails. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book