What does Envy-Free Inheritance and the Samaritan Trap conclude, in numbers, about “Three Yardsticks: How Proportionality, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency Nest over Indivisible Assets”?
Answer: Chapter 1 enumerates the 27 ways three heirs can split three indivisible assets and finds none proportional; under random valuations with three assets only 0.2150 of profiles admit an envy-free division.
Scope of the numbers: Chapter 2 computes Knaster's sealed-bid procedure exactly (the illustrative surplus is 393.33), shows that it can leave envy of 30.00, and maps all envy-free cash schemes as a region with 5 vertices. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (20 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 27
| assignments enumerated | 27 |
| proportional | 0 |
| envy-free | 0 |
| Pareto-efficient | 25 |
| proportional and Pareto | 0 |
| heir A total 1320 fair share | 440.00 |
| heir B total 1220 fair share | 406.67 |
| heir C total 1230 fair share | 410.00 |
| dominated assignments (owner of house, factory, collection): | |
| ABA utilities A 420 B 600 C 0 | |
| ACA utilities A 420 B 0 C 540 | |
| max total value 1650 by BAC (A 900 B 420 C 330) |
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: three heirs, three indivisible assets, no cash: count
# the proportional, envy-free and Pareto-efficient assignments.
# Model: additive valuations; every one of the 3**3 = 27 assignments of
# house, factory and collection to heirs A, B, C is enumerated exactly.
# Proportional: each heir values her bundle at >= 1/3 of her own total.
# Envy-free: no heir values another bundle above her own.
# Pareto: no other assignment is weakly better for all, strictly for one.
# Valuations (in 10k-yuan units) are illustrative, not measured.
import itertools
import math
from fractions import Fraction
HEIRS = ["A", "B", "C"]
ITEMS = ["house", "factory", "collection"]
VAL = {"A": [300, 900, 120], "B": [420, 600, 200], "C": [360, 540, 330]}
def bundles(assign):
out = {h: [] for h in HEIRS}
for item, h in enumerate(assign):
out[h].append(item)
return out
def value(h, items):
return int(math.fsum(VAL[h][i] for i in items))
def utilities(assign):
b = bundles(assign)
return {h: value(h, b[h]) for h in HEIRS}
ALL = list(itertools.product(HEIRS, repeat=len(ITEMS)))
total = {h: int(math.fsum(VAL[h])) for h in HEIRS}
prop, ef, par = [], [], []
for a in ALL:
u = utilities(a)
b = bundles(a)
if all(Fraction(u[h]) >= Fraction(total[h], 3) for h in HEIRS):
prop.append(a)
if all(u[h] >= value(h, b[g]) for h in HEIRS for g in HEIRS):
ef.append(a)
dominated = False
for o in ALL:
v = utilities(o)
if all(v[h] >= u[h] for h in HEIRS) and any(
v[h] > u[h] for h in HEIRS):
dominated = True
break
if not dominated:
par.append(a)
print("assignments enumerated :", len(ALL))
print("proportional :", len(prop))
print("envy-free :", len(ef))
print("Pareto-efficient :", len(par))
print("proportional and Pareto :", len([a for a in prop if a in par]))
for h in HEIRS:
print("heir {} total {:4d} fair share {:7.2f}".format(
h, total[h], total[h] / 3))
print("dominated assignments (owner of house, factory, collection):")
for a in ALL:
if a not in par:
u = utilities(a)
print(" {} utilities A {} B {} C {}".format(
"".join(a), u["A"], u["B"], u["C"]))
best = max(ALL, key=lambda a: (int(math.fsum(utilities(a).values())), a))
u = utilities(best)
print("max total value {} by {} (A {} B {} C {})".format(
int(math.fsum(u.values())), "".join(best), u["A"], u["B"], u["C"]))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Three Yardsticks: How Proportionality, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency Nest over Indivisible Assets. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Sealed Bids and Cash Balancing: Knaster's Procedure, the Envy-Free Cash Polytope and Internal Auctions
- Chapter 3 · The Incentive to Misreport: Best Deviations under Complete Information and Shrinking toward the Middle under Uncertainty
- Chapter 4 · The Samaritan's Dilemma: the Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium of an Ex-Post Safety Net and Where the Rotten Kid Theorem Fails
- Chapter 5 · Commitment, Not Conditions: Fixed Distributions, Milestone Trusts, Matching Trusts and the Softening of Trustees
- Chapter 6 · Equity Is Not Power: Shapley Values, Banzhaf Indices and the Externality of Decoupled Voting Rights
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources Examined: Yan Zhitui's Family Instructions and Carnegie's "Wealth"
- Chapter 8 · Practice and Falsification: a Communication Skill Pack for Family Offices and a Pre-Registered Test