What does Envy-Free Inheritance and the Samaritan Trap conclude, in numbers, about “The Incentive to Misreport: Best Deviations under Complete Information and Shrinking toward the Middle under Uncertainty”?
Answer: Chapter 3 shows that under complete information a unilateral misreport can take 206.22 more, and that under incomplete information shrinking bids toward the middle misallocates at least one asset with probability 0.2657.
Scope of the numbers: Chapter 2 computes Knaster's sealed-bid procedure exactly (the illustrative surplus is 393.33), shows that it can leave envy of 30.00, and maps all envy-free cash schemes as a region with 5 vertices. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (20 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 206.22
| heir | truthful | best | gain | best bids (house/factory/coll.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 571.11 | 777.33 | 206.22 | 420/601/330 |
| winners BAC | others' change: B -103.11, C -103.11 | |||
| B | 537.78 | 659.56 | 121.78 | 361/900/330 |
| winners BAC | others' change: A -60.89, C -60.89 | |||
| C | 541.11 | 691.78 | 150.67 | 420/900/201 |
| winners BAC | others' change: A -75.33, B -75.33 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p31: under Knaster, what does one heir gain by misreporting
# when she knows the other two bids (complete information)?
# Model: true values as in p21; the other two heirs bid truthfully; the
# deviating heir picks any integer bid from 0 to 1000 for each asset.
# Knaster's payoff is a sum of per-asset terms (the winner of an asset
# depends only on bids for that asset), so searching each asset
# separately finds the exact joint best response. A tie goes to the
# heir who is not deviating. Exact fractions.
from fractions import Fraction as F
HEIRS = ["A", "B", "C"]
ITEMS = ["house", "factory", "collection"]
TRUE = {"A": [300, 900, 120], "B": [420, 600, 200], "C": [360, 540, 330]}
def payoff(bid, me, dev):
n = 3
win = [max(HEIRS, key=lambda h: (bid[h][i], h != dev, h))
for i in range(3)]
tot = {}
for h in HEIRS:
t = F(0)
for x in bid[h]:
t += x
tot[h] = t
pot = F(0)
for i in range(3):
pot += bid[win[i]][i]
for h in HEIRS:
pot -= tot[h] / n
won_bid = F(0)
won_true = F(0)
for i in range(3):
if win[i] == me:
won_bid += bid[me][i]
won_true += TRUE[me][i]
cash = tot[me] / n - won_bid + pot / n
return won_true + cash, win
print("heir truthful best gain best bids (house/factory/coll.)")
for me in HEIRS:
base, _ = payoff(TRUE, me, me)
best = list(TRUE[me])
for i in range(3):
top, arg = None, None
for r in range(0, 1001):
bid = {h: list(TRUE[h]) for h in HEIRS}
bid[me][i] = r
u, _ = payoff(bid, me, me)
if top is None or u > top:
top, arg = u, r
best[i] = arg
bid = {h: list(TRUE[h]) for h in HEIRS}
bid[me] = best
u, win = payoff(bid, me, me)
print("{:4s} {:8.2f} {:6.2f} {:6.2f} {}".format(
me, float(base), float(u), float(u - base),
"/".join(str(b) for b in best)))
others = [g for g in HEIRS if g != me]
loss = []
for g in others:
ug, _ = payoff(bid, g, me)
ut, _ = payoff(TRUE, g, me)
loss.append("{} {:+.2f}".format(g, float(ug - ut)))
print(" winners {} others' change: {}".format(
"".join(win), ", ".join(loss)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: The Incentive to Misreport: Best Deviations under Complete Information and Shrinking toward the Middle under Uncertainty. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Three Yardsticks: How Proportionality, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency Nest over Indivisible Assets
- Chapter 2 · Sealed Bids and Cash Balancing: Knaster's Procedure, the Envy-Free Cash Polytope and Internal Auctions
- Chapter 4 · The Samaritan's Dilemma: the Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium of an Ex-Post Safety Net and Where the Rotten Kid Theorem Fails
- Chapter 5 · Commitment, Not Conditions: Fixed Distributions, Milestone Trusts, Matching Trusts and the Softening of Trustees
- Chapter 6 · Equity Is Not Power: Shapley Values, Banzhaf Indices and the Externality of Decoupled Voting Rights
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources Examined: Yan Zhitui's Family Instructions and Carnegie's "Wealth"
- Chapter 8 · Practice and Falsification: a Communication Skill Pack for Family Offices and a Pre-Registered Test