What does Envy-Free Inheritance and the Samaritan Trap conclude, in numbers, about “Sealed Bids and Cash Balancing: Knaster's Procedure, the Envy-Free Cash Polytope and Internal Auctions”?
Answer: Chapter 2 computes Knaster's sealed-bid procedure exactly (the illustrative surplus is 393.33), shows that it can leave envy of 30.00, and maps all envy-free cash schemes as a region with 5 vertices.
Scope of the numbers: Chapter 2 computes Knaster's sealed-bid procedure exactly (the illustrative surplus is 393.33), shows that it can leave envy of 30.00, and maps all envy-free cash schemes as a region with 5 vertices. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (20 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 393.33
| asset winner winning bid | |
| house B | 420 |
| factory A | 900 |
| collection C | 330 |
| surplus in pot 393.33; each heir's equal cut 131.11 | |
| heir fair share cash (+in/-out) value of own bundle | |
| A | 440.00 -328.89 571.11 |
| B | 406.67 117.78 537.78 |
| C | 410.00 211.11 541.11 |
| cash balances to 0 | |
| envy matrix: row heir's value of column heir's bundle | |
| A | 571.11 417.78 331.11 |
| B | 271.11 537.78 411.11 |
| C | 211.11 477.78 541.11 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p21: Knaster's sealed-bid procedure for three heirs and
# three indivisible assets, in exact fractions, with an envy check.
# Model: Knaster (1946) as described by Steinhaus (1948) and Brams and
# Taylor (1996). Each asset goes to its highest bidder; each heir's fair
# share is 1/n of the sum of her own bids; the winner pays (value won -
# fair share) into a pot, losers draw their shortfall, and the surplus
# left in the pot is split equally. Bids (10k-yuan units) are
# illustrative and assumed truthful here; Chapter 3 drops that.
from fractions import Fraction as F
HEIRS = ["A", "B", "C"]
ITEMS = ["house", "factory", "collection"]
BID = {"A": [300, 900, 120], "B": [420, 600, 200], "C": [360, 540, 330]}
def knaster(bid):
n = len(HEIRS)
win = {}
for i in range(len(ITEMS)):
win[i] = max(HEIRS, key=lambda h: (bid[h][i], h))
fair, won, cash = {}, {}, {}
for h in HEIRS:
tot = F(0)
for v in bid[h]:
tot += v
fair[h] = tot / n
won[h] = F(0)
for i in range(len(ITEMS)):
if win[i] == h:
won[h] += bid[h][i]
pot = F(0)
for h in HEIRS:
pot += won[h] - fair[h]
for h in HEIRS:
cash[h] = fair[h] - won[h] + pot / n
return win, fair, cash, pot
win, fair, cash, pot = knaster(BID)
print("asset winner winning bid")
for i, name in enumerate(ITEMS):
print("{:10s} {:6s} {:11d}".format(name, win[i], BID[win[i]][i]))
print("surplus in pot {:.2f}; each heir's equal cut {:.2f}".format(
float(pot), float(pot / 3)))
print("heir fair share cash (+in/-out) value of own bundle")
for h in HEIRS:
own = F(0)
for i in range(3):
if win[i] == h:
own += BID[h][i]
print("{:4s} {:10.2f} {:15.2f} {:18.2f}".format(
h, float(fair[h]), float(cash[h]), float(own + cash[h])))
check = F(0)
for h in HEIRS:
check += cash[h]
print("cash balances to {}".format(check))
print("envy matrix: row heir's value of column heir's bundle")
for h in HEIRS:
row = []
for g in HEIRS:
v = F(0)
for i in range(3):
if win[i] == g:
v += BID[h][i]
row.append(float(v + cash[g]))
print(" {} ".format(h) + " ".join("{:8.2f}".format(x) for x in row))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Sealed Bids and Cash Balancing: Knaster's Procedure, the Envy-Free Cash Polytope and Internal Auctions. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Three Yardsticks: How Proportionality, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency Nest over Indivisible Assets
- Chapter 3 · The Incentive to Misreport: Best Deviations under Complete Information and Shrinking toward the Middle under Uncertainty
- Chapter 4 · The Samaritan's Dilemma: the Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium of an Ex-Post Safety Net and Where the Rotten Kid Theorem Fails
- Chapter 5 · Commitment, Not Conditions: Fixed Distributions, Milestone Trusts, Matching Trusts and the Softening of Trustees
- Chapter 6 · Equity Is Not Power: Shapley Values, Banzhaf Indices and the Externality of Decoupled Voting Rights
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources Examined: Yan Zhitui's Family Instructions and Carnegie's "Wealth"
- Chapter 8 · Practice and Falsification: a Communication Skill Pack for Family Offices and a Pre-Registered Test