What does Envy-Free Inheritance and the Samaritan Trap conclude, in numbers, about “Classical Sources Examined: Yan Zhitui's Family Instructions and Carnegie's "Wealth"”?
Answer: The second part is more direct. With no bequest the child's effort is 0.8828 and her own earnings make up 0.7793 of her total resources. With a bequest of 100 her effort falls to 0.3252, exactly the effort under the ex-post safety net of Chapter 4, since in both cases parental wealth plus base income comes to 110, and her own earnings are only 0.1057 of the total. With a bequest of 400 her effort is just 0.0966. The value of a modest skill lies not only in the fact that skills cannot be divided among heirs but also in the effort it takes to acquire one, and a large bequest weakens precisely that effort.
Scope of the numbers: Chapter 2 computes Knaster's sealed-bid procedure exactly (the illustrative surplus is 393.33), shows that it can leave envy of 30.00, and maps all envy-free cash schemes as a region with 5 vertices. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (20 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.0966, 0.1057, 0.3252, 0.7793, 0.8828, 100
| growth factor over one generation | 2.4273 |
| heirs per gen. spend c per heir after 3 generations | |
| 2 | 0.00 178.76 |
| 2 | 0.50 62.90 |
| 3 | 0.00 52.96 |
| 3 | 0.50 18.64 |
| 4 | 0.00 22.34 |
| 4 | 0.50 7.86 |
| bequest Q effort earned income share earned | |
| 0 | 0.8828 35.31 0.7793 |
| 25 | 0.6540 26.16 0.4277 |
| 50 | 0.5000 20.00 0.2500 |
| 100 | 0.3252 13.01 0.1057 |
| 200 | 0.1840 7.36 0.0339 |
| 400 | 0.0966 3.87 0.0093 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. p72: "a small skill beats hoarded wealth" (Yan Zhitui) and
# Carnegie's case against great bequests, in two small calculations.
# Block 1: an estate of 100 is split equally among n heirs each
# generation; between generations it grows at a real 3 per cent a year
# for 30 years while the holder spends a share c of the gain. Shown: what
# one great-grandchild holds. Block 2: the heir of p41 receives an
# unconditional bequest Q; her effort solves b/(y0 + b*e + Q) = k*e
# (y0 = 10, b = 40, k = 1). All parameters are illustrative.
import math
GROW = 1.03 ** 30
print("growth factor over one generation: {:.4f}".format(GROW))
print("heirs per gen. spend c per heir after 3 generations")
for n in (2, 3, 4):
for c in (0.0, 0.5):
w = 100.0
for _ in range(3):
w = w * (1 + (GROW - 1) * (1 - c)) / n
print("{:14d} {:7.2f} {:10.2f}".format(n, c, w))
def effort(q, y0=10.0, b=40.0, k=1.0):
# positive root of k*b*e^2 + k*(y0 + q)*e - b = 0
aa, bb, cc = k * b, k * (y0 + q), -b
return (-bb + math.sqrt(bb * bb - 4 * aa * cc)) / (2 * aa)
print("bequest Q effort earned income share earned")
for q in (0, 25, 50, 100, 200, 400):
e = effort(q)
earned = 40.0 * e
print("{:8d} {:7.4f} {:14.2f} {:13.4f}".format(
q, e, earned, earned / math.fsum([10.0, earned, q])))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Classical Sources Examined: Yan Zhitui's Family Instructions and Carnegie's "Wealth". 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Three Yardsticks: How Proportionality, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency Nest over Indivisible Assets
- Chapter 2 · Sealed Bids and Cash Balancing: Knaster's Procedure, the Envy-Free Cash Polytope and Internal Auctions
- Chapter 3 · The Incentive to Misreport: Best Deviations under Complete Information and Shrinking toward the Middle under Uncertainty
- Chapter 4 · The Samaritan's Dilemma: the Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium of an Ex-Post Safety Net and Where the Rotten Kid Theorem Fails
- Chapter 5 · Commitment, Not Conditions: Fixed Distributions, Milestone Trusts, Matching Trusts and the Softening of Trustees
- Chapter 6 · Equity Is Not Power: Shapley Values, Banzhaf Indices and the Externality of Decoupled Voting Rights
- Chapter 8 · Practice and Falsification: a Communication Skill Pack for Family Offices and a Pre-Registered Test