Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters: chapter answers
This book addresses three entangled problems that family business owners face in succession: how several heirs can fairly divide indivisible assets such as an old house, a factory and a collection, with cash to balance the shares; why altruistic parents weaken their children's effort by catching them after the fact; and how much power each member really holds once a family charter separates votes from dividends. Its valuations, wealth levels, altruism weights and voting weights are illustrative parameters; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal, tax or financial…
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-180 · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · Three Yardsticks: How Proportionality, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency Nest over Indivisible Assets
Chapter 1 enumerates the 27 ways three heirs can split three indivisible assets and finds none proportional; under random valuations with three assets only 0.2150 of profiles admit an envy-free division. - Chapter 2 · Sealed Bids and Cash Balancing: Knaster's Procedure, the Envy-Free Cash Polytope and Internal Auctions
Chapter 2 computes Knaster's sealed-bid procedure exactly (the illustrative surplus is 393.33), shows that it can leave envy of 30.00, and maps all envy-free cash schemes as a region with 5 vertices. - Chapter 3 · The Incentive to Misreport: Best Deviations under Complete Information and Shrinking toward the Middle under Uncertainty
Chapter 3 shows that under complete information a unilateral misreport can take 206.22 more, and that under incomplete information shrinking bids toward the middle misallocates at least one asset with probability 0.2657. - Chapter 4 · The Samaritan's Dilemma: the Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium of an Ex-Post Safety Net and Where the Rotten Kid Theorem Fails
Chapter 4 writes Buchanan's Samaritan's dilemma as a two-stage game: an ex-post safety net lowers the child's effort from 0.8828 to 0.3252, prior commitment restores it to 0.5975 and leaves the parent better off too, an… - Chapter 5 · Commitment, Not Conditions: Fixed Distributions, Milestone Trusts, Matching Trusts and the Softening of Trustees
Chapter 5 compares fixed distributions, milestone trusts and matching trusts, showing that the value of commitment comes mainly from payments that do not float with outcomes; as the probability that the enforcer makes e… - Chapter 6 · Equity Is Not Power: Shapley Values, Banzhaf Indices and the Externality of Decoupled Voting Rights
Chapter 6 uses exact enumeration of Shapley values and Banzhaf indices to show that equity is not power: a member holding forty per cent has power 0.000 under a voting trust, and when the controller's cash-flow share is… - Chapter 7 · Classical Sources Examined: Yan Zhitui's Family Instructions and Carnegie's "Wealth"
The second part is more direct. With no bequest the child's effort is 0.8828 and her own earnings make up 0.7793 of her total resources. With a bequest of 100 her effort falls to 0.3252, exactly the effort under the ex-… - Chapter 8 · Practice and Falsification: a Communication Skill Pack for Family Offices and a Pre-Registered Test
Chapter 8 gives a checklist for the head of family, a communication skill pack for family clients and a pre-registered test protocol (388 families per group). Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python ca…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote