关于「虚报的激励:完全信息下的最优偏离与不确定之下的向中收缩」,《无嫉妒分家与慈父懒惰陷阱》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第三章说明完全信息下单方虚报可多拿 206.22,信息不完全时向中收缩使至少一件资产错配的概率达到 0.2657。

数据口径:书中的估价、财富、利他系数与表决权重均为示意参数;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是针对任何个人或家庭的法律、税务或理财建议,各法域的继承法、信托法与公司法不同,具体安排须咨询当地持牌专业人士。 第二章精确计算 Knaster 密封出价程序(示意例的盈余为 393.33),说明它可能留下 30.00 的嫉妒,而全部无嫉妒现金方案构成一个有 5 个顶点的区域。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 206.22

heirtruthfulbestgainbest bids (house/factory/coll.)
A571.11777.33206.22420/601/330
winners BACothers' change: B -103.11, C -103.11
B537.78659.56121.78361/900/330
winners BACothers' change: A -60.89, C -60.89
C541.11691.78150.67420/900/201
winners BACothers' change: A -75.33, B -75.33
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 3. p31: under Knaster, what does one heir gain by misreporting
# when she knows the other two bids (complete information)?
# Model: true values as in p21; the other two heirs bid truthfully; the
# deviating heir picks any integer bid from 0 to 1000 for each asset.
# Knaster's payoff is a sum of per-asset terms (the winner of an asset
# depends only on bids for that asset), so searching each asset
# separately finds the exact joint best response. A tie goes to the
# heir who is not deviating. Exact fractions.
from fractions import Fraction as F

HEIRS = ["A", "B", "C"]
ITEMS = ["house", "factory", "collection"]
TRUE = {"A": [300, 900, 120], "B": [420, 600, 200], "C": [360, 540, 330]}


def payoff(bid, me, dev):
    n = 3
    win = [max(HEIRS, key=lambda h: (bid[h][i], h != dev, h))
           for i in range(3)]
    tot = {}
    for h in HEIRS:
        t = F(0)
        for x in bid[h]:
            t += x
        tot[h] = t
    pot = F(0)
    for i in range(3):
        pot += bid[win[i]][i]
    for h in HEIRS:
        pot -= tot[h] / n
    won_bid = F(0)
    won_true = F(0)
    for i in range(3):
        if win[i] == me:
            won_bid += bid[me][i]
            won_true += TRUE[me][i]
    cash = tot[me] / n - won_bid + pot / n
    return won_true + cash, win


print("heir  truthful  best    gain   best bids (house/factory/coll.)")
for me in HEIRS:
    base, _ = payoff(TRUE, me, me)
    best = list(TRUE[me])
    for i in range(3):
        top, arg = None, None
        for r in range(0, 1001):
            bid = {h: list(TRUE[h]) for h in HEIRS}
            bid[me][i] = r
            u, _ = payoff(bid, me, me)
            if top is None or u > top:
                top, arg = u, r
        best[i] = arg
    bid = {h: list(TRUE[h]) for h in HEIRS}
    bid[me] = best
    u, win = payoff(bid, me, me)
    print("{:4s}  {:8.2f}  {:6.2f}  {:6.2f}  {}".format(
        me, float(base), float(u), float(u - base),
        "/".join(str(b) for b in best)))
    others = [g for g in HEIRS if g != me]
    loss = []
    for g in others:
        ug, _ = payoff(bid, g, me)
        ut, _ = payoff(TRUE, g, me)
        loss.append("{} {:+.2f}".format(g, float(ug - ut)))
    print("      winners {}  others' change: {}".format(
        "".join(win), ", ".join(loss)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《多继承人不可分资产无嫉妒拍卖、慈父利他主义懒惰陷阱与家族宪章投票权解耦》第 3 章「虚报的激励:完全信息下的最优偏离与不确定之下的向中收缩」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-180 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026180,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Envy-Free Auctions of Indivisible Assets among Multiple Heirs, the Altruistic-Parent Sloth Trap and Voting-Right Decoupling in Family Charters},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

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