关于「条款何时有威慑力」,《合伙人的股权、条款与预警》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:没有这一条款时,离开去竞争的损失从第 6 个月的 12.00 降到第 12 个月的 9.00、第 24 个月的 6.00、第 36 个月的 3.00、第 48 个月的 0.00;对于 6.0 的收益,只在头两年有威慑力。有这一条款时,即使十次只有七次得到执行,损失在第 12 个月是 10.68,第 24 个月 9.36,第 36 个月 8.04,第 48 个月 6.72,自始至终都足以威慑。这一条款恰恰在成熟机制完成任务之后最重要。

数据口径:书中的参数均为示意或合成;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是法律、税务或投资建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.00, 10.68, 12, 12.00, 24, 3.00

monthvestedloss, no clauseloss, clausedeterred?
60.00012.0012.00yes / yes
120.2509.0010.68yes / yes
240.5006.009.36no / yes
360.7503.008.04no / yes
481.0000.006.72no / yes
gain from competing G = 6.0
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 6. p11: A bad-leaver clause as deterrence. Founder B holds
# 30% of a firm worth 40 units, vesting monthly over 48 months after a
# 12-month cliff. B can leave to compete, gaining G = 6 units. Without
# a bad-leaver clause B keeps the vested shares and forfeits only the
# unvested ones. With the clause, a leaver who competes must also sell
# the vested shares back at 20% of fair value, if the clause is
# enforced (chance 0.7). B is deterred if the expected loss exceeds G.
VALUE, STAKE, G, BUYBACK, ENFORCE = 40.0, 0.30, 6.0, 0.20, 0.7

def vested(month):
    return 0.0 if month < 12 else min(1.0, month / 48)

def loss(month, clause):
    full = VALUE * STAKE
    unvested = full * (1 - vested(month))
    if not clause:
        return unvested
    return unvested + ENFORCE * full * vested(month) * (1 - BUYBACK)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   month   vested   loss, no clause   loss, clause   deterred?")
    for m in (6, 12, 24, 36, 48):
        a, b = loss(m, False), loss(m, True)
        print("   {:5d}   {:6.3f}   {:15.2f}   {:12.2f}   {:>4} / {}"
              .format(m, vested(m), a, b, "yes" if a > G else "no",
                      "yes" if b > G else "no"))
    print("   gain from competing G = {:.1f}".format(G))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型》第 6 章「条款何时有威慑力」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-093 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026093,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090243},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243}
}

本书其他章节结论