关于「条款何时有威慑力」,《合伙人的股权、条款与预警》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:没有这一条款时,离开去竞争的损失从第 6 个月的 12.00 降到第 12 个月的 9.00、第 24 个月的 6.00、第 36 个月的 3.00、第 48 个月的 0.00;对于 6.0 的收益,只在头两年有威慑力。有这一条款时,即使十次只有七次得到执行,损失在第 12 个月是 10.68,第 24 个月 9.36,第 36 个月 8.04,第 48 个月 6.72,自始至终都足以威慑。这一条款恰恰在成熟机制完成任务之后最重要。
数据口径:书中的参数均为示意或合成;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是法律、税务或投资建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.00, 10.68, 12, 12.00, 24, 3.00
| month | vested | loss, no clause | loss, clause | deterred? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | 0.000 | 12.00 | 12.00 | yes / yes |
| 12 | 0.250 | 9.00 | 10.68 | yes / yes |
| 24 | 0.500 | 6.00 | 9.36 | no / yes |
| 36 | 0.750 | 3.00 | 8.04 | no / yes |
| 48 | 1.000 | 0.00 | 6.72 | no / yes |
| gain from competing G = 6.0 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 6. p11: A bad-leaver clause as deterrence. Founder B holds
# 30% of a firm worth 40 units, vesting monthly over 48 months after a
# 12-month cliff. B can leave to compete, gaining G = 6 units. Without
# a bad-leaver clause B keeps the vested shares and forfeits only the
# unvested ones. With the clause, a leaver who competes must also sell
# the vested shares back at 20% of fair value, if the clause is
# enforced (chance 0.7). B is deterred if the expected loss exceeds G.
VALUE, STAKE, G, BUYBACK, ENFORCE = 40.0, 0.30, 6.0, 0.20, 0.7
def vested(month):
return 0.0 if month < 12 else min(1.0, month / 48)
def loss(month, clause):
full = VALUE * STAKE
unvested = full * (1 - vested(month))
if not clause:
return unvested
return unvested + ENFORCE * full * vested(month) * (1 - BUYBACK)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" month vested loss, no clause loss, clause deterred?")
for m in (6, 12, 24, 36, 48):
a, b = loss(m, False), loss(m, True)
print(" {:5d} {:6.3f} {:15.2f} {:12.2f} {:>4} / {}"
.format(m, vested(m), a, b, "yes" if a > G else "no",
"yes" if b > G else "no"))
print(" gain from competing G = {:.1f}".format(G))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型》第 6 章「条款何时有威慑力」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-093 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026093,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090243},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243}
}