What does Equity, Clauses and Early Warning among Partners conclude, in numbers, about “When Clauses Deter”?
Answer: Without the clause, the loss from leaving to compete falls from 12.00 in month 6 to 9.00 in month 12, 6.00 in month 24, 3.00 in month 36 and 0.00 in month 48; against a gain of 6.0 it deters only in the first two years. With the clause, even if it is enforced only seven times in ten, the loss is 10.68 in month 12, 9.36 in month 24, 8.04 in month 36 and 6.72 in month 48, enough to deter throughout. The clause matters most precisely when vesting has done its work.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative or synthetic; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal, tax or investment advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.00, 10.68, 12, 12.00, 24, 3.00
| month | vested | loss, no clause | loss, clause | deterred? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | 0.000 | 12.00 | 12.00 | yes / yes |
| 12 | 0.250 | 9.00 | 10.68 | yes / yes |
| 24 | 0.500 | 6.00 | 9.36 | no / yes |
| 36 | 0.750 | 3.00 | 8.04 | no / yes |
| 48 | 1.000 | 0.00 | 6.72 | no / yes |
| gain from competing G = 6.0 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p11: A bad-leaver clause as deterrence. Founder B holds
# 30% of a firm worth 40 units, vesting monthly over 48 months after a
# 12-month cliff. B can leave to compete, gaining G = 6 units. Without
# a bad-leaver clause B keeps the vested shares and forfeits only the
# unvested ones. With the clause, a leaver who competes must also sell
# the vested shares back at 20% of fair value, if the clause is
# enforced (chance 0.7). B is deterred if the expected loss exceeds G.
VALUE, STAKE, G, BUYBACK, ENFORCE = 40.0, 0.30, 6.0, 0.20, 0.7
def vested(month):
return 0.0 if month < 12 else min(1.0, month / 48)
def loss(month, clause):
full = VALUE * STAKE
unvested = full * (1 - vested(month))
if not clause:
return unvested
return unvested + ENFORCE * full * vested(month) * (1 - BUYBACK)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" month vested loss, no clause loss, clause deterred?")
for m in (6, 12, 24, 36, 48):
a, b = loss(m, False), loss(m, True)
print(" {:5d} {:6.3f} {:15.2f} {:12.2f} {:>4} / {}"
.format(m, vested(m), a, b, "yes" if a > G else "no",
"yes" if b > G else "no"))
print(" gain from competing G = {:.1f}".format(G))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: When Clauses Deter. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-093 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026093,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090243},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Free Riding When Effort Cannot Be Verified
- Chapter 2 · Vesting: What It Repairs and What It Does Not
- Chapter 3 · The Shotgun Clause: Who Gains When Information and Cash Are Unequal
- Chapter 4 · Shapley Values and the Drift of Contributions
- Chapter 5 · Early Warning with Wald's Sequential Test
- Chapter 7 · "Bei nei", the Eight Villainies, Pooled Capital and Body Shares
- Chapter 8 · Practice: A Cap Table, a Key-Person Test and the Rule That an Alarm Is Not Proof