What does Equity, Clauses and Early Warning among Partners conclude, in numbers, about “Free Riding When Effort Cannot Be Verified”?

Answer: Chapter 1 computes the free-riding loss when effort cannot be verified: two equal founders reach only 0.750 of the first best and three 0.556; Holmström's group target restores 0.990 under small noise but falls to 0.010 under large noise.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative or synthetic; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal, tax or investment advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.010, 0.750, 0.990

noise sdefforttarget missedoutput forfeitedefficiency
0.01.0000.0000.0001.000
0.11.0970.0260.0230.990
0.31.1650.1360.1080.973
0.60.0051.0000.9020.010
equal shares, no target: effort 0.500, efficiency 0.750
zero effort is also an equilibrium at sd 0.0: True
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p02: A group target with noisy output. Holmstrom showed
# that a rule paying the team its shares only if output reaches a
# target can restore first-best effort, but someone outside the team
# (an investor, the "budget breaker") must keep the output when the
# target is missed. Two founders, theta = c = 1: output
# Y = e_1 + e_2 + noise (sd sigma). Each founder gets Y / 2 if Y >= 2
# (the first-best output), else nothing. Symmetric Nash efforts are the
# fixed points of the best response on a grid (step 0.0025, within one
# step). Reported:
# the highest one, the chance the target is missed although both make
# that effort, and the share of expected output the founders forfeit.
from math import erf, exp, pi, sqrt

def Phi(x):
    return 0.5 * (1 + erf(x / sqrt(2)))

def phi(x):
    return exp(-x * x / 2) / sqrt(2 * pi)

def paid(mu, sigma, t=2.0):
    # E[Y 1{Y >= t}] for Y ~ normal(mu, sigma)
    if sigma == 0:
        return mu if mu >= t - 1e-9 else 0.0
    z = (t - mu) / sigma
    return mu * (1 - Phi(z)) + sigma * phi(z)

GRID = [i / 400 for i in range(0, 601)]

def best(other, sigma):
    return max(GRID, key=lambda e: 0.5 * paid(e + other, sigma) - e * e / 2)

def equilibria(sigma):
    return [e for e in GRID if abs(best(e, sigma) - e) <= 0.0025]

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   noise sd   effort   target missed   output forfeited"
          "   efficiency")
    for sigma in (0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.6):
        e = max(equilibria(sigma))
        mu = 2 * e
        miss = (0.0 if mu >= 2 else 1.0) if sigma == 0 else \
            1 - Phi((mu - 2) / sigma)
        lost = 1 - paid(mu, sigma) / mu
        print("   {:8.1f}   {:6.3f}   {:13.3f}   {:16.3f}   {:10.3f}".format(
            sigma, e, miss, lost, 2 * e - e * e))
    print("   equal shares, no target: effort 0.500, efficiency 0.750")
    print("   zero effort is also an equilibrium at sd 0.0: {}".format(
        0.0 in equilibria(0.0)))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Free Riding When Effort Cannot Be Verified. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-093 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026093,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090243},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243}
}

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