What does Equity, Clauses and Early Warning among Partners conclude, in numbers, about “The Shotgun Clause: Who Gains When Information and Cash Are Unequal”?
Answer: Chapter 3 solves the shotgun clause: with private values the offerer shades toward the middle and the chooser gains; a partner who can raise only 0.2 can be bought out at 0.21 instead of 0.5.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative or synthetic; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal, tax or investment advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.2, 0.21, 0.5
| R's budget b | O's price | R's loss vs fair 0.5 | loss with financing |
| 0.1 | 0.11 | 0.39 | 0.025 |
| 0.2 | 0.21 | 0.29 | 0.025 |
| 0.3 | 0.31 | 0.19 | 0.025 |
| 0.4 | 0.41 | 0.09 | 0.025 |
| 0.5 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.000 |
| Texas shootout with b = 0.2: O buys at 0.21 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p06: When the responder cannot pay. Same clause as p05,
# but both partners know the firm is worth 1 and R can raise at most
# a budget b to buy O's half. If p > b, R cannot buy and must sell at
# p, so O names p just above b (here b + 0.01) whenever that is below
# the fair 0.5. R's loss against the fair price, by budget. Then the
# "Texas shootout" variant: sealed bids, the higher bidder buys at its
# own bid; a cash-poor R can bid at most b, so O bids b + 0.01 too.
# A clause with a financing period (R may raise money for 90 days at
# a cost of 5% of the amount) removes most of the gap.
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" R's budget b O's price R's loss vs fair 0.5"
" loss with financing")
for b in (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5):
p = min(0.5, b + 0.01)
loss = 0.5 - p
fin = 0.0 if b >= 0.5 else 0.05 * 0.5
print(" {:12.1f} {:9.2f} {:20.2f} {:21.3f}".format(
b, p, loss, fin))
print(" Texas shootout with b = 0.2: O buys at {:.2f}".format(0.21))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: The Shotgun Clause: Who Gains When Information and Cash Are Unequal. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-093 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026093,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090243},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Free Riding When Effort Cannot Be Verified
- Chapter 2 · Vesting: What It Repairs and What It Does Not
- Chapter 4 · Shapley Values and the Drift of Contributions
- Chapter 5 · Early Warning with Wald's Sequential Test
- Chapter 6 · When Clauses Deter
- Chapter 7 · "Bei nei", the Eight Villainies, Pooled Capital and Body Shares
- Chapter 8 · Practice: A Cap Table, a Key-Person Test and the Rule That an Alarm Is Not Proof