关于「互买条款:信息与现金不对等时谁获益」,《合伙人的股权、条款与预警》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第三章求解互买条款:在私人估值下报价方向中间压价,做选择的一方获益;只能筹到 0.2 的合伙人可能以 0.21 而不是 0.5 被买断。
数据口径:书中的参数均为示意或合成;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是法律、税务或投资建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.2, 0.21, 0.5
| R's budget b | O's price | R's loss vs fair 0.5 | loss with financing |
| 0.1 | 0.11 | 0.39 | 0.025 |
| 0.2 | 0.21 | 0.29 | 0.025 |
| 0.3 | 0.31 | 0.19 | 0.025 |
| 0.4 | 0.41 | 0.09 | 0.025 |
| 0.5 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.000 |
| Texas shootout with b = 0.2: O buys at 0.21 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 3. p06: When the responder cannot pay. Same clause as p05,
# but both partners know the firm is worth 1 and R can raise at most
# a budget b to buy O's half. If p > b, R cannot buy and must sell at
# p, so O names p just above b (here b + 0.01) whenever that is below
# the fair 0.5. R's loss against the fair price, by budget. Then the
# "Texas shootout" variant: sealed bids, the higher bidder buys at its
# own bid; a cash-poor R can bid at most b, so O bids b + 0.01 too.
# A clause with a financing period (R may raise money for 90 days at
# a cost of 5% of the amount) removes most of the gap.
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" R's budget b O's price R's loss vs fair 0.5"
" loss with financing")
for b in (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5):
p = min(0.5, b + 0.01)
loss = 0.5 - p
fin = 0.0 if b >= 0.5 else 0.05 * 0.5
print(" {:12.1f} {:9.2f} {:20.2f} {:21.3f}".format(
b, p, loss, fin))
print(" Texas shootout with b = 0.2: O buys at {:.2f}".format(0.21))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型》第 3 章「互买条款:信息与现金不对等时谁获益」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-093 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026093,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090243},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243}
}