关于「沙普利值与贡献的漂移」,《合伙人的股权、条款与预警》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第四章计算三位创始人的沙普利值,并说明以贡献漂移作警报时,在什么都没变的情形中也有 0.823 会响。

数据口径:书中的参数均为示意或合成;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是法律、税务或投资建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.823

true C share: before 0.181, after 0.111
window kalarm by q8by q12median qfalse alarm
10.9220.98150.823
20.8270.94260.593
40.6490.84680.358
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 4. p08: Watching contributions drift. Each quarter the value
# of every coalition is measured with noise (each v(S) times a
# lognormal factor, log-sd 0.25). From quarter 5 on, founder C quietly
# withdraws half of C's contribution: every v(S) containing C loses
# 1.5. C's Shapley share is recomputed each quarter; the alarm sounds
# when C's share averaged over the last k quarters falls 0.05 below its
# average in quarters 1 to 4. How long until it sounds, and how often
# it sounds by quarter 12 when nothing has changed? 4,000 runs, seed 93.
import random
from math import exp
from itertools import permutations

BASE = {"A": 2, "B": 1, "C": 0, "AB": 8, "AC": 5, "BC": 3, "ABC": 12}

def shapley_c(v):
    tot = 0.0
    for order in permutations("ABC"):
        have = ""
        for p in order:
            if p == "C":
                k1 = "".join(sorted(have + "C"))
                tot += v[k1] - (v["".join(sorted(have))] if have else 0)
            have += p
    return tot / 6 / v["ABC"]

def quarter(rng, q, change=True):
    v = {}
    for s, x in BASE.items():
        x = x - (1.5 if change and q >= 5 and "C" in s and x >= 1.5
                 else 0)
        v[s] = x * exp(rng.gauss(0, 0.25))
    return shapley_c(v)

def run(rng, k, change=True):
    shares = [quarter(rng, q, change) for q in range(1, 13)]
    base = sum(shares[:4]) / 4
    for q in range(4 + k, 13):
        if sum(shares[q - k:q]) / k < base - 0.05:
            return q, shares
    return None, shares

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(93)
    print("   true C share: before {:.3f}, after {:.3f}".format(
        shapley_c({s: x for s, x in BASE.items()}),
        shapley_c({s: x - (1.5 if "C" in s and x >= 1.5 else 0)
                   for s, x in BASE.items()})))
    print("   window k   alarm by q8   by q12   median q   false alarm")
    for k in (1, 2, 4):
        qs = [run(rng, k)[0] for _ in range(4000)]
        hit = sorted(q for q in qs if q is not None)
        med = hit[len(hit) // 2] if hit else 0
        fa = sum(1 for _ in range(4000) if run(rng, k, False)[0]) / 4000
        print("   {:8d}   {:11.3f}   {:6.3f}   {:8d}   {:11.3f}".format(
            k, sum(1 for q in qs if q and q <= 8) / 4000,
            len(hit) / 4000, med, fa))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型》第 4 章「沙普利值与贡献的漂移」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-093 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026093,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090243},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243}
}

本书其他章节结论