关于「《备内》、八奸、合本集资与身股」,《合伙人的股权、条款与预警》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:山西商号以给掌柜「身股」著称,即不出资而分享利润,与东家的「银股」并列 (weijuxian)。p13 的 (b) 部分问:当掌柜的努力随份额而定时,什么份额使东家所得最大。东家所得 \((1-s)s\) 在 \(s = 0.5\) 时最大,为 0.250,总剩余为 0.375;份额 0.7 把总剩余提高到 0.455,却把东家所得降到 0.210。按自身所得来定份额的东家,会让一部分价值无法实现,这与第一章的搭便车损失相同。

数据口径:书中的参数均为示意或合成;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是法律、税务或投资建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.210, 0.250, 0.375, 0.455, 0.5, 0.7

(a) managers m expected loss P(lose half or more)
10.100 0.1000
20.100 0.1900
40.100 0.0523
100.100 0.0016
(b) body share s effort owner's take total surplus
0.10.100 0.090 0.095
0.30.300 0.210 0.255
0.50.500 0.250 0.375
0.70.700 0.210 0.455
0.90.900 0.090 0.495
(c) partners n P(return below 0.5 of capital)
10.2000
20.0400
50.0067
100.0009
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 7. p13: Three old arrangements as arithmetic.
# (a) Han Feizi, "Bei nei": a ruler who trusts one person is ruled by
# him. A principal's client relationships are held by m managers in
# equal parts; each defects in a year with chance 0.1, taking his part.
# Expected loss is the same for every m, but the chance of losing half
# or more is not.
# (b) Shanxi merchants: the manager holds "body shares" giving a share
# s of profit without capital; the owner holds the "silver shares".
# Manager effort e = s (theta = c = 1), profit = e, owner's take
# (1 - s) e, total surplus e - e^2 / 2.
# (c) Pooled capital ("he ben"): a voyage loses everything with chance
# 0.2, otherwise returns 1.6 times the stake. A merchant who joins n
# equal partners in n independent voyages, chance of losing over half.
from math import comb

def p_at_least(n, k, p):
    return sum(comb(n, i) * p ** i * (1 - p) ** (n - i)
               for i in range(k, n + 1))

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   (a) managers m   expected loss   P(lose half or more)")
    for m in (1, 2, 4, 10):
        k = (m + 1) // 2
        print("   {:16d}   {:13.3f}   {:20.4f}".format(
            m, 0.1, p_at_least(m, k, 0.1)))
    print("   (b) body share s   effort   owner's take   total surplus")
    for s in (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9):
        print("   {:18.1f}   {:6.3f}   {:12.3f}   {:13.3f}".format(
            s, s, (1 - s) * s, s - s * s / 2))
    print("   (c) partners n   P(return below 0.5 of capital)")
    for n in (1, 2, 5, 10):
        bad = sum(comb(n, i) * 0.2 ** i * 0.8 ** (n - i)
                  for i in range(n + 1) if 1.6 * (n - i) / n < 0.5)
        print("   {:16d}   {:30.4f}".format(n, bad))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型》第 7 章「《备内》、八奸、合本集资与身股」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-093 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026093,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090243},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243}
}

本书其他章节结论