关于「股权成熟:它修补什么、不修补什么」,《合伙人的股权、条款与预警》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第二章说明成熟机制把离开创始人平均持有的股份从 0.500 降到 0.094,却只修补留任、不修补努力:共同创造的价值从 0.016 提高到 0.312。

数据口径:书中的参数均为示意或合成;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是法律、税务或投资建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.094, 0.500

static 50 / 50
share of founders who leave early0.251
equity held by a departed founder (mean)0.500
active owners' share after a 15% hire0.425
4-year vesting, 1-year cliff
share of founders who leave early0.248
equity held by a departed founder (mean)0.094
active owners' share after a 15% hire0.770
leaver in month 11: keeps 0.000; month 130.135
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 2. p03: Dead equity. Two founders split 50 / 50. Founder B
# leaves in month m with chance 0.25 spread evenly over the first 24
# months (else B stays four years). With static shares B keeps 50%
# whatever m is. With four-year vesting and a one-year cliff, B keeps
# nothing before month 12 and m / 48 of the 50% afterwards (the firm
# buys back the rest at cost). A replacement needs 15% of the firm
# for the remaining time. 100,000 draws, seed 93.
import random

def one(rng, vesting):
    if rng.random() >= 0.25:
        return None
    m = rng.uniform(0, 24)
    if not vesting:
        return 0.50
    return 0.0 if m < 12 else 0.50 * m / 48

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(93)
    for vesting in (False, True):
        out = [one(rng, vesting) for _ in range(100000)]
        left = [x for x in out if x is not None]
        dead = sum(left) / len(left)
        lab = "4-year vesting, 1-year cliff" if vesting else "static 50 / 50"
        print("   {}".format(lab))
        print("     share of founders who leave early: {:.3f}".format(
            len(left) / len(out)))
        print("     equity held by a departed founder (mean): {:.3f}".format(
            dead))
        print("     active owners' share after a 15% hire: {:.3f}".format(
            (1 - dead) * 0.85))
    print("   leaver in month 11: keeps {:.3f}; month 13: {:.3f}".format(
        0.0, 0.50 * 13 / 48))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型》第 2 章「股权成熟:它修补什么、不修补什么」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-093 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026093,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090243},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243}
}

本书其他章节结论