关于「努力无法核实时的搭便车」,《合伙人的股权、条款与预警》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第一章计算努力无法核实时的搭便车损失:两位均分创始人只达到最优的 0.750,三位 0.556;霍姆斯特罗姆的团队目标在小噪声下恢复到 0.990,但在大噪声下跌到 0.010。

数据口径:书中的参数均为示意或合成;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是法律、税务或投资建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.010, 0.750, 0.990

noise sdefforttarget missedoutput forfeitedefficiency
0.01.0000.0000.0001.000
0.11.0970.0260.0230.990
0.31.1650.1360.1080.973
0.60.0051.0000.9020.010
equal shares, no target: effort 0.500, efficiency 0.750
zero effort is also an equilibrium at sd 0.0: True
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 1. p02: A group target with noisy output. Holmstrom showed
# that a rule paying the team its shares only if output reaches a
# target can restore first-best effort, but someone outside the team
# (an investor, the "budget breaker") must keep the output when the
# target is missed. Two founders, theta = c = 1: output
# Y = e_1 + e_2 + noise (sd sigma). Each founder gets Y / 2 if Y >= 2
# (the first-best output), else nothing. Symmetric Nash efforts are the
# fixed points of the best response on a grid (step 0.0025, within one
# step). Reported:
# the highest one, the chance the target is missed although both make
# that effort, and the share of expected output the founders forfeit.
from math import erf, exp, pi, sqrt

def Phi(x):
    return 0.5 * (1 + erf(x / sqrt(2)))

def phi(x):
    return exp(-x * x / 2) / sqrt(2 * pi)

def paid(mu, sigma, t=2.0):
    # E[Y 1{Y >= t}] for Y ~ normal(mu, sigma)
    if sigma == 0:
        return mu if mu >= t - 1e-9 else 0.0
    z = (t - mu) / sigma
    return mu * (1 - Phi(z)) + sigma * phi(z)

GRID = [i / 400 for i in range(0, 601)]

def best(other, sigma):
    return max(GRID, key=lambda e: 0.5 * paid(e + other, sigma) - e * e / 2)

def equilibria(sigma):
    return [e for e in GRID if abs(best(e, sigma) - e) <= 0.0025]

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   noise sd   effort   target missed   output forfeited"
          "   efficiency")
    for sigma in (0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.6):
        e = max(equilibria(sigma))
        mu = 2 * e
        miss = (0.0 if mu >= 2 else 1.0) if sigma == 0 else \
            1 - Phi((mu - 2) / sigma)
        lost = 1 - paid(mu, sigma) / mu
        print("   {:8.1f}   {:6.3f}   {:13.3f}   {:16.3f}   {:10.3f}".format(
            sigma, e, miss, lost, 2 * e - e * e))
    print("   equal shares, no target: effort 0.500, efficiency 0.750")
    print("   zero effort is also an equilibrium at sd 0.0: {}".format(
        0.0 in equilibria(0.0)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型》第 1 章「努力无法核实时的搭便车」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-093 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026093,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090243},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243}
}

本书其他章节结论