What does Cross-Cultural Contracts and Market Entry conclude, in numbers, about “Incomplete Contracts and Relational Contracts”?
Answer: The conclusion agrees with the theory: the asset should be owned by the party whose investment matters more. In a business led by product and technology, ownership by headquarters brings the surplus to 92 % of the first-best level; in a business led by distribution and licences, the local partner should own it. Joint ownership is the worst in both cases, at 75 % of the first best: each side can veto the other, and as a result neither has enough reason to invest.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal, financial or investment advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 75, 92
| HQ's investment matters more (technology-led product): first-best surplus 2.50 | |
| owner H : investments h | 1.50, l = 0.60, surplus 2.29 (92% of first best) |
| owner L : investments h | 1.20, l = 0.75, surplus 2.15 (86% of first best) |
| owner joint: investments h | 1.00, l = 0.50, surplus 1.88 (75% of first best) |
| local investment matters more (distribution- and licence-led market): first-best surplus 2.50 | |
| owner H : investments h | 0.75, l = 1.20, surplus 2.15 (86% of first best) |
| owner L : investments h | 0.60, l = 1.50, surplus 2.29 (92% of first best) |
| owner joint: investments h | 0.50, l = 1.00, surplus 1.88 (75% of first best) |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Who should own the asset? The Grossman-Hart-Moore property-rights model, numerically.
# Two parties invest before they bargain: H (the foreign headquarters: product, brand, technology,
# investment h) and L (the local partner: distribution, customer and regulator relationships, l).
# Investment costs h^2/2 and l^2/2. Inside the relationship the venture is worth
# V = a*h + b*l.
# If bargaining fails, each party has an outside option that depends on who owns the key asset
# (for example the local operating company holding licences and the customer base). The owner can
# still use part of its own investment with the asset (share 0.5); a non-owner keeps only 0.2 of
# its investment's value. Ex post they split the gain over outside options 50/50 (Nash bargaining),
# so each invests where marginal cost = 1/2 (marginal value inside + marginal outside option).
# Under joint ownership either party can block use of the asset, so neither has an outside option.
def outcome(owner, a, b):
oh = 0.5 if owner == "H" else 0.2 # share of own investment usable outside the relationship
ol = 0.5 if owner == "L" else 0.2
if owner == "joint": # joint ownership: either party can veto use of the asset
oh = ol = 0.0
h = 0.5 * (a + oh * a) # first-order conditions: h = (a + oh*a)/2
l = 0.5 * (b + ol * b)
surplus = a * h + b * l - h * h / 2 - l * l / 2
return h, l, surplus
for a, b, story in ((2.0, 1.0, "HQ's investment matters more (technology-led product)"),
(1.0, 2.0, "local investment matters more (distribution- and licence-led market)")):
first_best = (a * a + b * b) / 2
print(f"{story}: first-best surplus {first_best:.2f}")
for owner in ("H", "L", "joint"):
h, l, s = outcome(owner, a, b)
print(f" owner {owner:5s}: investments h = {h:.2f}, l = {l:.2f}, surplus {s:.2f} ({s / first_best:.0%} of first best)")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry (Version 1.0.1), Chapter 3: Incomplete Contracts and Relational Contracts. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765345 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-016 · v1.0.1 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026016,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.1},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23765345},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Two Business Operating Systems: the Commitment Game and Adaptive Search
- Chapter 2 · Real Options and Optimal Stopping: the Value of a Stop-Loss and the Signal It Sends
- Chapter 4 · The Control Theory of Iteration Speed: Feedback Delay, Gain and Transaction Costs
- Chapter 5 · Institutional Distance, Religious Ethics and Southeast Asia's Plural Markets
- Chapter 6 · The Principal-Agent Problem and Incentives for Local Teams
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-registered Trial