关于「不完全契约与关系型契约」,《跨文化契约与出海博弈》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:结论与理论一致:资产应当归投资更重要的一方所有。产品与技术主导的业务,由总部持有关键资产,合作剩余达到最优水平的 92%;渠道与牌照主导的业务,则应由本地合伙人持有。共同所有在两种情况下都是最差的,只有最优水平的 75%:每一方都可以否决对方,结果每一方都没有足够的投资动力。

数据口径:本书不是法律、财务或投资建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(15 段程序,全部核对)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 75, 92

HQ's investment matters more (technology-led product): first-best surplus 2.50
owner H : investments h1.50, l = 0.60, surplus 2.29 (92% of first best)
owner L : investments h1.20, l = 0.75, surplus 2.15 (86% of first best)
owner joint: investments h1.00, l = 0.50, surplus 1.88 (75% of first best)
local investment matters more (distribution- and licence-led market): first-best surplus 2.50
owner H : investments h0.75, l = 1.20, surplus 2.15 (86% of first best)
owner L : investments h0.60, l = 1.50, surplus 2.29 (92% of first best)
owner joint: investments h0.50, l = 1.00, surplus 1.88 (75% of first best)

核心公式

\[\text{cap} = \frac{\delta}{1-\delta}\,(S - f)\]
查看完整验算程序
# Who should own the asset? The Grossman-Hart-Moore property-rights model, numerically.
# Two parties invest before they bargain: H (the foreign headquarters: product, brand, technology,
# investment h) and L (the local partner: distribution, customer and regulator relationships, l).
# Investment costs h^2/2 and l^2/2. Inside the relationship the venture is worth
#     V = a*h + b*l.
# If bargaining fails, each party has an outside option that depends on who owns the key asset
# (for example the local operating company holding licences and the customer base). The owner can
# still use part of its own investment with the asset (share 0.5); a non-owner keeps only 0.2 of
# its investment's value. Ex post they split the gain over outside options 50/50 (Nash bargaining),
# so each invests where marginal cost = 1/2 (marginal value inside + marginal outside option).
# Under joint ownership either party can block use of the asset, so neither has an outside option.
def outcome(owner, a, b):
    oh = 0.5 if owner == "H" else 0.2       # share of own investment usable outside the relationship
    ol = 0.5 if owner == "L" else 0.2
    if owner == "joint":                    # joint ownership: either party can veto use of the asset
        oh = ol = 0.0
    h = 0.5 * (a + oh * a)                  # first-order conditions: h = (a + oh*a)/2
    l = 0.5 * (b + ol * b)
    surplus = a * h + b * l - h * h / 2 - l * l / 2
    return h, l, surplus

for a, b, story in ((2.0, 1.0, "HQ's investment matters more (technology-led product)"),
                    (1.0, 2.0, "local investment matters more (distribution- and licence-led market)")):
    first_best = (a * a + b * b) / 2
    print(f"{story}: first-best surplus {first_best:.2f}")
    for owner in ("H", "L", "joint"):
        h, l, s = outcome(owner, a, b)
        print(f"   owner {owner:5s}: investments h = {h:.2f}, l = {l:.2f}, surplus {s:.2f} ({s / first_best:.0%} of first best)")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《跨文化契约、实物期权与东南亚出海博弈论》第 3 章「不完全契约与关系型契约」(版本 1.0.1). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765345 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-016 · v1.0.1 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026016,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.1},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23765345},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345}
}

本书其他章节结论