关于「两种商业操作系统:承诺博弈与适应性寻优」,《跨文化契约与出海博弈》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:在情形 A 中,4 次改变几乎排除了守诺型(0.45 降到 0.01),却使机会主义型的概率从 0.10 升到 0.18,接近翻倍。原因不是合伙人多疑,而是对一个看不到原因的观察者来说,适应型与机会主义型的行为看起来一样。在情形 B 中,同样的 4 次改变反而成了「对方确实是按约定适应市场」的有力证据。情形 C 说明这种判断也有容错:一次偏差使机会主义型的概率回到 0.12,并不会让信任一下子崩塌。

数据口径:本书不是法律、财务或投资建议。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(15 段程序,全部核对)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.01, 0.10, 0.12, 0.18, 0.45

A4 changes, reason not verifiable
committed 0.450.01 adaptive 0.45 -> 0.81 opportunist 0.10 -> 0.18
B4 changes, each with the agreed state indicator
committed 0.450.00 adaptive 0.45 -> 1.00 opportunist 0.10 -> 0.00
C as B, but one change came without the indicator
committed 0.450.00 adaptive 0.45 -> 0.87 opportunist 0.10 -> 0.12
查看完整验算程序
# How a local partner decodes a plan change. Three types of foreign team, as the partner sees them:
#   committed   - changes plan in 5 % of months, whatever happens;
#   adaptive    - changes plan when the market state shifts (95 %), almost never otherwise (2 %);
#   opportunist - changes plan in 35 % of months, whenever it privately pays, ignoring the state.
# The state shifts in 30 % of months, so the adaptive team also changes plan in about 30 % of months.
# The partner starts with prior 0.45 / 0.45 / 0.10 and watches 12 months.
PRIOR = {"committed": 0.45, "adaptive": 0.45, "opportunist": 0.10}

def p_change(team, shift):
    if team == "committed":
        return 0.05
    if team == "adaptive":
        return 0.95 if shift else 0.02
    return 0.35

def posterior(months, sees_state):
    """months: list of (shift, change). If the state is not verifiable, the partner averages over it."""
    post = dict(PRIOR)
    for shift, change in months:
        for t in post:
            if sees_state:
                p = p_change(t, shift)
            else:
                p = 0.3 * p_change(t, True) + 0.7 * p_change(t, False)
            post[t] *= p if change else 1 - p
    z = sum(post.values())
    return {t: v / z for t, v in post.items()}

year = [(True, True)] * 4 + [(False, False)] * 8          # 4 shifts, 4 changes, all in shift months
odd = [(True, True)] * 3 + [(True, False)] + [(False, True)] + [(False, False)] * 7
cases = (("A  4 changes, reason not verifiable", year, False),
         ("B  4 changes, each with the agreed state indicator", year, True),
         ("C  as B, but one change came without the indicator", odd, True))
for label, months, sees in cases:
    post = posterior(months, sees)
    print(label)
    print("   " + "   ".join(f"{t} {PRIOR[t]:.2f} -> {post[t]:.2f}" for t in PRIOR))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《跨文化契约、实物期权与东南亚出海博弈论》第 1 章「两种商业操作系统:承诺博弈与适应性寻优」(版本 1.0.1). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765345 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-016 · v1.0.1 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026016,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.1},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23765345},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345}
}

本书其他章节结论